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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MERRILYN SUSAN VARALLO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 930574-CA
Priority No. 15

vs.
FRANCIS V. VARALLO,
Defendant-Appellee.

j

I. INTRODUCTION
Comes now the Appellee, Francis V. Varallo, by and through his
attorneys of record, W. Kevin Jackson and Douglas P. Hoyt, and
respectfully submits the following appellate brief in this matter.
II. STATEMENT OF THE COURT'S JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal and the
cross-appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(i)(1994).
This is an appeal by the plaintiff and a cross appeal by the
defendant from a Decree of Divorce and Judgment entered by the
Second District Court on August 11, 1993.

(R. 187) . The defendant

filed an objection to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of
law and the Decree of Divorce on the 29th day of June, 1993.
post judgment motions were filed by either party.

No

A notice of

appeal was filed by the plaintiff on September 7, 1993. An amended
notice of cross-appeal was filed by the defendant on September 24,
1993.

This court on it own motion consolidated the appeal and the

cross-appeal by an order entered on the 12th day of November, 1993.

III. STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following four (4) issues are presented to this Court by
the

Appellant

Merrilyn

Susan

Varallo

(sometimes

hereinafter

referred to as the "plaintiff") on her direct ,appeal:
1.

Whether or not the plaintiff was entitled to an award of

thirty percent

(30%) of the defendant's

(i.e. her husband's)

disposable military retirement benefits.
2.

Whether or not income should be imputed to the defendant

for purposes of computing alimony and child support.
3.

Whether or not the parties' twenty (20) year old son,

Sean, is in need of continued child support.
4.

Who should be entitled to claim Sean as a dependant for

federal and state income tax purposes.
The following seven (7) issues are presented to this Court by
Francis

V.

Varallo,

also

known

as

"Bob" Varallo

(sometimes

hereinafter referred to as the "defendant), on his cross appeal:
1.
ordering

Whether or not the District Court committed error by
the Defendant, Mr. Varallo, to pay

alimony

to the

Plaintiff in the sum of $500.00 per month, given the earning
capacity of Ms. Varallo and the fact that Mr. Varallo is currently
retired from his military occupation and is not otherwise employed.
2.

Did the District Court commit error by dividing Mr.

Varallo's retirement benefits and giving Ms. Varallo a 30% interest
therein in light of the property division ordered by the court.

-2-

3.

Did the District

Court

commit error in ordering Mr.

Varallo to exercise his Survivor's Benefit Protection enrollment
option to obtain the maximum

coverage

for Ms. Varallo

and by

ordering Mr. Varallo to pay all costs associated with the coverage.
4.

Did the District

Court commit error by ordering Mr.

Varallo to pay one-half (1/2) of all educational expenses of each
of the parties7 children until each child attains the age of 22
years without a specific finding of disability or other unusual
dependency of the adult children.
5.

Did the District

Court commit error by ordering Mr.

Varallo to maintain unchanged his life insurance contracts with the
present carrier in light of the facts of the case and the fact that
the insurance company is currently in receivership.
6.

Whether or not the District Court committed error by not

dividing the plaintiff's pension fund and a Bank of Scotland bond
as part of the marital estate.
7.

Whether or not the state court has jurisdiction to divide

any portion of the defendant's disability benefits.
IV. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
This Court has defined the standard of review for an appeal
from a decree of divorce.

The standard of review that this Court

uses in resolving an appeal of a domestic matter is that the Court
of Appeals will not disturb the findings of fact of the trial court
unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown.
716 P.2d 781 (Utah 1986) .

Burnham v. Burnham,

Greene v. Greene, 751 P.2d 827 (Utah
-3-

App. 1988) cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).

This standard

of

and

review

applies

to

cases

involving

alimony

property

distribution, Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331 (Utah App. 1988),
and child support, Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P. 2d 1055

(Utah App.

1987).
If it is alleged, on appeal, that the District Court made
insufficient findings of fact, the District Court's findings of
fact will be reversed "unless the facts in the record are 'clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor
of the judgment. 7 "

Carlton v. Carlton, 756 P. 2d 86

(Utah App.

1988) citing Action v. J.B. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) .
Issues of law are reviewed by the Court under the correction
of error standard with no special deference being given to the
District Court's ruling on the law.

Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407

(Utah App. 1990), Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472

(Utah App.

1991).
V.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

The determinative statutes for this appeal are as follows: 10
USC §1408, which is set forth in addendum "A".

10 USC §1448, which

is set forth in addendum "B".
Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(i) reads as follows:
11

(2) The
Court
of
Appeals
has
appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory
appeals, over: . . .
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic
relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce,
-4-

annulment, property division, child custody, support,
visitation, adoption, and paternity; . . . "
Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.5(2) reads as follows:
11

(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to
the equivalent of one full-time job."
Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.10 reads as follows:
11

(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or has
graduated from high school during the child's normal and
expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later, the
base child support award is automatically reduced to
reflect the lower base combined child support obligation
shown in the table for the remaining number of children
due child support, unless otherwise provided in the child
support order.
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child
amount derived from the base child support award
originally ordered."
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A,

The Nature of the Case:
This appeal is made by reason of a divorce action filed by

Plaintiff on or about the 21st day of August, 1992.
B.

(R. 1) .

The Course of Proceedings:
In this brief

"Tr." refers to the trial transcript, with

regard to the trial held on February 17 and 18, 1993; "R." refers
to the Court's record of the case.
On or about the 21st day of August, 1992, the plaintiff, Mrs.
Merrilyn Susan Varallo, filed a verified complaint for a divorce in
the

Second

Judicial

District,

County of Davis.

The

verified

complaint sought a divorce from the defendant, Francis V. Varallo,
an alimony award, the division of the marital property, the payment
-5-

of all marital debts by the defendant and the division of the
defendant's military pension.

A non-jury trial, on the merits of

the case, was held before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, on February
17th and 18th, 1993.

When the Court rendered its decision it gave

the plaintiff and the defendant two options as to the division of
the marital estate and the payment of the alimony.
The first option presented by the District Court and rejected
by the plaintiff during the trial was to divide the marital estate
which would include the defendant's retirement payments and his
disability income or benefits.

The plaintiff would receive thirty

percent (30%) of the defendant's retirement benefits in the amount
of $1,267.50 per month.

(Tr. 186) . The plaintiff would then have

to pay alimony to the defendant in the amount of $850.00 per month.
The second option presented by the District Court provided
that

Mr.

Varallo

would

increase

the

Survivor

Benefits

Plan

(hereinafter "SBP") to the maximum level available and he would pay
the monthly cost of the plan or election.

Mr. Varallo would then

pay the plaintiff $500.00 per month in alimony.

(Tr. 187) .

The

plaintiff choose the second option presented by the District Court.
(Tr. 193) .

The defendant agreed to this option based upon the

plaintiff's decision rather than allowing the court to make the
decision and taking the decision away from the parties.
On or about the 11th day of August, 1993 the Court entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree of Divorce.
In the Findings of Fact the trial court specifically found that
-6-

Sean Varallo, the son of the parties, does not have any special
needs which warrant ongoing custody and support.

The court found

that the plaintiff's gross income was in the sum of $3,242.00 per
month and the defendant's gross income was $4,225.00 per month.
Based upon these findings on the parties' respective income the
District
according

Court

ordered

the

the guidelines

defendant

which were

to pay
then

child

support,

in effect, to the

plaintiff in the amount of $401.86 per month.
The District Court further found that the defendant was
capable of being gainfully employed notwithstanding his proven
military

disability

rating.

The

court

recognized

that

the

defendant would probably be unable to find employment at a salary
comparable to his previous salary while he was working with Unisys
and that his prospects for employment may depend on obtaining
vocational training.
The court found that the plaintiff was in need of spousal
support and the defendant was ordered to pay $500.00 per month in
alimony to the plaintiff.

The court further found that the

defendant should pay the plaintiff the sum of $4,250 to reinstate
the plaintiff's retirement fund with the federal government.

The

District Court did not divide the plaintiff's pension benefits as
part of the marital estate.
The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to thirty
percent (30%) of the Defendant's gross military retirement in the
amount of $1,267.50 per month.

The court allowed the parties the
-7-

decision to increase the SBP to the maximum level in lieu of the
3 0% award of gross retirement payments with the defendant paying
the monthly costs of the plan.
VII. STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The defendant attended college at Loyola University in

1958 and obtained a Bachelor of Science degree in Humanities.
2.

The

defendant

successfully

completed

Training Corp while attending college.

Reserve

Officer

Upon his graduating from

college and ROTC the defendant was commissioned a Second Lieutenant
in the United States Army during the month of February, 1958.
3.

The defendant was periodically advanced in rank during

the time of his military service and held the rank of major when he
married the plaintiff.
4.

(Tr. 86).

The defendant had been an active member of the military

for over 12 years prior to the date the parties were married.
(Tr. 86).
5.

The parties were legally and lawfully married on June 26,

1970 in Washington D.C.

the

6.

The plaintiff was working

U.S.

Census

Bureau

when

the

as a government employee at
parties

were

married.

The

plaintiff obtained a job with the United States Army shortly after
the parties were married.
7.

(Tr. 86).

The parties agreed that the plaintiff would quit her job

with the government and devote her time to the keeping of the

-8-

marital residence and the raising of the children of the marriage.
(Tr. 7).
8.

During the course of the marriage the defendant was

involved in military intelligence and in other sensitive and covert
operations throughout the world.
9.

(Tr. 84).

The plaintiff was not employed outside of the home until

some time late in 1987 when she voluntarily began working for the
Defense Nuclear Agency.

(Tr. 49). She then took a job with the

Department of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation in the month of
January, 1990.

(Tr. 31).

The plaintiff was still gainfully

employed by the Department of the Interior at the time of the
trial.
10.

The plaintiff voluntarily made the decision to return to

full time work.

The plaintiff expressed her happiness that the

defendant was able to care for the children at the time the
defendant left the work force.
11.

(Tr. 31).

Three (3) children have been born as of issue to the

parties during the course of the marriage, TO WIT:
born January 18, 1972

Valerie Jean,

now age 22, Sean Thomas, born August 17,

1974 now age 2 0 and Cara Noel, born December 21, 1977, now age 16
and who is the only minor child of the marriage.
12.

The son of the parties, Sean Thomas Varallo, is currently

living with the plaintiff and plans to return to school to obtain
his high school diploma.

Sean testified at trial that if he

decides to apply himself he can succeed at anything.
-9-

(Tr. 153-4).

13.

Sean has an above average I.Q. and received an award for

being the most improved student in Bountiful Junior High School.
(Tr. 150) .
14.

Sean testified that he has no physical or psychological

impairment that would prevent him from pursuing a career or an
appropriate profession.
15.
plaintiff

(Tr. 147-150).

Sean has also considered leaving the residence of the
and

living

with

the

defendant.

The

issue

of

his

permanent residency has not been resolved at this time and the
Court did not make
parent.
16.

an order involving his living with

either

(Tr. 154).
The defendant has retired from the United States Army

after having served in this occupation for approximately thirty
(30) years.

He received an honorable discharge when he retired

from the United State Army.

The defendant, by and through his

military service, has retirement benefits available to him.

He

retired in or about 1988.
17.

The defendant also receives a monthly disability benefit

due to a physical disability he incurred while serving in the army.
(Tr. 28).
18.

The defendant is paid $4,225.00 per month in combined

retirement benefits and disability benefits.
19.

The

defendant

also

has

the

option

of

purchasing

a

Survivors Benefit Plan that would pay the plaintiff 55% of the
defendant's gross monthly retirement payments for the remainder of
-10-

the plaintiff's life.

The plan is optional and can only be entered

into by the defendant.

Pursuant to the second option provided by

the trial court the defendant has obtained the maximum coverage for
the plaintiff.
20.
to

be

The total amount of the Survivor's Benefit Plan allowed

paid

to

the

plaintiff

will

be

reduced

to

35% of

the

defendant's retirement benefits if and when the plaintiff utilizes
the defendant's Social Security benefits which consist of payments
directly to the plaintiff of approximately $1,300.00 per month when
the defendant claims any Social Security benefits.
21.

(Tr. 180).

The plaintiff was awarded the custody of the minor child,

Cara, and was awarded child support in the amount of $410.86 per
month from the defendant.
22.

(Tr. 202).

The defendant was ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of each

child's educational expenses.

These additional payments were to

continue until each child reached the age of 22 years.
amounts are in addition to the court ordered child support.

These
(Tr.

203) .
23.

The plaintiff was awarded the following property by the

trial court:
Item

Value

Pentagon Federal Credit Union Account

$32,572.00

Riggs National Bank account

1,000.00

America First Credit Union Account

8,000.00

Chase Manhattan Account

3,133.00
-11-

Proceeds from the sale of the parties7
Virginia home

143,541.00

TOTAL

$188,246.00.

The plaintiff was awarded all of the property she received as an
inheritance from her mother, even though all monies from the
inheritance were not segregated from the other assets of the
marital estate.

(Tr. 203-204) . The amount of the inheritance was

determined to be $56,536.88 and consisted of a $15,000.00 bond with
the Royal Bank of Scotland, $15,000.00 equity in the Petroleum
Technologies Corporation, $5,261.98 in the Vanguard Money Market
Fund and $21,274.90 in the Dreyfus Money Market Fund. (Plaintiff's
Trail Exhibit No. 1) . The Royal Bank of Scotland Bond is currently
held in a joint account with Susan Varallo and Bob Varallo being
the holders of the bond.

(Tr. 20) . The bond was held in a joint

account because the broker did not have a pay on death option when
the account was initially opened.
24.

Id.

The defendant was awarded the following property by the

court:
Item

Value

Pentagon Federal Credit Union account

$13,733.00

Union Bank of Switzerland account

97,797.00

Army National Bank account

3 0,000.00

Miscellaneous securities

2,000.00

Proceeds from the sale of the parties'
Virginia home
-12-

45,659 . 00

TOTAL

$189,225.00.

(Tr. 203-204).
25.

The plaintiff makes $3,242 per month in gross pay from

her employment with the United States Government.

The defendant

makes $4,225 per month in retirement pay and disability benefits.
The defendant's military retirement pay is $3,734 per month and the
disability benefit is $491.00 per month.
VIII.
1.

(Tr. 194).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Under Utah law a party is awarded alimony after the court

applies a three (3) part test.

This test was announced in Jones v.

Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) . The three (3) parts of this test
are:
A.

The financial conditions and needs of the spouse;

B.

The ability of the spouse to produce a sufficient income

for himself or herself; and
C.

The ability of the other spouse to provide support.

This Court held in Rasband, 752 P.2d at 1333 that:
"An alimony award should, to the extent possible,
equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living
standards and maintain them at a level as close as
possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage.
. . .
Failure to consider these factors
constitutes an abuse of the trial court's discretion."
The trial court erred by awarding the plaintiff alimony in
this case and abused its discretion by failing to consider and
apply the above three (3) factors when the court entered its order
of alimony.

The trial court erred in failing to include the
-13-

plaintiff's separate sources of income in the court's assessment of
the plaintiff's financial situation, the award of the alimony and
the requirement of the payment of child support beyond age 18.
2.

The trial court erred when it ordered the division of the

gross amount of the military retirement benefits and disability
benefits which are being paid to the defendant/appellee.

The trial

court ordered that 3 0% of the gross amount be awarded to the
plaintiff/appellant.

In interpreting the federal law, the United

States Supreme Court clearly held that a state court order can only
divide the retiree's "net" retirement pay. Mansell v. Mansell, 490
US 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 675 (1989).

The state District

Court failed to apply the governing federal law which is setforth
in 10 USC

§1408.

Disability benefits are not subject

to any

division by the state courts.
3.

The trial court cannot impute income to the defendant to

determine the amount of alimony or child support obligations.

The

trial court must base its award of alimony upon the factors that
are presented at the time of the trial and cannot speculate on
future employment or the possibility of future income.

See Rudman

v. Rudman, 812 P. 2d 73 (Utah App. 1991) . No evidence was presented
to

the

trial

court

concerning

the

defendant's

ability

or

opportunity for future employment and the court found that such
earnings would require additional training in any event.
4.
to provide

The trial court also erred when it ordered the defendant
the maximum

coverage
-14-

available under the

Survivors

Benefit Plan. The member of the military and their spouse are the
proper persons to decide if the spouse or children should be
covered

by

the

SBP

and

not

the

trial

Court.

See

10 USC

§1448 (a) (3) . A state court may order participation in the plan but
may not order a specific level of participation.

In this case the

parties agreed that the defendant would provide a minimum amount of
coverage under the SBP and not the maximum amount available.
5.

The trial court's decision with respect to the issues of

the level of child support for the minor child and the tax
deduction allowed to the defendant for Sean Varallo should be
upheld.
6.

The trial court erred with respect to the issues of the

payment of additional educational expenses for the adult children
of the parties when no specific need for the education or training
was shown.
7.
to

It was error for the trial court to order the defendant

maintain

all

present

insurance

policies

inasmuch

as

the

insurance companies were no longer financially secure and it would
be imprudent for the defendant to maintain those insurance policies
when alternative carriers are available.
8.

It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to

order defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $4,250.00 for
reinstatement of the plaintiff's retirement plan while failing to
divide said retirement plan according to the Woodward formula. See
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P. 2d 1431 (Utah 1982) . No findings were
-15-

made as to how the court offset or considered this asset when
dividing the defendant's benefits.
9.

The Bank of Scotland Bond should be divided equally

between the parties as part of the marital estate even though the
plaintiff received the bond through an inheritance.
IX. ARGUMENT
A.

The trial court abused its discretion in awarding
the plaintiff alimony.

The trial court did not sufficiently or properly determine the
plaintiff's need for spousal support in the findings of fact and
conclusions of law.

The law in Utah states that the trial court

must take into consideration the following:

(1) the financial

conditions and needs of the recipient spouse, (2) the recipient's
ability to provide her own income, and (3) the payor spouse's
ability to provide the necessary or desired level or support.
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980), Cox v. Cox, 242
Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (Utah App. 1994) .

The District Court entered

findings of fact on the first two (2) parts of this, test but never
made any determinations about the defendant's ability to pay
support to the plaintiff.

(tr. 198). The District Court did not

enter sufficient findings of facts concerning the plaintiff's need
for support.

It made no determination as to the needs of the

defendant and his ability to earn income in excess of a minimal
standard of living for himself.

-16-

The District Court simply stated that the plaintiff should be
awarded $500.00 per month in alimony. No specific findings of fact
as to the plaintiff's need for spousal support were entered by the
court. A general finding was entered stating that the plaintiff is
in need of support to maintain the standard of living which the
parties enjoyed while they were married.

The District Court made

a general finding as to the monthly expenses of the parties.

The

court did not make any findings of the plaintiff's ability to
provide support for herself with the monthly income she was found
to be earning.

Nor did the District Court take into consideration

the parties' financial condition from other monetary sources, such
as the plaintiff's income from her investments.
The

District

Court

found that

the plaintiff

was making

$3,643.42 per month with reasonable living expenses of $2,496.00
per month.

The defendant was found to be making $4,475.00 per

month from the retirement benefits he receives from the United
States Army and the defendant's monthly living expenses were
determined to be $2,300.00 per month.

(Tr. 195)

The plaintiff

thus has a net income of $1,147.42 per month and the defendant has
a net income, before alimony and child support, of $2,175.0 0 per
month.

The District Court ordered the defendant to pay child

support in the amount of $401.86 per month and alimony of $500.00
per month thus leaving him with $1,273.14 per month in net income.
The plaintiff would then have net income per month of $2,049.28.
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Source of income

Plaintiff

Defendant

Gross monthly income

3,643.42

4, , 4 7 5 . 0 0

less expenses
subtotal

2 , 496.00
1,147.42

2, , 3 0 0 , . 0 0
2, , 1 7 5 . . 0 0

alimony
subtotal

+ 500.00
1,647.42

_ 500. .00
1, , 6 7 5 . . 0 0

child support

+ 401.86

_ 4 0 1 ..86

NET MONTHLY INCOME

2,04 9.28

1,273.14.

Additionally, the defendant was ordered to pay the costs associated
with providing Survivor's Benefit Plan at the maximum rate in lieu
of paying the plaintiff 30% of the defendant's net retirement pay.
It is clear that the plaintiff

is in a much better

financial

position than the defendant, after the District Court entered its
order of
premises

support.
that

This award

the

court

had

also

the

is based on an

right

and

ability

erroneous
to

divide

disability benefits of the defendant.
Any finding of fact that the a spouse is in need of support
should be specific enough for this court to properly review the
District Court's analysis and computation of the award.
has

stated

that

'sufficiently

" [f ] indings

detailed

and

are

include

adequate
enough

only

This Court

if

they

are

subsidiary

facts

to

disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual
issue was reached.'"

Action, 737 P.2d at 999 (Utah 1987), quoting

Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979).

The District Court

failed to make adequate findings of fact to support the decision to
award alimony to the plaintiff.
-18-

The findings of fact are not

specific

enough to show how the court came to its ultimate

conclusion to award alimony to the plaintiff

and the amount

thereof.
This Court needs to be able to review the findings of the
District Court in order to make a proper decision on appeal.

To

properly review the District Court's decision to award alimony
sufficient findings of fact should have been entered that would
show this Court how the District Court made its decision. No such
findings of fact were entered by the District Court.
The District Court did not address the important fact that the
plaintiff has approximately $57,000.00 in liquid assets or near
liquid assets, as valued at the time of the trial, from an
inheritance from her mother's estate and its earnings potential.
The plaintiff was further awarded one-half (1/2) of the marital
estate which is valued at approximately $188,246.00 in liquid
assets.

The Defendant had approximately the same amount from the

marital estate awarded to him in the Decree of Divorce.

The

plaintiff has a greater amount of assets available to her for her
benefit than does the defendant.
The plaintiff did not prove that she was in need of spousal
support from the defendant.

However, this court cannot properly

review this determination because the District Court did not enter
the specific findings of fact that would allow this court to
properly review the matter.
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The issue of spousal support should be returned to the
District Court so that adequate findings of fact may be made as to
the plaintiff's

actual

need

for continuing

support

from the

defendant and his ability to provide the same.
B. The plaintiff should not be entitled to thirty
percent of Bob's disposable retirement benefits.
The plaintiff argues that she should also be entitled to
thirty

(30%) percent of the defendant's disposable retirement

income.

This would amount to a lump sum payment to the plaintiff

of $185,058.00 or a monthly payment to the plaintiff from the
defendant of $1,028.00.

See Appellant's brief at page 17.

The

state District Court failed to properly address this issue in its
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The District Court found that the plaintiff should have been
awarded thirty percent (30%) of the defendant's gross retirement
pay.

The United State Supreme Court has held that only the "net"

or "disposable" retirement pay of United States Military personnel
can be divided in a Decree of Divorce.

Mansell, 490 U.S. at 589,

101 S.Ct. at 2028. The Supreme Court found that the definition for
"disposable" pay is contained directly in the language of 10 USC
§1408 (a) (4).

This section of the United States Code reads as

follows:
"The term "disposable retired pay" means the total
monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled less
amounts which
for

(A) are owed by that member to the United States
previous overpayments of retired pay and for
-20-

recoupments required by law resulting from entitlement to
retired pay;
(B) are deducted from the retired pay of such other
member as a result of forfeitures of retired pay ordered
by a court-martial or as a result of a waiver of retired
pay required by law in order to receive compensation
under title 5 or title 38;
(C) in the case of a member entitled to retired pay
under chapter 61 of this title [10 USC §§1201 et s e q . ] ,
are equal to the amount of retired pay of the member
under that chapter computed using the percentage of the
member's disability on the date when the member was
retired (or the date on which the members' name was
placed on the temporary disability retired list); or
(D) are deducted because of an election under
chapter 73 of this title [10 USC §§1431 et seq.] to
provide an annuity to a spouse or former spouse to whom
payment of a portion of such member's retired pay is
being made pursuant to a court order under his section."
The

District

Court

erroneously

ordered

that

the

receive thirty percent

(30%) of the defendant's gross

pay.

is

The

plaintiff

only

entitled

to

defendant's disposable retirement pay, if any.

a

plaintiff
retirement

portion

of

the

The District Court

failed to make any findings of fact as to what the net pay of the
defendant would be when all lawful deductions are taken out of the
gross retirement pay and the defendant's disability benefits are
excluded from the monthly income and analysis.
The plaintiff argues that the expert introduced at trial gave
an

accurate

actuarial

life

expectancy

tables used by

for

the

defendant

the plaintiff's

based

expert.

The

upon

the

District

Court found that the method used by the plaintiff's expert was too
speculative

to

accurately

determine
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a

present

value

of

the

defendant's retirement fund. The District Court is correct in this
determination. The retirement fund for the defendant will end upon
the defendant's death.

See 10 USC §1408 (d)(4).

This makes the

present value of the defendant's retirement fund too speculative to
determine at any point in time.

The proper way to determine the

present value of any income stream, such as the defendant's
military retirement fund, is to know exactly how long the income
stream lasts.

It is impossible to determine the present value of

an income stream when it is unknown how long the income stream will
last.

If the income stream lasts one period longer or one period

shorter than the amount of time used to determine the present value
of the income stream, the value of the income stream is different
than what it was originally determined to be.
If the defendant dies then the value of the retirement
benefits is nothing.

If the defendant lives for a period of time

longer than the time period used by the expert witness then the
present value is greater than what the plaintiff's expert estimated
it to be.

It is too uncertain to determine a present value of the

defendant's retirement income at this or any time in the future.
If the District Court had ordered a lump sum payment of the
retirement income, as estimated by the plaintiff's expert witness,
it is almost a certainty that one party would be harmed by either
receiving an award that is too small in terms of the actual value
of the retirement benefits or would be paying out too much of the

-22-

marital

estate

to

fulfill

the

court's

order

to

divide

the

defendant's retirement fund.
The District Court determined that one way to solve this
problem would be to provide the plaintiff a type of retirement fund
by having the defendant provide the maximum amount available in the
survivor's benefit plan. This way the plaintiff forgoes receiving
a portion of the defendant's retirement plan at the present time in
order to receive a secured income for the beneficiary upon the
death of the defendant. When the defendant dies the plaintiff will
receive survivor benefits for the remainder of her lifetime. This
benefit will only decrease if the plaintiff begins to take social
security benefits due to her from the defendant's work history. An
offset does not occur for her own earned social security benefits.
The plaintiff is actually gaining financial security in the long
run because she will receive the secured income rather than a
portion of the defendant's retirement fund that will end at the
death of the defendant.
The District Court determined that a more equitable solution
would be found in one of the two options presented by the court to
the parties. The parties both finally choose the option where the
plaintiff would forego the thirty percent of the defendant's net
retirement

pay

and

have

the

defendant

survivors' benefit plan available.

provide

the

maximum

The defendant was ordered to

pay for the costs of increasing the survivor's benefit plan in lieu
of paying the plaintiff thirty percent of the retirement fund. The
-23-

court also ordered the defendant to pay $500.00 per month in
alimony to the plaintiff as part of this option.
The defendant, by providing the maximum survivor's benefits
available, is providing a type of retirement benefit for the
plaintiff.

This is an equitable and fair resolution by the

District Court to the problem of the division of the defendant's
retirement fund.
The District Court acted properly in allowing the defendant to
provide the plaintiff with the maximum survivor's benefit plan,
which provides

for the plaintiff's

future needs, instead of

ordering the defendant to pay thirty percent of the net retirement
benefits.

The District Court's order should be upheld by this

Court and the defendant should keep the survivor's benefit plan at
the current level.
C.

Income for purposes of alimony and child support
should not be imputed to the Defendant.

The plaintiff argues that the District Court should have
imputed income to the defendant in an amount at least equal to the
plaintiff's monthly income.

The plaintiff's assertion of this

argument is wholly unsupported by the evidence.

The plaintiff

relies upon Olson v. Olson, 704 P. 2d 564 (Utah 1985) and Osauthorpe
v. Osguthorpe, 804 P. 2d 530 (Utah App. 1990) in her argument to say
that

the

District

Court

should

have

imputed

income

to

the

defendant. The plaintiff relies upon the statements made in these
decisions that historical income should be used by the court when
-24-

making an award of alimony.

The cases cited by the plaintiff can

easily be distinguished from this case.
The Olson court found that the defendant had a total lack of
income even though he was working.

This finding by the District

Court allowed the court to impute income to the defendant for the
determination
Osauthorpe

of

case

the

alimony

imputed

and

income

to

child

support

the

defendant

awards.
because

The
the

District Court found that the defendant was either overpaid when he
began his career or was underpaid at the time of the trial. Again,
the court made a specific

finding as to why income should be

imputed to the defendant in awarding alimony and child support.

In

this case the District Court has not made any findings of fact as
to why any income should be imputed to the defendant.

Neither did

the plaintiff introduce any evidence at the trial that would allow
the District

Court

to impute

income to the defendant

for any

purpose.
The District Court found that the defendant received a monthly
income in the form of a military retirement and disability income.
The District Court also found that the defendant was unemployed.
There were no findings that would support the District Court's
imputing income to the defendant.
This Court has stated that "... the trial court must make
adequate factual findings on all material issues unless the facts
in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting
only a finding in favor of the judgment.'"
-25-

Rudman, 812 P.2d at

76.

There were no findings of fact by the court as to the

defendant's ability or opportunity to obtain employment comparable
to what he had or enjoyed in the military or with Unisys.

There

were no findings of fact that would support the court in imputing
income to the defendant.
The District Court's finding that the defendant was receiving
a retirement benefit and a disability benefit was sufficient for
the court to award alimony based upon these sources of income. The
plaintiff's appeal does not take into account Utah Code Annotated
§78-45-7.5(2). This section states that for child support purposes
income

from

earned

income

sources

equivalent of one full-time job.

is to be

limited

to the

The defendant's retirement pay

should be considered the equivalent of one full-time job for
purposes of computing child support.

The defendant's retirement

income from the military is sufficient income to base an alimony
and child support award on.

The disability income should be

considered a separate source of income.

The District Court used

the combined retirement fund amount to base the award of support
on.

The District Court acted improperly in using this amount for

the support award.

This Court should uphold the District Court's

decision, except for including the disability benefit amount as part
of the defendant's monthly income used to determine the child
support award, and not impute any income to the defendant.
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D. The District Court's order for maximum coverage
under the Survivor's Benefit Plan should be overturned.
The trial court also erred when it ordered the defendant to
provide the maximum coverage available under the Survivors Benefit
Plan.

The Court lacks the proper power to make an order of this

type under 10 USC §1448(a) (3) (A) .

The member of the military and

their spouse are the proper persons to decide if the spouse or
children

should be

covered by

the SBP and at what

coverage should be at, not the trial Court.

level

the

It could be argued

that a court may order participation in the plan but it may not
order a specific level of participation.
so

that

the payor

and

the payor's

coverage amount should be.

The federal law is set up

spouse determine

what

the

Congress' intent is shown in 10 USC

§1448(a) (3) (A), which reads as follows:
"A married person who is eligible to provide a
standard annuity may not without the concurrence of the
person's spouse elect-(i)

not to participate in the Plan;

(ii) to provide an annuity for the person's spouse
at less than the maximum level; or
(iii) to provide an annuity for a dependent child
but not for the person's spouse."
The parties in this case agreed that the defendant

would

provide a minimum amount of coverage under the SBP and not the
maximum amount available.
with

the provisions

enacted by Congress.

(Tr. 27). This agreement is in accord

of the Survivor's Benefit

Plan as

it was

The defendant should not have been ordered by
-27-

the District Court to provide the maximum amount of coverage when
the parties had already agreed that the defendant would provide a
different
Court's

amount of coverage

order regarding

for the plaintiff.

the Survivor's Benefit

The District
Plan should be

reversed and the parties original agreement for coverage should be
given full credit.

This was a bargained for consideration by the

parties which should not be disturbed on appeal.
E. The trial court's decision with respect
to the issues of child support and the tax
deduction allowed to the defendant
for Sean Varallo should be upheld.
The District Court found that Sean Varallo is not a dependant
for purposes of child support needs.

(Tr. 194). Sean Varallo was

examined by Dr. Chris Wale, a clinical psychologist who was called
to testify on behalf of the plaintiff.

Dr. Wale testified that

Sean had an auditory processing difficulty with some difficulties
in verbal expression and with his memory.

(Tr. 119) .

Dr. Wale

further testified that Sean might have trouble with self-motivation
and would be a good candidate for "vocational rehabilitation."

Dr.

Wale did not know for certain what Sean's motivational level is.
Plaintiff's counsel argued that there was no other evidence to show
that Sean was not in need of further support from his father.
However, this argument is unsupported by the evidence presented at
the time of trial.
Sean Varallo testified at the trial that he does not have any
physical

disabilities.

He

did

testify
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that

he has

an

audio

auditor V iiscnmin.:" . ::
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into ~~-

\^-r" '

] !:

,- thought :i- -;uic ae- ir

;r :ie were --ni^ed -...v.

H-' - " <= - ^^^-ifiec "h^* he can be higiily m u L i v v ^a

once

hp. ran do a good ^ b

made up his mind to do so.
tjie

. -

past

competent
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enjoyed

(Tr. 1 5 3 - 1 5 4 ) .
those

jobs.

to testify about his physical

_•
_ i^

Sean has held jobs
(Tr,

3 <;.

S-

condition and

testified

that he did not: have any physical impairment that would stop him
from obta :i ning a h igl :i school degree : i a j DI:

Tl: i :i s test:! mony :i s :i n

direct conflict to Dr. Wale's testimony.
The

District

:ioi it: i n id Jig

Court

cl :i i I d

demonstrated

found

that

there was

suppor t: f :>:i : Sea i i

special

circumstances

no need

\i ai a ] ] :>.

that

to

There

w< *>i

order
were

no

require

support

payments to continue beyond the statutory p e n u u lor / •• .

-.h i ch

ends w h e n a child, reaches the age of eighteen years
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Utah Code
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- o . -J -

support of dependant children rather than allowing them to become
-29-

dependant on the State."
1978) .

Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d 435

(Utah

The evidence considered in a light most favorable to the

plaintiff does not suggest the child will be dependant on the
state.
In this case the District Court specifically found that Sean
Varallo is not a dependant for child support purposes.

(Tr. 194) .

This finding by the court is specific enough for this court to
properly review this determination under the standard of review
stated above.

No abuse of discretion has been committed by the

District Court when it entered its findings on this issue.
District

The

Court referred to the testimony of the parties, Sean

Varallo and the psychologist to properly make the findings of fact
in support of this decision.
The

plaintiff

argues

that

the

District

Court

abused

its

discretion in allowing the defendant the tax deduction for Sean
Varallo as a dependant.
the District
deduction.

The plaintiff urges this Court to overturn

Court's decision and allow the plaintiff

the tax

The plaintiff relies upon Motes v. Motes, 786 P. 2d 232,

239, (Utah App. 1990) cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990), to
say that the plaintiff should be allowed the tax deduction for Sean
because under the Motes decision the tax deduction should be given
to the parent who provides the "majority of support for the child."
The plaintiff maintains that she is providing virtually all of
the support for Sean.

She conveniently forgets to inform this

Court that the defendant is providing the majority of support for
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the m i n o r daughter, Cara, w h o is still receiving child support fi om,
the defendant

IJn ier t:l le Motes i ati ona] the defendant

si lould 1: e

g i v e n t h e t a x d e d u c t i o n for the m i n o r daughter because he is p a y i n g
the m a j o r i t y of t h e support under the order of the D i s t r i c t C o u r t .
• • : i lit C : 'i n t: foi ind the defer idant: w 01; 1] d be ei it it led to t h e t a x
d e d u c t i o n f o r o n e child and the plaintiff would b e e n t i t l e d to the
tax d e d u c t i o n for the two other children.

See Findings of Fact

N u m b e r 21
If

the

defendant
eirui.

District

t tn

t 1 • ftdu

The D i o L i i

tax deduction
deduction

Court

for

J 01

I In

committed

I inn lm

VMIII

any

error

Varalli

it

in a w a r d i n g
1 1 iimm 1 t e d

1M mil

t C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n awarding t h e defendant
, i^an V a r a l l o and a w a r d i n q t h e p l a i n t i f f
J1 h^i

I wi

1 liildn.Mi

M| I ht» J 1 u 11 1 i d g e

the

the

»-\^ 1

t IIH
tax

siiuuJiJ

In

u p h e l d b y this C o u r t .
F.

T h e D i s t r i c t Court erred when it ordered the
d e f e n d a n t to p a y one-half of the education
e x p e n s e s for the children of the marriage
u n t i l each child reaches the age of
Twenty-two years.

•p^e D i s t r i c t court o r d e r e d the parties to eacr. cay one-half of
the educational
age

c o s t s f o r each child until

.:: twen•: \ - r w".

reve • ~-' ' '

~- "

.!<.'

ye ar s .

i-h^ oh ^ : r e a c h e s the

The I:: •::: 1 c:: "OLrr

•:"mm.:.r e-1

-i making this 01 "•*-

issues p^^v^j-.,. *, .i-;t support for a

...

.:. . :

w —:., ;.., ~ ,

...;

r e a c h e s t h e a g e of e i g h t e e n years or when " .•- ch;lu g r a d u a t e s from
h i gh

s c ho o 1

graduation.

du r i 1 lg

11: 1 a

c h i ] :iJ

S e e U t a h Code A n n o t a t e d §78-^r
-31-

"*

n .:-:e: :'..

_r:r-

court to modify this statutory law the court must make specific and
detailed findings of fact supporting its financial determinations.
"Findings are adequate only if they are 'sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'"
737 P. 2d at 999.

Action,

The District Court made the finding that each

parent was committed to the education of the children.

See

Findings of Fact No. 14. Based solely upon this finding the Court
ordered each parent to pay one-half of the educational expenses for
each child.

Specifically, the parties were to pay for Valerie

Varallo to complete the requirements for her degree at Westminster
College, a private school.

See Findings of Fact No. 14.

The Supreme Court of Utah has stated that it is improper for
a court to compel a parent to assist a child in securing a college
education.

Ferguson v. Ferguson, 578 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1978) . The

Ferguson Court went on to say that a trial court may make such an
order if some unusual circumstance exists. The Ferguson court did
not list any such unusual circumstances as an example that would
allow this type of order.

No such facts exist in this case.

The District Court committed error in its order because the
law states that support, including support so that the child may
obtain a college education, for a child ends when the child reaches
his or her majority.
making this order.

The District Court abused its discretion in
The order of continuing support for education

should be overturned by this court and the support order should
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reflect the law of Utah and have the support terminate when each
child reaches the age of majority.
G

It was error for the District Court to order
the defendant to maintain insurance
policies with an insurance company
in receivership.

The District C :i)urt ordered the defendant to maintain the life
^ n s u r a n c e poxxcrea coverlnq1 th*ij defendant

!'j

\)w\

"»uit

held that if the company winch holds the 1Lte insurance policies
was not viable then the court's order would be to discontinue the
IVIUPI
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I: i lid i ngn ui'i IJIC
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The District Court did not make any specific

'ICJIIMJLJ

MI
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present
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allowed
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j e1 w./ii i unique .
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H. The District Court abused its discretion
when it ordered the defendant to pay one-half
of the cost of restoring the plaintiff's
retirement plan without also dividing the
retirement plan as marital property.
The District Court ordered that all marital property be
divided equally between the parties.

The District Court also

ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $4,250.00
so that the plaintiff could reinstate her government employee's
retirement fund.

However, the Court did not order the division of

the plaintiff's retirement fund as marital property.

It also did

not determine how must the plaintiff's retirement benefits were
accrued prior to the marriage.
When a court makes a division of marital property in a divorce
the

court may

take

into consideration

circumstances to the property.

all of the pertinent

The Court in Woodward stated that

these circumstances "encompass all of the assets of every nature
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever
source derived; and that this includes any such pension fund or
insurance." Woodward, 656 P. 2d at 432. The plaintiff's retirement
fund was obtained from her employment with the federal government
while the parties were married.

(Tr. 7-8) . The portion of her

retirement fund that was earned while the parties were married
should have been included in the marital estate for division by the
District Court.
The District Court abused its discretion when it failed to
properly divide this asset of the marriage.
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This Court should

return the case to the trial court so that the trial court can
properly

divide

the retirement

fund according

to the Woodward

criteria.
I

The Bank of Scotland Bond should be divided
equally between the parties as part of the
marital estate.

During the course ^"p *" n- marriage * .:e -""'aintiff inherited seme
property or m c * * "

' -

di f f erent ban]she had t r i e d

19 - 2 0 ) ,

- - c a r ,r
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.
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. <=? n t ^ s M f i ^ d
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Miaf
-«::::
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...-..^and

•>-- ^ e i e n d a n t ,
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t h e on] y seen i:i
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the bond in a
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.:_- ,..a±i^^:: explained tn<t
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.
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statement
defendant
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She
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marital property.
The Di sti i ct C'-oi irt fa i ] ed t D d :i ^ > :i d e

t l } i s be: -nd betweei i the

parties as part of the marital estate whei i the court entered its
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Decree of Divorce.

The plaintiff did not segregate these funds

from those of the marital estate. If she had intended to do so she
would have bought the bond in her name alone.

The trial court

abused its discretion in not including the Bank of Scotland Bond
with the marital estate.

This Court should remand this issue to

the trial court to make the findings of fact necessary to include
the bond in the marital estate and to divide the proceeds from the
bond equally between the parties.
J.

The District court does not have jurisdiction to
divide the defendant's disablitv benefits
as part of the marital estate.

Under the Act, the state court is still prohibited from
dividing any portion of retirement pay that a veteran waives in
order to receive disability compensation.

Disability benefits of

a veteran are separate property that can not be divided by the
state court.

In Re: Stenauist 582 P.2d 96 (Calif. 1978).

The

District Court divided the defendant's total monthly benefits,
including the disability benefits the defendant receives.
The District court committed an error when it included the
disability benefits as part of the defendant's monthly divisible
income.

This Court should return the issue of the defendant's

monthly income to the District court for a determination of the
amount that is divisible for support purposes.
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X

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE the defendant in this matter respectfully requests
that:

.

:
r:.:.

*" " ' h~- ~; strict

order for that couii to

B.

the issue of alimony

in

peio.^ determine if alimony should be

..her oartv ace-.: :..na

paid

Court

to t-he Jones analysis;

Direct the District Court to amend the Decree of Divorce

£ Q conform the division of the def»jn< lai ii ' :: i ^f i r^Tn^nt ini'ume t : tl le
current law;
C.
defendant

Deny the plaintiff's demand that income be imputed to the
s : • that

tl le plai nt :

• ha « =

-

eater

amount

• :: f

a] imony and child support;
D

Overturn the District Court's order for the defendant '

obtazi i i and pa;\, f ::: :i : tl le n: ta :;: :::i i i: n IIII ] e v e] • of the Sui: v i v 0:1 : s Bei lef it: Pi an
available to the defendant;
E.

Uphold the District Court's order allowing the defendant

the tax deduction for Sean Varallo and not having the defendant pay
child support to the plaintiff for Sean;
p^

Overturn the District court's oxuer c:

av-ient for the

college educational expenses for the parties ch: ire:;;
G.
nia i n t a i i i

0verturn the District Court' s •: ;i~ r zhar.
:i ns i irance

coverage

v

conservatorship;
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•; he def endant

•• e

- *ipan^ /

i i1

H.

Return the issue of the division of the marital property

to the District Court to make a full division of marital property
including the plaintiff's pension fund; and
I.

Return the issue of the Bank of Scotland Bond to the

District Court so that proper findings of fact as to the bond being
marital property can be entered by the court.
DATED this 26th day of September, 1994
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON
?
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36 months (whether or not consecutive) of active duty as a membei of a
uniformed service.
(Added Sept. 8, 198U, P. L. 96-342, Title VIII, § 813(a)(1), 94 Stat. 1100;
Dec. 12, 1980, P. L. 96-513, Title I, § 113(c), Title V, Part A, §501(21),
Part B, § 511(53), 94 Stat 2877, 2908, 2925.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Amendments:
1980. Act Dec. 12, 1980 (effective upon enactment on 12/12/80, as
provided by § 701(b)(3) of such Act, which appears as 10 USCS § 101
note), in subsec. (a)(1), substituted "after September 7, 1980" for "on
or after the date of the enactment of the Department of Defense
Authorization Act, 1981".
Such Act further (effective 9/15/81, as provided by § 701(a) of such
Act, which appears as 10 USCS § 101 note), in subsec. (b)(4) inserted
"633, 634, 635, 636, 1251,"; in subsec. (d)(1) substituted "or 6383" for
"6381, 6383, 6390, 6394, 6396, 6398, or 6400".
Other provisions:
Effective date of 1980 amendment. Act Dec. 12, 1980, P.L. 96-513,
Title VII, § 701(a), 94 Stat. 2955, provided that the amendment made
to this section "shall take effect on September 15, 1981", except as
provided in § 701(b)(1) of such Act Dec. 12, 1980, which appears as 10
USCS § 101 note.
CROSS REFERENCES:
This section is referred to in 10 USCS §§ 1401, 1402, 1402a, 3991, 3992,
6151, 6322, 6323, 6325, 6326, 6330, 6383, 8991, 8992; 14 USCS §423; 33
USCS § 853o; 42 USCS §§ 211, 212.
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
Erroneous payments of basic pay are not
includable in computation of service member's
retirement pay base; provision that retired pay
base is computed on basic pay *""i eceived" is

§ 1408, Payment
court orders

limited to basic pay service member was legally
entitled to receive. (1983) 62 Op Comp Gen p
157.

compliance

(a) In this section:
(1) "Court" means—
(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of any State, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American
Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands;
(B) any court of the United States (as defined in section
28 [28 USCS § 451]) having competent jurisdiction; and
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(C) any court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign country with
which the United States has an agreement requiring the United States
to honor any court order of such country.
(2) "Court order" means a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation issued by a court, or a court ordered, ratified,
or approved property settlement incident to such a decree (including a
final decree modifying the terms of a previously issued decree of divorce,
dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, or a court ordered, ratified,
or approved property settlement incident to such previously issued
decree), which—
(A) is issued in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction of that
court;
(B) provides for—
(i) payment of child support (as defined in section 462(b) of the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C 662(b)) [42 USCS § 662(b)]);
(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in section 462(c) of the Social
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 662(c)) [42 USCS § 662(c)]); or
(iii) division of property (including a division of community property); and
(C) in the case of a division of property, specifically provides for the
payment of an amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of
disposable retired or retainer pay, from the disposable retired or
retainer pay of a member to the spouse or former spouse of that
member.
(3) "Final decree" means a decree from which no appeal may be taken
or from which no appeal has been taken within the time allowed for
taking such appeals under the laws applicable to such appeals, or a
decree from which timely appeal has been taken and such appeal has
been finally decided under the laws applicable to such appeals.
(4) "Disposable retired or retainer pay" means the total monthly retired
or retainer pay to which a member is entitled (other than the retired pay
of a member retired for disability under chapter 61 of this title [10
USCS §§ 1201 et seq.]) less amounts which—
(A) are owed by that member to the United States;
(B) are required by law to be and are deducted from the retired or
retainer pay of such member, including fines and forfeitures ordered
by courts-martial, Federal employment taxes, and amounts waived in
order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38 [5 USCS §§101
et seq.; 38 USCS §§ 101 et seq.];
(C) are properly withheld for Federal, State, or local income tax
purposes, if the withholding of such amounts is authorized or required by law and to the extent such amounts withheld are not
greater than would be authorized if such member claimed all dependents to which he was entitled;
(D) are withheld under section 3402(f) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 (26 U.S.C. 3402(i)) [26 USCS § 3402(i)] if such member
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presents evidence of a tax obligation which supports such withholding;
(E) are deducted as Government life insurance premiums (not including amounts deducted for supplemental coverage); or
(F) are deducted because of an election under chapter 73 of this title
[10 USCS §§ 1431 et seq.] to provide an annuity to a spouse or
former spouse to whom payment of a portion of such member's
retired or retainer pay is being made pursuant to a court order under
this section.
(5) "Member" includes a former member.
(6) "Spouse or former spouse" means the husband or wife, or former
husband or wife, respectively, of a member who, on or before the date of
a court order, was married to that member.
(b) For the purposes of this section—
(1) service of a court order is effective if—
(A) an appropriate agent of the Secretary concerned designated for
receipt of service court orders under regulations prescribed pursuant
to subsection (h) or, if no agent has been so designated, the Secretary
concerned, is personally served or is served by certified or registered
mail, return receipt requested;
(B) the court order is regular on its face;
(C) the court order or other documents served with the court order
identify the member concerned and include, if possible, the social
security number of such member; and
(D) the court order or other documents served with the court order
certify that the rights of the member under the Soldiers' and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C. App. 501 et seq.) [50 USCS Appx
§§ 501 et seq.] were observed; and
(2) a court order is regular on its face if the order—
(A) is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(B) is legal in form; and
(C) includes nothing on its face that provides reasonable notice that it
is issued without authority of law.
(c)(1) Subject to the limitations of this section, a court may treat disposable
retired or retainer pay payable to a member for pay periods beginning
after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the member or as
property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of
the jurisdiction of such court.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section does not
create any right, title, or interest which can be sold, assigned, transferred, or otherwise disposed of (including by inheritance) by a spouse
or former spouse.
(3) This section does not authorize any court to order a member to
apply for retirement or retire at a particular time in order to effectuate
any payment under this section.
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(4) A court may not treat the disposal retired or retainer pay of a
member in the manner described in paragraph (1) unless the court has
jurisdiction over the member by reason of (A) his residence, other than
because of military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the court,
(B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or (C) his
consent to the jursidiction of the court.
(d)(1) After effective service on the Secretary concerned of a court order
providing for the payment of child support or alimony or, with respect
to a division of property, specifically providing for the payment of an
amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay from a member to the
spouse or a former spouse of the member, the Secretary shall make
payments (subject to the limitations of this section) from the disposable
retired or retainer pay of the member to the spouse or former spouse in
an amount sufficient to satisfy the amount of child support and alimony
set forth in the court order and, with respect to a division of property,
in the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay specifically provided
for in the court order. In the case of a member entitled to receive retired
or retainer pay on the date of the effective service of the court order,
such payments shall begin not later than 90 days after the date of
effective service. In the case of a member ^iot entitled to receive retired
or retainer pay on the date of the effective service of the court order,
such payments shall begin not later than 90 days after the date on which
the member first becomes entitled to retired or retainer pay.
(2) If the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are to be made
under this section was not married to the member for a period of 10
years or more during which the member performed at least 10 years of
service creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retired or
retainer pay, payments may not be made under this section to the extent
that they include an amount resulting from the treatment by the court
under subsection (c) of disposable retired or retainer pay of the member
as property of the member or property of the member and his spouse.
(3) Payments under this section shall not be made more frequently than
once each month, and the Secretary concerned shall not be required to
vary normal pay and disbursement cycles for retired or retainer pay in
order to comply with a court order.
(4) Payments from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member
pursuant to this section shall terminate in accordance with the terms of
the applicable court order, but not later than the date of the death of
the member or the date of the death of the spouse or former spouse to
whom payments are being made, whichever occurs first.
(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1) provides for a division of
property (including a division of community property) in addition to an
amount of child support or alimony or the payment of an amount of
disposable retired or retainer pay as the result of the court's treatment of
such pay under subsection (c) as property of the member and his spouse,
the Secretary concerned shall pay (subject to the limitations of this
section) from the disposable retired or retainer pay of the member to the
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spouse or former spouse of the member, any part of the amount payable
to the spouse or former spouse under the division of property upon
effective service of a final court order of garnishment of such amount
from such retired or retainer pay.
(e)(1) The total amount of the disposable retired or retainer pay of a
member payable under subsection (d) may not exceed 50 percent of such
disposable retired or retainer pay.
(2) In the event of effective service of more than one court order which
provide for payment to a spouse and one or more former spouses or to
more than one former spouse the disposable retired or retainer pay of
the member shall be used to satisfy (subject to the limitations of
paragraph (1)) such court orders on a first-come, first-served basis. Such
court orders shall be satisfied (subject to the limitations of paragraph
(1)) out of that amount of disposable retired or retainer pay which
remains after the satisfaction of all court orders which have been
previously served.
(3)(A) In the event of effective service of conflicting court orders under
this section which assert to direct that different amounts be paid
during a month to the same spouse or former spouse of the same
member, the Secretary concerned shall—
(i) pay to that spouse from the member's disposable retired or
retainer pay the least amount directed to be paid during that
month by any such conflicting court order, but not more than the
amount of disposable retired or retainer pay which remains available for payment of such courts orders based on when such court
orders were effectively served and the limitations of paragraph (1)
and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); (ii) retain an amount of disposable retired or retainer pay that is
equal to the lesser of—
(I) the difference between the largest amount required by any
conflicting court order to be paid to the spouse or former spouse
and the amount payable to the spouse or former spouse under
clause (i); and
(II) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay which
remains available for payment of any conflicting court order
based on when such court order was effectively served and the
limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph
(4); and
(hi) pay to that member the amount which is equal to the amount
of that member's disposable retired or retainer pay (less any
amount paid during such month pursuant to legal process served
under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) [42
USCS § 659] and any amount paid during such month pursuant to
court orders effectively served under this section, other than such
conflicting court orders) minus—
314

R E T I R E D PAY COMPUTATION

10 USCS § 1408

(I) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay paid under
clause (i); and
(II) the amount of disposable retired or retainer pay retained
under clause (ii).
(B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the amount retained under
clause (ii) of subparagraph (A) until such time as that Secretary is
provided with a court order which has been certified by the member
and the spouse or former spouse to be valid and applicable to the
retained amount. Upon being provided with such an order, the
Secretary shall pay the retained amount in accordance with the order.
(4)(A) In the event of effective service of a court order under this
section and the service of legal process pursuant to section 459 of the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) [42 USCS § 659], both of which
provide for payments during a month from the same member,
satisfaction of such court orders and legal process from the retired or
retainer pay of the member shall be on a first-come, first-served basis.
Such court orders and legal process shall be satisfied out of moneys
which are subject to such orders and legal process and which remain
available in accordance with the limitations of paragraph (1) and
subparagraph (B) of this paragraph during such month after the
satisfaction of all court orders or legal process which have been
previously served.
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount of
the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member payable by the
Secretary concerned under all court orders pursuant to this section
and all legal processes pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security
Act (42 U.S.C. 659) [42 USCS § 659] with respect to a member may
not exceed 65 percent of the disposable retired or retainer pay payable
to such member.
(5) A court order which itself or because of previously served court
orders provides for the payment of an amount which exceeds the
amount of disposable retired or retainer pay available for payment
because of the limit set forth in paragraph (1), or which, because of
previously served court orders or legal process previously served under
section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) [42 USCS § 659],
provides for payment of an amount that exceeds the maximum amount
permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4),
shall not be considered to be irregular on its face solely for that reason.
However, such order shall be considered to be fully satisfied for
purposes of this section by the payment to the spouse or former spouse
of the maximum amount of disposable retired or retainer pay permitted
under paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4).
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member of
liability for the payment of alimony, child support, or other payments
required by a court order on the grounds that payments made out of
disposable retired or retainer pay under this section have been made in
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the maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph
(B) of paragraph (4). Any such unsatisfied obligation of a member may
be enforced by any means available under law other than the means
provided under this section in any case in which the maximum amount
permitted under paragraph (1) has been paid and under section 459 of
the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C 659) [42 USCS § 649] in any case in
which the maximum amount permitted under subparagraph (B) of
paragraph (4) has been paid.
(f)(1) The United States and any officer or employee of the United States
shall not be liable with respect to any payment made from retired or
retainer pay to any member, spouse, or former spouse pursuant to a
court order that is regular on its face if such payment is made in
accordance with this section and the regulations prescribed pursuant to
subsection (h).
(2) An officer or employee of the United States who, under regulations
prescribed pursuant to subsection (h), has the duty to respond to
interrogatories shall not be subject under any law to any disciplinary
action or civil or criminal liability or penalty for, or because of, any
disclosure of information made by him' in carrying out any of his duties
which directly or indirectly pertain to answering such interrogatories.
(g) A person receiving effective service of a court order under this section
shall, as soon as possible, but not later than 30 days after the date on
which effective service is made, send a written notice of such court order
(together with a copy of such order) to the member affected by the court
order at his last known address.
(h) The Secretaries concerned shall prescribe uniform regulations for the
administration of this section.
(Added Sept. 8, 1982, P. L. 97-252, Title X, § 1002(a), 96 Stat. 730; Oct.
19, 1984, P. L. 98-525, Title VI, Part E, § 643(a)-(d), 98 Stat. 2547.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Effective date of section:
Act Sept. 8, 1982, P. L. 97-252, Title X, § 1006, 96 Stat. 737, which
appears as a note to this section, provided that this section, as added
by such Act, is effective on thefirstday of thefirstmonth which begins
more than one hundred and twenty days after enactment on Sept. 8,
1982.
Amendments:
1984. Act Oct. 19, 1984, in subsec. (a)(2)(C), inserted "in the case of a
division of property,"; in subsec. (b)(1)(C), inserted ", if possible,"; in
subsec. (d), in para. (1), substituted "After effective service on the
Secretary concerned of a court order providing for the payment of
child support or alimony or, with respect to a division of property,
specifically providing for the payment of an amount of the disposable
retired or retainer pay from a member to the spouse or a former spouse
of the member, the Secretary shall make payments (subject to the
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limitations of this section) from the disposable retired or retainer pay of
the member to the spouse or former spouse in an amount sufficient to
satisfy the amount of child support and alimony set forth in the court
order and, with respect to a division of property, in the amount of
disposable retired or retainer pay specifically provided for in the court
order." for "After effective service on the secretary concerned of a
court order with respect to the payment of a portion of the retired or
retainer pay of a member to the spouse or a former spouse of the
member, the Secretary shall, subject to the limitations of this section,
make payments to the spouse or former spouse in the amount of the
disposable retired or retainer pay of the member specifically provided
for in the court order/*, in para. (5), substituted "child support or
alimony or the payment of an amount of disposable retired or retainer
pay as the result of the court's treatment of such pay under subsection
(c) as property of the member and his spouse, the Secretary concerned
shall pay (subject to the limitations of this section) from the disposable
retired or retainer pay of the member to the spouse or former spouse of
the member, any part" for "disposable retired or retainer pay, the
Secretary concerned shall, subject to the limitations of this section, pay
to the spouse or former spouse of the member, from the disposable
retired or retainer pay of the member, any part"; and in subsec. (e), in
para. (2), substituted ", the disposable retired or retainer pay of the
member" for "from the disposable retired or retainer pay of a member,
such pay", in para. (3)(A), in the introductory matter, deleted "from
the disposable retired or retainer pay" following "former spouse", in cl.
(i), substituted "from the member's disposable retired or retainer pay
the least amount" for "the least amount of disposable retired or
retainer pay", in cl. (ii)(I), deleted "of retired or retainer pay" following "largest amount", in para. (4)(A), deleted "the retired or retainer
pay o f following "month from", and substituted "satisfaction of such
court orders and legal process from the retired or retainer pay of the
member shall be" for "such court orders and legal process shall be
satisfied", and in para. (5), deleted "of disposable retired or retainer
pay" in two places following "payment of an amount", and substituted
"disposable retired or retainer pay" for "such pay" following "which
exceeds the amount of.
Other provisions:
Commissary and exchange privileges. Act Sept. 8, 1982, P. L. 97-252,
Title X, § 1005, 96 Stat. 737, effective on the first day of the first
month which begins more than 120 days after enactment on Sept. 8,
1982, as provided by U 1006(a) of such Act, which appears as 10 USCS
§ 1408 note, provided: "The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such
regulations as may be necessary to provide that an unremarried former
spouse described in subparagraph (F)(i) of section 1072(2) of title 10,
United States Code [10 USCS § 1072(2)(F)(i)] (as added by section
1004), is entitled to commissary and post exchange privileges to the
same extent and on the same basis as the surviving spouse of a retired
member of the uniformed services.".
Effective dates and transition of amendments by Act Sept. 8, 1982;
application of subsec. (d). Act Sept 8, 1982, P. L. 97-252, Title X,
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§ 1006, 96 Stat. 737; Sept. 24, 1983, P. L. 98-94, Title IX, Part D,
§ 941(c)(4), 97 Stat. 654; Oct. 19, 1984, P. L. 98-525, Title VI, Part E,
§ 645(b), 98 Stat. 2549, effective Jan. 1, 1985, as provided by § 645(d)
in part of such Act, which appears as 10 USCS § 1072 note, provided:
"(a) The amendments made by this title [which, among other things,
enacted this section; for full classification, consult USCS Tables volumes] shall take effect on the first day of the first month which begins
more than one hundred and twenty days after the date of the enactment of this title [enacted Sept. 8, 1982].
"(b) Subsection (d) of section 1408 of title 10, United States Code
[subsec. (d) of this section], as added by section 1002(a), shall apply
only with respect to payments of retired or retainer pay for periods
beginning on or after the effective date of this title [subsec, (a) of this
note], but without regard to the date of any court order. However, in
the case of a court order that became final before June 26, 1981,
payments under such subsection may only be made in accordance with
such order as in effect on such date and without regard to any
subsequent modifications.
"(c) The amendments made by section 1003 of this title [10 USCS
§§ 1447, 1448 and 1450] shall apply to persons who become eligible to
participate in the Survivor Benefit Plan provided for in subchapter II of
chapter 73 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.],
before, on, or after the effective date of such amendments [subsec. (a)
of this note].
"(d) The amendments made by section 1004 of this title [10 USCS
§§ 1072, 1076 and 1086] and the provisions of section 1005 of this title
[note to this section] shall apply in the case of any former spouse of a
member or former member of the uniformed services whether the final
decree of divorce, dissolution, or annulment of the marriage of the
former spouse and such member or former member is dated before, on,
or after February 1, 1983.
"(e) For the purposes of this section—
"(1) the term 'court order' has the same meaning as provided in
section 1408(a)(2) of title 10, United States Code [subsec. (a)(2) of
this section] (as added by section 1002 of this title);
"(2) the term 'former spouse' has the same meaning as provided in
section 1408(a)(6) of such title [subsec. (a)(6) of this section] (as
added by section 1002 of this title); and
"(3) the term 'uniformed services* has the same meaning as provided
in section 1072 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS § 1072].".
Application of Oct. 19, 1984 amendments. Act Oct. 19, 1984, P. L. 98525, Title VI, Part E, § 643(e), 98 Stat. 2548, provides: "The amendments made by this section [amending this section] shall apply with
respect to court orders for which effective service (as described in
section 1408(b)(1) of title 10, United States Code [subsec. (b)(1) of this
section], as amended by subsection (b) of this section) is made on or
after the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted Oct. 19, 1984].".
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Establishment of policy and authorization for direct payments to former
spouse of member of armed forces from retired pay in response to courtorder alimony, child support, or division of property, 32 CFR Part 63.
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This section is referred to in 10 USCS § 1447.
RESEARCH GUIDE
Am JUT:
24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation § 909.

INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
VERALEX™: Cases and annotations referred to herein can be further
researched through the VERALEX electronic retrieval system's two services, Auto-Cite® and SHOWME™. Use Auto-Cite to check citations for
form, parallel references, prior and later history, and annotation references. Use SHOWME to display the full text of cases and annotations.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Generally
Purpose
Retroactivity
Pay subject to apportionment and direct payment
5. 10-year marriage requirement

before divorce court in 1966 and was not altered
by divorce decree. Casas v Thompson (1985, 4th
Dist) 111 Cal App 3d 458, 217 CaJ Rptr 471.
Division of value by state Family Court of
right of United States Public Health veterinarian
to retire and receive benefits does not violate 10
USCS § 1408. Wallace v Wallace (1984) 5 Hawaii App 55, 677 P2d 966.
Section 1048(c)(1) does not mandate that military retirement pension be shared by recipient
and recipient's former spouse; it only authorizes
division, and leaves to state courts decision regarding whether any allocation is to be made. Re
Marriage of Habermehl (1985, 5th Dist) 135 111
App 3d 105, 89 111 Dec 939, 481 NE2d 782.
Former Spouses' Protection Act (10 USCS
§ 1408) allowing courts to consider retirement
pay in fashioning divorce settlements permits but
does not command state courts to consider military retirement benefit as marital property; Act
provides power to each state to deal with military pensions in manner in which it had previously treated them or chooses to treat them in
future. Koenes v Koenes (1985, Ind App) 478
NE2d 1241.
Prior judgment awarding approximately onehalf of military retiree's future benefits is res
judicata, notwithstanding subsequent decision by
United States Supreme Court in McCarty v
McCarty (1981) 453 US 210, 69 L Ed 2d 589,
101 S Ct 2728, 2 EBC 1502 (superseded by
statute as stated in Chase v Chase (Alaska) 662
P2d 944) and (superseded by statute as stated in

1. Generally
Requirement in predecessor to 10 USCS
§ 1448(a) that spouse be notified if person eligible to participate in plan elects not to participate
applies only to service member who is automatically enrolled in Survivor Benefit Plan because
he retires on or after effective date of § 1448;
requirement does not apply with respect to service member who was already entitled to retired
or retainer pay and who was permitted by Congress but declined to elect to participate in Plan.
Passaro v United States (1985, CA F Q 774 F2d
456.
Trial court erred in declaring military pension
to be husband's separate property, notwithstanding that Uniformed Services Former Spouse's
Protection Act (10 USCS § 1408) gives each
state power to deal with military pensions as it
sees fit. In re Marriage of Sarles (1983, 4th Dist)
143 Cal App 3d 24, 191 Cal Rptr 514.
Fact that § 1408 is effective February 1, 1983
does nor bar action by former wife, divorced
from serviceman in 1966, for community interest
in serviceman's military retirement pension,
where former wife does not seek to modify or
reopen 1966 judgment, and where her action is
independent one to divide asset which was not
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"(c) Computation of high-three average. (1) Formula. For the purposes of this section, a
member's high-three average is the amount equal to—
"(A) the total amount of monthly basic pay to which the member was entitled for the
member's high-36 months, divided by
"(B) 36.
"(2) High-36 months defined. (A) General rule. A member's high-36 months are the 36
months out of all the months of active duty served by the member as a member of a
uniformed service for which the monthly basic pay to which the member was entitled
was the highest.
"(B) Rule for non-regular service retirees. In the case of a member who is entitled to
retired pay under section 1204 or 1205 of this title or under chapter 67 of this title, a
member's high-36 months are the 36 months out of all the months the member was
a member of a uniformed service before becoming entitled to retired pay for which
the monthly basic pay to which the member would have been entitled had he served
on active duty during those months was the highest.".
Such Act further redesignated former subsec. (d) as subsec. (e); added new subsecs* (c) and
(d); and deleted former subsecs. (e)-(g), which read:
"(e) Special rules for short-term disability retirees. (1) Members entitled to retired pay under
section 1201 or 1202. In the case of a member who—
"(A) is entitled to retired pay under section 1201 or 1202 of this title; and
"(B) served on active duty for less than 36 months, the months (including any fraction
thereof) that the member served on active duty shall be deemed to be the member's
high-36 months.
"(2) Members entitled to retired pay under section 1204 or 1205. In the case of a member
who—
"(A) is entitled to retired pay under section 1204 or 1205 of this title; and
"(B) was a member of a uniformed service for less than 36 months, the months
(including any fraction thereof) that the member was such a member shall be deemed
to be the member's high-36 months.
"(f) Special rule for members retiring with non-regular service. (1) Disability retirement. In
the case of a member of a uniformed service who is entitled to retired pay under section 1204
or 1205 of this title (relating to members on active duty for 30 days or less), the high-36
average is determined as if the member served on active duty and was entitled to basic pay
for the member's high-36 months.
"(2) Chapter 67 retirement. In the case of a person who is entitled to retired pay under
section 1331 of this title (relating to retired pay for non-regular service), the person's
high-36 average is determined as if the person served on active duty and was entitled to
basic pay for the person's high-36 months.
"(g) Definition. In this section, the term 'years of creditable service' means the number of
years of service creditable to a member in computing the member's retired or retainer pay
(including V12 of a year for each full month of service that is in addition to the number of
full years of service of the member).".
§ 1408.

Payment of retired or retainer pay in compliance with court orders

(a) Definitions. In this section:
(1) The term "court" means—
(A) any court of competent jurisdiction of any State, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands;
(B) any court of the United States (as denned in section 451 of title 28) having competent
jurisdiction; and
(C) any court of competent jurisdiction of a foreign country with which the United States
has an agreement requiring the United States to honor any court order of such country.
(2) The term "court order" means a final decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal
separation issued by a court, or a court ordered, ratified, or approved property settlement
incident to such a decree (including a final decree modifying the terms of a previously issued
decree of divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, or a court ordered, ratified,
or approved property settlement incident to such previously issued decree), which—
(A) is issued in accordance with the laws of the jurisdiction of that court;
(B) provides for—
(i) payment of child support (as defined in section 462(b) of the Social Security Act
(42 U.S.C. 662(b)));
(ii) payment of alimony (as defined in section 462(c) of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. 662(c))); or
(iii) division of property (including a division of community property); and
(C) in the case of a division of property, specifically provides for the payment of an
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amount, expressed in dollars or as a percentage of disposable retired pay, from the
disposable retired pay of a member to the spouse or former spouse of that member.
(3) The term "final decree" means a decree from which no appeal may be taken or from
which no appeal has been taken within the time allowed for taking such appeals under the
laws applicable to such appeals, or a decree from which timely appeal has been taken and
such appeal has been finally decided under the laws applicable to such appeals.
(4) The term "disposable retired pay" means the total monthly retired pay to which a
member is entitled less amounts which—
(A) are owed by that member to the United States for previous overpayments of retired
pay and for recoupments required by law resulting from entitlement to retired pay;
(B) are deducted from the retired pay of such member as a result of forfeitures of retired
pay ordered by a court-martial or as a result of a waiver of retired pay required by law
in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38;
(Q in the case of a member entitled to retired pay under chapter 61 of this title [10
USCS §§ 1201 et seq.], are equal to the amount of retired pay of the member under that
chapter computed using the percentage of the member's disability on the date when the
member was retired (or the date on which the member's name was placed on the
temporary disability retired list); or
(D) are deducted because of an election under chapter 73 of this title [10 USCS §§ 1431
et seq J to provide an annuity to a spouse or former spouse to whom payment of a portion
of such member's retired pay is being made pursuant to a court order under this section.
(E), (F) [Redesignated]
(5) The term "member" includes a former member entitled to retired pay under section
1331 of this title.
(6) The term "spouse or former spouse" means the husband or wife, or former husband or
wife, respectively, of a member who, on or before the date of a court order, was married to
that member.
(7) The term "retired pay" includes retainer pay.
(b) Effective service of process. For the purposes of this section—
(1) service of a court order is effective if—
(A) an appropriate agent of the Secretary concerned designated for receipt of service
court orders under regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (i) or, if no agent has
been so designated, the Secretary concerned, is personally served or is served by certified
or registered mail, return receipt requested;
(B) the court order is regular on its face;
(Q the court order or other documents served with the court order identify the member
concerned and include, if possible, the social security number of such member; and
(D) the court order or other documents served with the court order certify that the
rights of the member under the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (50 U.S.C.
App. 501 et seq.) were observed; and
(2) a court order is regular on its face if the order—
(A) is issued by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(B) is legal in form; and
(Q includes nothing on its face that provides reasonable notice that it is issued without
authority of law.
(c) Authority for court to treat retired pay as property of the member and spouse. (1) Subject
to the limitations of this section, a court may treat disposable retired pay payable to a
member for pay periods beginning after June 25, 1981, either as property solely of the
member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the
jurisdiction of such court A court may not treat retired pay as property in any proceeding
to divide or partition any amount of retired pay of a member as the property of the member
and the member's spouse or former spouse if a final decree of divorce, dissolution,
annulment, or legal separation (including a court ordered, ratified, or approved property
settlement incident to such decree) affecting the member and the member's spouse or former
spouse (A) was issued before June 25, 1981, and (B) did not treat (or reserve jurisdiction to
treat) any amount of retired pay of the member as property of the member and the member's
spouse or former spouse.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this section does not create any right, title,
or interest which can be sold, assigned, transferred, or otherwise disposed of (including by
inheritance) by a spouse or former spouse. Payments by the Secretary concerned under
subsection (d) to a spouse or former spouse with respect to a division of retired pay as the
property of a member and the member's spouse under this subsection may not be treated as
amounts received as retired pay for service in the uniformed services.
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(3) This section does not authorize any court to order a member to apply for retirement or
retire at a particular time in order to effectuate any payment under this section.
(4) A court may not treat the disposable retired pay of a member m the manner described
in paragraph (1) unless the court has jurisdiction over the member by reason of (A) his
residence, other than because of military assignment, in the territorial jurisdiction of the
court, (B) his domicile in the territorial jurisdiction of the court, or ( Q his consent to the
jurisdiction of the court.
(d) Payments by Secretary concerned to spouse or7onner spouse. (1) After effective service on
the Secretary concerned of a court order providing for the payment of child support or
alimony or, with respect to a division of property, specifically providing for the payment of
an amount of the disposable retired pay from a member to the spouse or a former spouse
of the member, the Secretary shall make payments (subject to the limitations of this section)
from the disposable retired pay of the member to the spouse or former spouse in an amount
sufficient to satisfy the amount of child support and alimony set forth m the court order
and, with respect to a division of property, m the amount of disposable retired pay
specifically provided for m the court order In the case of a member entitled to receive
retired pay on the date of the effective service of the court order, such payments shall begin
not later than 90 days after the date of effective service In the case of a member not entitled
to receive retired pay on the date of the effective service of the court order, such payments
shall begin not later than 90 days after the date on which the member first becomes entitled
to retired pay
(2) If the spouse or former spouse to whom payments are to be made under this section was
not married to the member for a period of 10 years or more during which the member
performed at least 10 years of service creditable in determining the member's eligibility for
retired pay, payments may not be made under this section to the extent that they mclude
an amount resulting from the treatment by the court under subsection (c) of disposable
retired pay of the member as property of the member or property of the member and his
spouse
(3) Payments under tins section shall not be made more frequently than once each month,
and the Secretary concerned shall not be required to vary normal pay and disbursement
cycles for retired pay in order to comply with a court order
(4) Payments from the disposable retired pay of a member pursuant to this section shall
terminate m accordance with the terms of the applicable court order, but not later than the
date of the death of the member or the date of the death of the spouse or former spouse to
whom payments are being made, whichever occurs first
(5) If a court order described in paragraph (1) provides for a division of property (including
a division of community property) m addition to an amount of child support or alimony or
the payment of an amount of disposable retired pay as the result of the court's treatment of
such pay under subsection (c) as property of the member and his spouse, the Secretary
concerned shall pay (subject to the limitations of this section) from the disposable retired
pay of the member to the spouse or former spouse of the member, any part of the amount
payable to the spouse or former spouse under the division of property upon effective service
of a final court order of garnishment of such amount from such retired pay
(e) Limitations. (1) The total amount of the disposable retired pay of a member payable under
all court orders pursuant to subsection (c) may not exceed 50 percent of such disposable
retired pay
(2) In the event of effective service of more than one court order which provide for payment
to a spouse and one or more former spouses or to more than one former spouse the
disposable retired pay of the member shall be used to satisfy (subject to the limitations of
paragraph (1)) such court orders on a first-come, first-served basis Such court orders shall
be satisfied (subject to the limitations of paragraph (1)) out of that amount of disposable
retired pay which remains after the satisfaction of all court orders which have been
previously served
(3)(A) In the event of effective service of conflicting court orders under this section which
assert to direct that different amounts be paid during a month to the same spouse or
former spouse of the same member, the Secretary concerned shall—
(i) pay to that spouse from the member's disposable retired pay the least amount
directed to be paid during that month by any such conflicting court order, but not
more than the amount of disposable retired pay which remains available for payment
of such courts orders based on when such court orders were effectively served and the
limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4),
(u) retain an amount of disposable retired pay that is equal to the lesser of—
(I) the difference between the largest amount required by any conflicting court
order to be paid to the spouse or former spouse and the amount payable to the
spouse or former spouse under clause (l), and
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(II) the amount of disposable retired pay which remains available for payment of
any conflicting court order based on when such court order was effectively served
and the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4); and
(iii) pay to that member the amount which is equal to the amount of that member's
disposable retired pay (less any amount paid during such month pursuant to legal
process served under section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) and any
amount paid during such month pursuant to court orders effectively served under this
section, other than such conflicting court orders) minus—
(I) the amount of disposable retired pay paid under clause (i); and
(II) the amount of disposable retired pay retained under clause (ii).
(B) The Secretary concerned shall hold the amount retained under clause (ii) of
subparagraph (A) until such time as that Secretary is provided with a court order which
has been certified by the member and the spouse or former spouse to be valid and
applicable to the retained amount. Upon being provided with such an order, the Secretary
shall pay the retained amount in accordance with the order.
(4)(A) In the event of effective service of a court order under this section and the service of
legal process pursuant to section 459 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659), both of
which provide for payments during a month from the same member, satisfaction of such
court orders and legal process from the retired pay of the member shall be on a firstcome, first-served basis. Such court orders and legal process shall be satisfied out of
moneys which are subject to such orders and legal process and which remain available
in accordance with the limitations of paragraph (1) and subparagraph (B) of this
paragraph during such month after the satisfaction of all court orders or legal process
which have been previously served.
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount of the disposable
retired pay of a member payable by the Secretary concerned under all court orders
pursuant to this section and all legal processes pursuant to section 459 of the Social
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) with respect to a member may not exceed 65 percent of
the amount of the retired pay payable to such member that is considered under section
462 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 662) to be remuneration for employment that
is payable by the United States.
(5) A court order which itself or because of previously served court orders provides for the
payment of an amount which exceeds the amount of disposable retired pay available for
payment because of the limit set forth in paragraph (1), or which, because of previously
served court orders or legal process previously served under section 459 of the Social
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659), provides for payment of an amount that exceeds the maximum
amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4), shall not be
considered to be irregular on its face solely for that reason. However, such order shall be
considered to be fully satisfied for purposes of this section by the payment to the spouse or
.former spouse of the maximum amount of disposable retired pay permitted under paragraph
(1) and subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4).
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member of liability for the payment
of alimony, child support, or other payments required by a court order on the grounds that
payments made out of disposable retired pay under this section have been made in the
maximum amount permitted under paragraph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4).
Any such unsatisfied obligation of a member may be enforced by any means available under
law other than the means provided under this section in any case in which the maximum
amount permitted under paragraph (1) has been paid and under section 459 of the Social
Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659) in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4) has been paid.
(f) Immunity of officers and employees of United States. (1) The United States and any officer
or employee of the United States shall not be liable with respect to any payment made from
retired pay to any member, spouse, or former spouse pursuant to a court order that is
regular on its face if such payment is made in accordance with this section and the
regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (i).
(2) An officer or employee of the United States who, under regulations prescribed pursuant
to subsection (i), has the duty to respond to interrogatories shall not be subject under any
law to any disciplinary action or civil or criminal liability or penalty for, or because of, any
disclosure of information made by him in carrying out any of his duties which directly or
indirectly pertain to answering such interrogatories.
(g) Notice to member of service of court order on Secretary concerned. A person receiving
effective service of a court order under this section shall, as soon as possible, but not later than
30 days after the date on which effective service is made, send a written notice of such court
order (together with a copy of such order) to the member affected by the court order at his
last known address.
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(h) Benefits for dependents who are rictims of abuse by members losing right to retired pay.
(1) If, in the case of a member or former member of the armed forces referred to in
paragraph (2)(A), a court order provides (in the manner applicable to a division of property)
for the payment of an amount from the disposable retired pay of that member or former
member (as certified under paragraph (4)) to an eligible spouse or former spouse of that
member or former member, the Secretary concerned, beginning upon effective service of
such court order, shall pay that amount in accordance with this subsection to such spouse
or former spouse.
(2) A spouse or former spouse of a member or former member of the armed forces is eligible
to receive payment under this subsection if—
(A) the member or former member, while a member of the armed forces and after
becoming eligible to be retired from the armed forces on the basis of years of service, has
eligibility to receive retired pay terminated as a result of misconduct while a member
involving abuse of a spouse or dependent child (as defined in regulations prescribed by
the Secretary of Defense or, for the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in
the Navy, by the Secretary of Transportation); and
(B) the spouse or former spouse—
(i) was the victim of the abuse and was married to the member or former member at
the time of that abuse; or
(ii) is a natural or adopted parent of a dependent child of the member or former
member who was the victim of the abuse.
(3) The amount certified by the Secretary concerned under paragraph (4) with respect to a
member or former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall be
deemed to be the disposable retired pay of that member or former member for the purposes
of this subsection.
(4) Upon the request of a court or an eligible spouse or former spouse of a member or
former member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) in connection with a
civil action for the issuance of a court order in the case of that member or former member,
the Secretary concerned shall determine and certify the amount of the monthly retired pay
that the member or former member would have been entitled to receive as of the date of
the certification—
(A) if the member or former member's eligibility for retired pay had not been terminated
as described in paragraph (2)(A); and
(B) if, in the case of a member or former member not in receipt of retired pay
immediately before that termination of eligibility for retired pay, the member or former
member had retired on the effective date of that termination of eligibility.
(5) A court order under this subsection may provide that whenever retired pay is increased
under section 1401a of this title (or any other provision of law), the amount payable under
the court order to the spouse or former spouse of a member or former member described in
paragraph (2)(A) shall be increased at the same time by the percent by which the retired
pay of the member or former member would have been increased if the member, or former
member were receiving retired pay.
(6) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a member or former member of the armed
forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A) shall have no ownership interest in, or claim against,
any amount payable under this section to a spouse or former spouse of the member or
former member.
(7)(A) If a former spouse receiving payments under this subsection with respect to a member
or former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) marries again after such payments
begin, the eligibility of the former spouse to receive further payments under this
subsection shall terminate on the date of such marriage.
(B) A person's eligibility to receive payments under this subsection that is terminated
under subparagraph (A) by reason of remarriage shall be resumed in the event of the
termination of that marriage by the death of that person's spouse or by annulment or
divorce. The resumption of payments shall begin as of the first day of the month in
which that marriage is so terminated. The monthly amount of the payments shall be the
amount that would have been paid if the continuity of the payments had not been
interrupted by the marriage.
(8) Payments in accordance with this subsection shall be made out of funds in the
Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund established by section 1461 of this title
or, in the case of the Coast Guard, out of funds appropriated to the Department of
Transportation for payment of retired pay for the Coast Guard.
(9)(A) A spouse or former spouse of a member or former member of the armed forces
referred to in paragraph (2)(A), while receiving payments in accordance with this
subsection, shall be entitled to receive medical and dental care, to use commissary and
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exchange stores, and to receive any other benefit that a spouse or a former spouse of a
retired member of the armed forces is entitled to receive on the basis of being a spouse
or former spouse, as the case may be, of a retired member of the armed forces in the
same manner as if the member or former member referred to in paragraph (2XA) was
entitled to retired pay.
(B) A dependent child of a member or former member referred to in paragraph (2XA)
who was a member of the household of the member or former member at the time of
the misconduct described in paragraph (2)(A) shall be entitled to receive medical and
dental care, to use commissary and exchange stores, and to have other benefits provided
to dependents of retired members of the armed forces in the same manner as if the
member or former member referred to in paragraph (2)(A) was entitled to retired pay.
(C) If a spouse or former spouse or a dependent child eligible or entitled to receive a
particular benefit under this paragraph is eligible or entitled to receive that benefit under
another provision of law, the eligibility or entitlement of that spouse or former spouse
or dependent child to such benefit shall be determined under such other provision of law
instead of this paragraph.
(10XA) For purposes of this subsection, in the case of a member of the armed forces who
has been sentenced by a court-martial to receive a punishment that will terminate the
eligibility of that member to receive retired pay if executed, the eligibility of that member
to receive retired pay may, as determined by the Secretary concerned, be considered
terminated effective upon the approval of that sentence by the person acting under section
860(c) of this title (article 60(c) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
(B) If each form of the punishment that would result in the termination of eligibility to
receive retired pay is later remitted, set aside, or mitigated to a punishment that does not
result in the termination of that eligibility, a payment of benefits to the eligible recipient
under this subsection that is based on the punishment so vacated, set aside, or mitigated
shall cease. The cessation of payments shall be effective as of the first day of the first
month following the month in which the Secretary concerned notifies the recipient of
such benefits in writing that payment of the benefits will cease. The recipient may not be
required to repay the benefits received before that effective date (except to the extent
necessary to recoup any amount that was erroneous when paid).
(11) In this subsection, the term "dependent child", with respect to a member or former
member of the armed forces referred to in paragraph (2)(A), means an unmarried legitimate
child, including an adopted child or a stepchild of the member or former member, who—
(A) is under 18 years of age;
(B) is incapable of self-support because of a mental or physical incapacity that existed
before becoming 18 years of age and is dependent on the member or former member for
over one-half of the child's support; or
( Q if enrolled in a full-time course of study in an institution of higher education
recognized by the Secretary of Defense for the purposes of this subparagraph, is under
23 years of age and is dependent on the member or former member for over one-half of
the child's support,
(i) Regnlatioiis. The Secretaries concerned shall prescribe uniform regulations for the administration of this section.
(As amended Nov. 14, 1986, P. L. 99-661, Div A, Title VI, Part D, § 644(a), 100 Stat. 3887;
Apr. 21, 1987, P. L. 100-26, §§ 3(3) in part, 7(h)(1) in part, 101 Stat. 273, 282; Nov. 29, 1989,
P. L. 101-189, Div A, Title VI, Part F, § 653(a)(5), Title XVI, Part C, § 1622(e)(6), 103 Stat.
1462, 1605; Nov. 5, 1990, P. L. 101-510, Div A, Title V, Part E, § 555(a)-(d), (f), (g), 104 Stat.
1569, 1570; Dec. 5, 1991, P. L. 102-190, Div A, Title X, Part E, § 1061(a)(7), 105 Stat 1472;
Oct. 23, 1992, P. L. 102-484, Div A, Title VI, Subtitle E, § 653(a), 106 Stat 2426; Nov. 30,
1993, P..L. 103-160, Div A, Title V, Subtitle E, § 555(a), (b), Title XI, Subtitle H, § 1182(a)(2),
107 Stat 1666, 1771.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Amendments:
1986. Act Nov. 14, 1986, § 644(a) (applicable as provided by § 644(b) of such Act, which
appears as a note to this section), as amended Act Apr. 21, 1987, § 3(3), (applicable as if
included in Act Nov. 14, 1986 when enacted on 11/14/86, as provided by § 12(a) of Act
Apr. 21, 1987, which appears as 10 USCS § 774 note), in subsec. (a), in para. (4), in the
introductory matter, deleted "(other than the retired pay of a member retired for disability
under chapter 61 of this title)" following "member is entitled", and substituted subpara. (E)
for one which read: "are deducted as Government life insurance premiums (not including
amounts deducted for supplemental coverage); or".
1987. Act Apr. 21, 1987, in subsec. (aX4)(D), substituted "Internal Revenue Code of 1986"
for "Internal Revenue Code of 1954".
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Such Act further made a technical correction to the directory language of § 644(a) of Act
Nov. 14, 1986, P. L. 99-661, which did not affect the text of this section.
1989. Act Nov. 29, 1989, in subsec (a), in para. (4)(D), deleted "(26 U.S.C. 3402®)"
following "1986", and, in para. (5), inserted "entitled to retired pay under section 1331 of
this title".
Such Act further, in subsec (a), in the introductory matter of paras. (1H^)» and in paras.
(5) and (6), inserted 'The term" and revised the first word in quotation marks in each. para,
so that the initial letter of such word is lower case.
1990. Act Nov. 5, 1990 deleted "or retainer" following "retired", wherever appearing, and
added the subsection headings in subsecs. (a)-(h).
Such Act further (applicable as provided by § 555(eXO of such Act, which appears as. a note
to this section), in subsec (c)(1), added the sentence beginning "A court may not treat retired
pay as property . . .".
Such Act further (applicable as provided by § 555(e)(2) of such Act, which appears as a note
to this section), in subsec. (aX*), in subpara. (A), substituted "for previous overpayments of
retired pay and for recoupments required by law resulting from entitlement to retired pay;"
for the semicolon, substituted subpara. (B) for one which read: "(B) are required by law to
be and are deducted from the retired or retainer pay of such member, including fines and
forfeitures ordered by courts-martial, Federal employment taxes, and amounts waived in
order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38;", redesignated former subparas. (E)
and (F) as subparas. ( Q and (D), and deleted former subparas. (C) and (D), which read:
"(Q are properly withheld for Federal, State, or local income tax purposes, if the
withholding of such amounts is authorized or required by law and to the extent such
amounts withheld are not greater than would be authorized if such member claimed all
dependents to which he was entitled;
"(D) are withheld under section 3402(i) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 U.S.C.
3402(i)) if such member presents evidence of a tax obligation which supports such
withholding;".
Such Act further (applicable as above), in subsec. (c)(2), added the sentence beginning
"Payments by the Secretary concerned under subsection (d) . . ."; and, in subsec (e), in
para. (1), substituted "payable under ail court orders pursuant to subsection (c)" for "payable
under subsection (d)", and, in para. (4)(B), substituted "the amount of the retired pay
payable to such member that is considered under section 462 of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. 662) to be remuneration for employment that is payable by the United States" for
"the disposable retired or retainer pay payable to such member".
1991. Act Dec. 5, 1991 substituted the section heading for one which read: "§ 1408. Payment
of retired pay in compliance with court orders".
1992. Act Oct. 23, 1992 (applicable as provided by § 653(c) of such Act, which appears as a
note to this section) redesignated subsec. (h) as subsec (i); and added new subsec (h).
1993. Act Nov. 30, 1993 (applicable as provided by § 1182(h) of such Act, which appears as
10 USCS § 101 note), in subsecs. (b), in para. (1)(A), and in subsec (0, in paras. (1) and
(2), substituted "subsection (i)" for "subsection (h)"; and, in subsec (h)(4)(B), inserted "of*
after "of that termination".
Such Act further (effective as of 10/23/92 and applicable as if the provisions of subsec.
(h)(10) added by such Act were included in the amendment made by § 653(aX2) of Act Oct
23, 1992, P. L. 102-484, as provided by § 555(c) of the 1993 Act), in subsec (h), in para.
(2)(A), inserted "or, for the Coast Guard when it is not operating as a service in the Navy,
by the Secretary of Transportation", in para. (8), inserted "or, in the case of the Coast Guard,
out of funds appropriated to the Department of Transportation for payment of retired pay
for the Coast Guard", redesignated para. (10) as para. (11), and added a new para. (10).
Other provisions:
Repeal of provision for commissary and exchange privileges. Act Sept. 8, 1982, P. L. 97-252,
Title X, § 1005, 96 Stat. 737, which formerly appeared as a note to this section, and which
was effective on the first day of the first month which began more than 120 days after
enactment on Sept 8, 1982, as provided by fl 1006(a) of such Act, which appears as 10
USCS § 1408 note, was repealed by Act July 19, 1988, P. L. 100-370, § l(cX5% 102 Stat.
841. It provided for rules and regulations to be prescribed for commissary and post exchange
privileges for surviving spouses of retired uniformed services members. Similar provisions are
now contained in 10 USCS § 1062.
Applicability of 1986 amendments. Act Nov. 14, 1986, P. L. 99-661, Div A, Tide VI, Part
D, § 644(b), 100 Stat 3887, provides: "The amendments made by subsection (a) shall apply
with respect to court orders issued after the date of the enactment of this Act".
Applicability of 1990 amendments. Act Nov. 5, 1990, P. L. 101-510, Div A Title V, Part E,
§ 555(e), 104 Stat 1570; Dec 5, 1991, P. L. 102-190, Div A, Title X, Part E, § 1062(a)(1),
105 Stat. 1475, provides:
"(1) The amendment made by subsection (a) [amending subsec (c)(1) of this section] shall
apply with respect to judgments issued before, on, or after the date of the enactment of this
Act. In the case of a judgment issued before the date of the enactment of this Act, such
amendment shall not relieve any obligation, otherwise valid, to make a payment that is due
to be made before the end of the two-year period beginning on the date of the enactment of
this Act.
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"(2) The amendments made by subsections (b), (c), and (d) [amending subsecs. (a), (cX2) and
(e) of this section] apply with only respect to divorces, dissolutions of marriage, annulments,
and legal separations that become effective after the end of the 90-day period beginning on
the date of the enactment of this Act'*
Applicability of subsec (h). Act Oct 23, 1992, P L 102-484, Div A, Title VI, Subtitle E,
§ 653(c), 106 Stat 2429, provides "No payments under subsection (h) of section 1408 of title
10, United States Code (as added by subsection (a)), shall accrue for periods before the date
of the enactment of this Act"
Study required. Act Oct 23, 1992, P L 102-484, Div A, Title VI, Subtitle E, § 653(e), 106
Stat 2429, provides
"(1) The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study in order to estimate—
"(A) the number of persons who will become eligible to receive payments under
subsection (h) of section 1408 of title 10, Umted States Code (as added by subsection (a)),
during each of fiscal years 1993 through 2000, and
"(B) for each of fiscal years 1993 through 2000, the number of members of the Armed
Forces who, after having completed at least one, and less than 20, years of service m that
fiscal year, will be approved in that fiscal year for separation from the Armed Forces as
a result of having abused a spouse or dependent child
"(2) The study shall mclude a thorough analysis of—
"(A) the effects, if any, of appeals and requests for clemency m the case of court-martial
convictions on the entitlement to payments m accordance with subsection (h) of section
1408 of title 10, Umted States Code (as added by subsection (a)),
"(B) the socio-economic effects on the dependents of members of the Armed Forces
described m subsection (h)(2) of such section that result from terminations of the
eligibility of such members to receive retired or retainer pay, and
"(Q the effects of separations of such members from the Armed Forces on the mission
readiness of the units of assignment of such members when separated and on the Armed
Forces m general
"(3) Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall
submit to Congress a report on the results of the study "
RESEARCH GUIDE
Am Jun
6 Am JUT 2d, Attachment § 179 5
9B Am JUT 2d, Bankruptcy § 3126
31 Am Jur 2d, Exemptions § 46
Annotations:
Divorce* excessiveness or adequacy of combined property division and spousal support
awards 55 ALR4tk 14
Divorce excessiveness or adequacy of trial court's property award 56 ALR4th 12
Law Renew Articles:
Polchek, Recent property settlement issues for legal assistance attorneys 1992 Army Law 4,
December, 1992
Cardos, Perry and Sinnott, The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection A c t 33
Federal Bar News and Journal 33, January, 1986
Guilford, Exploring the labyrinth current issues under the Uniformed Services Former
Spouses' Protection Act 132 Mil L Rev 43, Spring 1991
Manashil, The Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act of 1982 Problems
Resulting From its Application 20 U S F L Rev 83, Fall, 1985
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
1. Generally
Statute does not grant state courts power to treat
as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that retiree had waived pursuant to 38
USCS § 3105 m order to receive veterans' disability
benefits, it cannot be read merely as garnishment
statute designed not to pre-empt authonty of state
courts but solely to set out circumstances under
which federal government will make direct payments of retirement pay to retiree's former spouse
pursuant to court order because statute provides
that court may treat disposable retired or retainer
pay but not total retired pay as property of retiree
and spouse, and term "disposable retired or retainer
pay" is defined to exclude military retirement pay
waived m order to receive veterans' disability benefits, and other subsections of statute impose substantive limits on state courts' power to divide
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military retirement pay Mansell v Mansell (1989,
US) 104 L Ed 2d 675, 109 S a 2023, 10 EBC 2521
Court otherwise having jurisdiction of parties is
not allowed to mvoke powers of Federal Uniform
Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (10 USCS
§ 1408) unless personal jurisdiction has been acquired by domicile or consent or residence other
than by military assignment, careful reading of 10
USCS § 1408(c)(1) reveals that provision is limitation on subject-matter, rather than personal jurisdiction Steel v Umted States (1987, CA9 Cal) 813
F2dl545
passage of Uniform Services Former Spouse's
Protection Act (10 USCS § 1468(c)(1) (USFSPA)
did not result m taking of former military personnel's property (portion of then* military retired pay)
in violation of Fifth Amendment to Constitution as
Act merely removed federal pre-emption which
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Effective date and application of amendments made by Act Nov. 8,
1985. Act Nov. 8, 1985, P. L. 99-145, Title VII, Part C, § 731, 99 Stat.
678, provided:
"(a) Effective date. Except as otherwise provided in this title [this note,
among other things; for full classification, consult USCS Tables volumes], the amendments made by this title [this note, among other
things; for full classification, consult USCS Tables volumes] shall take
effect on the first day of the first month beginning more than 90 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted Nov. 8, 1985].
"(b) Prospective benefits only. No benefit shall accrue to any person by
reason of the enactment of this title [this note, among other things; for
full classification, consult USCS Tables volumes] for any period before
the effective date under subsection (a).".
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
Surviving spouse does not qualify under 10
USCS § 1447(3)(A) for any annuity at time of
her husband's death where service member had
elected spouse and children coverage, had divorced, remarried and died prior to first anniversay of remarriage; however since spouse was
pregnant and later gave birth to service member's child, she qualifies as eligible widow for
annuity purposes effective on date of child's
birth. (1981) 60 Op Comp Gen p 240.
Annuity may properly be suspended if evi-

§ 1448.

dence exists demonstrating that beneficiary has
become independently capable of earning
amounts sufficient for own pesonal needs
through substantial and gainful employment;
determination in any given case of whether
handicapped beneficiary has become capable of
self-support depends upon individual facts of
case; in absence of evidence that saiary of handicapped beneficiary is sufficient for her own particular personal needs, annuity should be not be
suspended. (1983) 62 Op Comp Gen p 193.

Application of Plan

(a)(1) The program established by this subchapter [10 USCS §§ 1447 et
seq.] shall be known as the Survivor Benefit Plan. The following persons
are eligible to participate in the Plan:
(A) Persons entitled to retired pay.
(B) Persons who would be eligible for retired pay under chapter 67 of
this title [10 USCS §§ 1331 et seq.] but for the fact that they are
under 60 years of age.
(2) The Plan applies—
(A) to a person who is eligible to participate in the Plan under
paragraph (1)(A) and who is married or has a dependent child when
he becomes entitled to retired pay, unless he elects (with his spouse's
concurrence, if required under paragraph (3)) not to participate in the
Plan before the first day for which he is eligible for that pay; and
(B) to a person who (i) is eligible to participate in the Plan under
paragraph (1)(B), (ii) is married or has a dependent child when he is
notified under section 1331(d) of this title [10 USCS § 1331(d)] that
he has completed the years of service required for eligibility for
retired pay under chapter 67 of this title [10 USCS §§ 1331 et seq.],
and (iii) elects to participate in the Plan (and makes a designation
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under subsection (e)) before the end of the 90-day period beginning
on the date he receives such notification.
A person described in subclauses (i) and (ii) of clause (B) who does not
elect to participate in the Plan before the end of the 90-day period
referred to in such clause shall remain eligible, upon reaching 60 years
of age and otherwise becoming entitled to retired pay, to participate in
the Plan in accordance with eligibility under paragraph (1)(A).
(3)(A) A married person who is eligible to provide a standard annuity
may not without the concurrence of the person's spouse elect—
(i) not to participate in the Plan;
(ii) to provide an annuity for the person's spouse at less than the
maximum level; or
(iii) to provide an annuity for a dependent child but not for the
person's spouse.
(B) A married person who elects to provide a reserve-component
annuity may not without the concurrence of the person's spouse
elect—
(i) to provide an annuity for the person's spouse at less than the
maximum level; or
(ii) to provide an annuity for a dependent child but not for the
person's spouse.
(C) A person may make an election described in subparagraph (A) or
(B) without the concurrence of the person's spouse if the person
establishes to the satisfaction of the Secretary concerned—
(i) that the spouse's whereabouts cannot be determined; or
(ii) that, due to exceptional circumstances, requiring the person to
seek the spouse's consent would otherwise be inappropriate.
(D) This paragraph does not affect any right or obligation to elect to
provide an annuity for a former spouse (or for a former spouse and
dependent child) under subsection (b)(2).
(E) If a married person who is eligible to provide a standard annuity
elects to provide an annuity for a former spouse (or for a former
spouse and dependent child) under subsection (b)(2), that person's
spouse shall be notified of that election.
(4)(A) An election under paragraph (2)(A) not to participate in the Plan
is irrevocable if not revoked before the date on which the person first
becomes entitled to retired or retainer pay.
(B) An election under paragraph (2)(B) to participate in the Plan is
irrevocable if not revoked before the end of the 90-day period referred
to in such paragraph.
(5) A person who is not married when he becomes eligible to participate
in the Plan but who later marries or acquires a dependent child may
elect to participate in the Plan, but his election must be written, signed
by him, and received by the Secretary concerned within one year after
he marries or acquires that dependent child. Such an election may not
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be revoked except in accordance with subsection (b)(3). His election is
effective as of the first day of the first calendar month following the
month in which his election is received by the Secretary concerned. In
the case of a person providing an annuity by virtue of eligibility under
paragraph (1)(B), such an election shall include a designation under
subsection (e).
(6)(A) A person—
(i) who is a participant in the Plan and is providing coverage for a
spouse or a spouse and child;
(ii) who does not have an eligible spouse beneficiary under the
Plan; and
(iii) who remarries,
may elect not to provide coverage under the Plan for the person's
spouse.
(B) If such an election is made, no reduction in the retired pay of
such person under section 1452 of this title [10 USCS § 1452] may be
made. An election under this paragraph—
(i) is irrevocable;
(ii) shall be made within one year after the person's remarriage;
and
(iii) shall be made in such form and manner as may be prescribed
in regulations under section 1455 of this title [10 USCS § 1455].
(C) If a person makes an election under this paragraph—
(i) not to participate in the Plan;
(ii) to provide an annuity for the person's spouse at less than the
maximum level; or
(iii) to provide an annuity for a dependent child but not for the
person's spouse,
the person's spouse shall be notified of that election.
(D) This paragraph does not affect any right or obligation to elect to
provide an annuity to a former spouse under subsection (b).
(b)(1) A person who is not married and does not have a dependent child
when he becomes eligible to participate in the Plan may elect to provide
an annuity to a natural person with an insurable interest in that person.
In the case of a person providing a reserve-component annuity, such an
election shall include a designation under subsection (e).
(2) A person who has a former spouse when he becomes eligible to
participate in the Plan may elect to provide an annuity to that former
spouse. In the case of a person with a spouse or a dependent child, such
an election prevents payment of an annuity to that spouse or child
(other than a child who is a beneficiary under an election under
paragraph (4)), including payment under subsection (d). If there is more
than one former spouse, the person shall designate which former spouse
is to be provided the annuity. In the case of a person providing a
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reserve-component annuity, such an election shall include a designation
under subsection (e).
(3)(A) A person—
(i) who is a participant in the Plan and is providing coverage for a
spouse or a spouse and child (even though there is no beneficiary
currently eligible for such coverage), and
(ii) who has a former spouse who was not that person's former
spouse when he became eligible to participate in the Plan,
may (subject to subparagraph (B)) elect to provide an annuity to that
former spouse. Any such election terminates any previous coverage
under the Plan and must be written, signed by the person, and received
by the Secretary concerned within one year after the date of the decree
of divorce, dissolution, or annulment.
(B) A person may not make an election under subparagraph (A) to
provide an annuity to a former spouse who that person married after
becoming eligible for retired pay unless—
(i) the person was married to that former spouse for at least one
year, or
(ii) that former spouse is the parent of issue by that marriage.
(C) An election under this paragraph may not be revoked except in
accordance with section 1450(f) of this title [10 USCS § 1450(0] and
is effective as of the first day of the first calendar month following the
month in which it is received by the Secretary concerned. This
paragraph does not provide the authority to change a designation
previously made under subsection (e).
(D) If a person who is married makes an election to provide an
annuity to a former spouse under this paragraph, that person's spouse
shall be notified of that election.
(4) A person who elects to provide an annuity for a former spouse under
paragraph (2) or (3) may, at the time of the election, elect to provide
coverage under that annuity for both the former spouse and a dependent
child, if the child resulted from the person's marriage to that former
spouse.
(5) A person who elects to provide an annuity to a former spouse under
paragraph (2) or (3) shall, at the time of making the election, provide
the Secretary concerned with a written statement (in a form to be
prescribed by that Secretary and signed by such person and the former
spouse) setting forth whether the election is being made pursuant to a
written agreement previously entered into voluntarily by such person as
a part of or incident to a proceeding of divorce, dissolution, or annulment and (if so) whether such voluntary written agreement has been
incorporated in, or ratified or approved by, a court order.
(c) The application of the Plan to a person whose name is on the
temporary disability retired list terminates when his name is removed from
that list and he is no longer entitled to disability retired pay.
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(d)(1) The Secretary concerned shall pay an annuity under this subchapter
[10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.] to the surviving spouse of a member who dies
on active duty after—
(A) becoming eligible to receive retired pay;
(B) qualifying for retired pay except that he has not applied for or
been granted that pay; or
(C) completing 20 years of active service but before he is eligible to
retire as a commissioned officer because he has not completed 10
years of active commissioned service.
(2) The Secretary concerned shall pay an annuity under this subchapter
[10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.] to the dependent child of a member described
in paragraph (1) if the member and the member's spouse die as a result
of a common accident.
(3) If a member described in paragraph (1) is required under a court
order or spousal agreement to provide an annuity to a former spouse
upon becoming eligible to be a participant in the Plan or has made an
election under subsection (b) to provide an annuity to a former spouse,
the Secretary—
(A) may not pay an annuity under paragraph (1) or (2); but
(B) shall pay an annuity to that former spouse as if the member had
been a participant in the Plan and had made an election under
subsection (b) to provide an annuity to the former spouse, or in
accordance with that election, as the case may be, if the Secretary
receives a written request from the former spouse concerned that the
election be deemed to have been made in the same manner as
provided in section 1450(0(3) of this title [10 USCS § 1450(f)(3)].
(4) An annuity that may be provided under this subsection shall be
provided in preference to an annuity that may be provided under any
other provision of this subchapter [10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.] on account
of service of the same member.
(5) The amount of an annuity under this subsection is computed under
section 1451(c) of this title [10 USCS § 1451(c)].
(e) In any case in which a person electing to participate in the Plan is
required to make a designation under this subsection, the person making
such election shall designate whether, in the event he dies before becoming
60 years of age, the annuity provided shall become effective on the day
after the date of his death or on the 60th anniversary of his birth.
(f)(1) The Secretary concerned shall pay an annuity under this subchapter
[10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.] to the surviving spouse of a person who is
eligible to provide a reserve-component annuity and who dies—
(A) before being notified under section 1331(d) of this title [10 USCS
§ 1331(d)] that he has completed the years of service required for
eligibility for retired pay under chapter 67 of this title [10 USCS
§§ 1331 et seq.]; or
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(B) during the 90-day period beginning on the date he receives
notification under section 1331(d) of this title [10 USCS § 1331(d)]
that he has completed the years of service required for eligibility for
retired pay under chapter 67 of this title [10 USCS §§ 1331 et seq.] if
he had not made an election under subsection (a)(2)(B) to participate
in the Plan.
(2) The Secretary concerned shall pay an annuity under this subchapter
[10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.] to the dependent child of a person described
in paragraph (1) if the person and the person's spouse die as a result of
a common accident.
(3) If a person described in paragraph (1) is required under a court
order or spousal agreement to provide an annuity to a former spouse
upon becoming eligible to be a participant in the Plan or has made an
election under subsection (b) to provide an annuity to a former spouse,
the Secretary—
(A) may not pay an annuity under paragraph (1) or (2); but
(B) shall pay an annuity to that former spouse as if the person had
been a participant in the Plan and had made an election under
subsection (b) to provide an annuity to the former spouse, or in
accordance with that election, as the case may be, if the Secretary
receives a written request from the former spouse concerned that the
election be deemed to have been made in the same manner as
provided in section 1450(0(3) of this title [10 USCS § 1450(0(3)].
(4) The amount of an annuity under this subsection is computed under
section 1451(c) of this title [10 USCS § 1451(c)].
(g)(1) A person—
(A) who is a participant in the Plan and is providing coverage under
subsection (a) for a spouse or a spouse and child, but at less than the
maximum level; and
(B) who remarries,
may elect, within one year of such remarriage, to increase the level of
coverage provided under the Plan to a level not in excess of the current
retired pay of that person.
(2) Such an election shall be contingent on the person paying to the
United States the amount determined under paragraph (3) plus interest
on such amount at a rate determined under regulations prescribed by
the Secretary of Defense.
(3) The amount referred to in paragraph (2) is the amount equal to the
difference between—
(A) the amount that would have been withheld from such person's
retired pay under section 1452 of this title [10 USCS § 1452] if the
higher level of coverage had been in effect from the time the person
became a participant in the Plan; and
(B) the amount of such person's retired pay actually withheld.
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(4) An election under paragraph (1) shall be made in such manner as
the Secretary shall prescribe and shall become effective upon receipt of
the payment required by paragraph (2).
(5) A payment received under this subsection by the Secretary of
Defense shall be deposited into the Department of Defense Military
Retirement Fund. Any other payment received under this subsection
shall be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts.
(Added Sept. 21, 1972, P. L. 92-425, § 1(3), 86 Stat. 707; Oct. 14, 1976, P.
L. 94-496, § 1(2), 90 Stat. 2375; Sept. 30, 1978, P. L. 95-397, Title II,
§ 202, 92 Stat 844; Sept. 8, 1982, P. L. 97-252, Title X, § 1003(b), 96 Stat.
735; Oct. 12, 1982, P. L. 97-295, § 1(18), 96 Stat. 1290; Sept. 24, 1983, P.
L. 98-94, Title IX, Part D, § 941(a)(1), (2), (c)(2), 97 Stat. 652, 653; Nov.
8, 1985, P. L. 99-145, Title V, Part B, § 513(b), Title VII, Part A,
§§ 712(a), 713(a), 715, 716(a), 719(3), (8)(A) in part, Part B, § 721(a), 99
Stat. 628, 670, 671, 673-676.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Amendments:
1976. Act Oct. 14, 1976 (effective 9/21/72, as provided by § 3 of such
Act, which appears as 10 USCS § 1447 note), in subsec. (a), inserted
"or elects to provide an annuity for a dependent child but not for his
spouse".
1978. Act Sept. 30, 1978, substituted subsec. (a) for one which read:
"The Plan applies to a person who is married or has a dependent child
when he becomes entitled to retired or retainer pay unless he elects not
to participate in the Plan before the first day for which he is eligible for
that pay. If a person who is married elects not to participate in the
Plan at the maximum level, or elects to provide an annuity for a
dependent child but not for his spouse that person's spouse shall be
notified of the decision. An election not to participate in the Plan is
irrevocable if not revoked before the date on which the person first
becomes entitled to retired or retainer pay. However, a person who is
not married when he becomes entitled to retired or retainer pay but
who later marries, or acquires a dependent child, may elect to participate in the Plan but his election must be written, signed by him, and
received by the Secretary concerned within one year after he marries,
or acquires that dependent child. Such an election may not be revoked.
His election is effective as of the first day of the month after his
election is received by the Secretary concerned."; in subsec. (b),
substituted "eligible to participate in the Plan" for "entitled to retired
or retainer pay" and added "In the case of a person providing an
annuity under this subsection by virtue of eligibility under subsection
(a)(1)(B), such an election shall include a designation under subsection
(e)."; and added subsec. (e).
1982. Act Sept. 8, 1982 (effective on the first day of the first month
which begins more than 120 days after enactment on 9/8/82), in
subsec. (a)(3), in subparas. (A) and (B), inserted "or elects to provide
an annuity under subsection (b)(2) of this section,"; and substituted
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subsec. (b) for one which read; "A person who is not married and does
not have a dependent child when he becomes eligible to participate in
the Plan may elect to provide an annuity to a natural person with an
insurable interest in that person. In the case of a person providing an
annuity under this subsection by virtue of eligibility under subsection
(a)(1)(B), such an election shall include a designation under subsection
(e).".
Act Oct. 12, 1982, in the section heading, substituted "Plan" for
"plan", s
1983. Act Sept. 24, 1983, in subsec. (a)(3), in subparas. (A) and (B),
inserted "for a former spouse" and deleted "of this section" following
"(b)(2)", in each instance, in para. (5), inserted "except in accordance
with subsection (b)(3)"; and substituted subsec. (b) for one which read:
"(b)(1) A person who is not married and does not have a dependent
child when he becomes eligible to participate in the Plan may elect
to provide an annuity to a natural person with an insurable interest
in that person or to provide an annuity to a former spouse.
"(2) A person who is married or has a dependent child may elect to
provide an annuity to a former spouse instead of providing an
annuity to a spouse or dependent child if the election is made in
order to carry out the terms of a written agreement entered into
voluntarily with the former spouse (without regard to whether such
agreement is included in or approved by a court order).
"(3) In the case of a person electing to provide an annuity under
paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection by virtue of eligibility under
subsection (a)(1)(B), the election shall include a designation under
subsection (e).
"(4) Any person who elects under paragraph (1) or (2) to provide an
annuity to a former spouse shall, at the time of making such
election, provide the Secretary concerned with a written statement,
in a form to be prescribed by that Secretary, signed by such person
and the former spouse setting forth whether the election is being
made pursuant to a voluntary written agreement previously entered
into by such person as a part of or incident to a proceeding of
divorce, dissolution, annulment, or legal separation, and if so,
whether such voluntary written agreement has been incorporated in
or ratified or approved by a court order.".
1985. Act Nov. 8, 1985, in subsec. (c), inserted "disability" before
"retired pay".
Such Act further (effective on the first day of the first month beginning
more than 90 days after enactment on 11/8/85, as provided by § 731(a)
of such Act, which appears as 10 USCS § 1447 note), in subsec. (a), in
para. (1)(A), deleted "or retainer" preceding "pay", in para. (2)(A),
deleted "or retainer" following "to retired", and inserted "(with his
spouse's concurrence, if required under paragraph (3))", and substituted para. (3) for one which read:
"(3)(A) If a person who is eligible under paragraph (1)(A) to
participate in the Plan and who is married elects not to participate in the Plan at the maximum level, or elects to provide an
annuity for a dependent child but not for his spouse, or elects to
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provide an annuity for a former spouse under subsection (b)(2),
that person's spouse shall be notified of that election.
"(B) If a person who is eligible under paragraph (1)(B) to
participate in the Plan and who is married does not elect to
participate in the Plan at the maximum level, or elects to provide
an annuity for a dependent child but not for his spouse, or elects
to provide an annuity for a former spouse under subsection (b)(2),
that person's spouse shall be notified of that action.".
Such Act further, in subsec. (a), added para. (6); in subsec. (b), in para.
(1), substituted "a reserve-component annuity" for "an annuity under
this paragraph by virtue of eligibility under subsection (a)(1)(B)", in
para. (2), inserted "(other than a child who is a beneficiary under an
election under paragraph (4))" and substituted "a reserve-component
annuity" for "an annuity under this paragraph by virtue of eligibility
under subsection (a)(1)(B)", in para. (3)(B), deleted "or retainer"
preceding "pay", redesignated para. (4) as para. (5), and added new
para. (4); substituted subsec. (d) for one which read: "If a member of
an armed force dies on active duty after he has become entitled to
retired or retainer pay, or after he has qualified for that pay except that
he has not applied for or been granted that pay, and his spouse is
eligible for dependency and indemnity compensation under section
411(a) of title 38 in an amount that is less than the annuity the spouse
would have received under this subchapter if it had applied to the
member when he died, the Secretary concerned shall pay to the spouse
an annuity equal to the difference between that amount of compensation and 55 percent of the retired or retainer pay to which the
otherwise eligible spouse described in section 1450(a)(1) of this title
would have been entitled if the member had been entitled to that pay
based upon his years of active service when he died."; and added
subsecs. (0 and (g).
Other provisions:
Election to participate in the Survivor Benefit Plan and withdraw from
the Retired Serviceman's Family Protection Plan.
Act Sept. 21, 1972, P. L. 92-425, § 3, 86 Stat. 711; Nov. 16, 1973, P. L.
93-155, Title VIII, § 804, 87 Stat. 615, provided:
"(a) The Survivor Benefit Plan established pursuant to clause (3) of the
first section of this Act [adding 10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.] applies to any
person who initially becomes entitled to retired or retainer pay on or
after the effective date of this Act [enacted Sept. 21, 1972]. An election
made before that date by such a person under section 1431 of title 10,
United States Code [10 USCS § 1431], is canceled. However, a person
who initially becomes entitled to retired or retainer pay within 180
days after the effective date of this Act [enacted Sept. 21, 1972] may,
within 180 days after becoming so entitled, elect—
"(1) not to participate in such Survivor Benefit Plan if he is married
or has a dependent child; or
"(2) to participate in that Plan, if he is a person covered by section
1448(b) of title 10, United States Code [subsec. (b) of this section].
"(b) Any person who is entitled to retired or retainer pay on the
effective date of this Act [enacted Sept. 21, 1972] may elect to
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participate in the Survivor Benefit Plan established pursuant to clause
(3) of the first section of this Act [adding 10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.] at
any time within eighteen months after such date. However, such a
person who is receiving retired or retainer pay reduced under section
1436(a) of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS § 1436(a)], or who is
depositing amounts under section 1438 of that title [10 USCS § 1438],
may elect at any time within eighteen months after the eflFective date of
this Act [enacted Sept. 21, 1972]—
"(1) to participate in the Plan and continue his participation under
chapter 73 of that title [10 USCS §§ 1431 et seq.] as in effect on the
day before the eflFective date of this Act [enacted Sept. 21, 1972],
except that the total of the annuities elected may not exceed 100
percent of his retired or retainer pay; or
"(2) to participate in the Plan and, notwithstanding section 1436(b)
of that title [10 USCS § 1436(b)], terminate his participation under
chapter 73 of that title [10 USCS §§ 1431 et seq.] as in effect on the
day before the eflFective date of this Act [enacted Sept. 21, 1972].
A person who elects under clause (2) of this subsection is not entitled
to a refund of amounts previously deducted from his retired or retainer
pay under chapter 73 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS §§ 1431
et seq.], as in effect on the day before the effective date of this Act
[enacted Sept. 21, 1972], or any payments made thereunder on his
behalf. A person who is not married or does not have a dependent
child on the first anniversary of the eflFective date of this Act [enacted
Sept. 21, 1972], but who later marries or acquires a dependent child,
may elect to participate in the Plan under the fourth sentence of
section 1448(a) of that title [subsec. (a) of this section].
"(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of the Survivor Benefit Plan
established pursuant to clause (3) of the first section of this Act [adding
10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.], and except as otherwise provided in this
section [this note], subchapter I of chapter 73 of title 10, United States
Code [10 USCS §§ 1431 et seq.] (other than the last two sentences of
section 1436(a), section 1443, and section 1444(b)), as in effect on the
day before the eflFective date of this Act [enacted Sept. 21, 1972], shall
continue to apply in the case of persons, and their beneficiaries, who
have elected annuities under section 1431 or 1432 of that title [10
USCS § 1431 or 1432] and who have not elected under subsection
(b)(2) of this section [this note] to participate in that Plan.
"(d) In this section [this note], 'base amount' means—
"(1) the monthly retired or retainer pay to which a person—
"(A) is entitled on the eflFective date of this Act [enacted Sept. 21,
1972]; or
"(B) later becomes entitled by being advanced on the retired list,
performing active duty, or being transferred from the temporary
disability retired list to the permanent disability retired list; or
"(2) any amount less than that described in clause (1) designated by
that person at the time he makes an election under subsection (a)(2)
or (b) of this section [this note], but not less than $300; as increased
from time to time under section 1401a of title 10, United States
Code [10 USCS § 1401a].

366

ANNUITIES

10 USCS § 1448

"(e) An election made under subsection (a) or (b) of this section [this
note] is effective on the date it is received by the Secretary concerned,
as defined in section 101(5) of title 37, United States Code [37 USCS
§ 101(5)].
"(0 Sections 1449, 1453, and 1454 of title 10, United States Code [10
USCS §§ 1449, 1453, 1454], as added by clause (3) of the first section
of this Act [adding 10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.], are applicable to persons
covered by this section [this note].".
Income supplement for certain widows of retired members of the
uniformed forces; special annuity for widows of commissioned personnel of the Public Health Service and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in lieu of VA Pension. Act Sept. 21, 1972, P. L.
92-425, §4, 86 Stat. 712; Oct. 14, 1976, P. L. 94-496, §2, 90 Stat.
2375; Sept. 30, 1978, P. L. 95-397, Title II, § 209, 92 Stat. 848; Oct. 9,
1980, P. L. 96-402, § 6, 94 Stat. 1708; Sept. 24, 1983, P. L. 98-94, Title
IX, Part D, § 942(a), 97 Stat. 654 (effective for payments after Sept.
1983, as provided by § 942(b) by such Act), provided:
"(a) A person—
"(1) who, on September 21, 1972, was, or during the period
beginning on September 22, 1972, and ending on March 20, 1974,
became, a widow of a person who was entitled to retired or retainer
pay when he died;"
"(2) who is eligible for a pension under subchapter III of chapter 15
of title 38, United States Code [38 USCS §§ 531 et seq.], or section
306 of the Veterans' and Survivors' Pension Improvement Act of
1978 [38 USCS § 521 note]; and
"(3) whose annual income, as determined in establishing that eligibility, is less than $2,340;
shall be paid an annuity by the Secretary concerned unless she is
eligible to receive an annuity under the Survivor Benefit Plan established pursuant to clause (3) of the first section of this Act [adding 10
USCS §§ 1447 et seq.]. However, such a person who is the widow of a
retired officer of the Public Health Service or the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, and who would otherwise be eligible for
an annuity under this section except that she does not qualify for the
pension described in clause (2) of this subsection because the service of
her deceased spouse is not considered active duty under section 101(21)
of title 38, United States Code [38 USCS § 101(21)], is entitled to an
annuity under this section [this note].
"(b) The annuity under subsection (a) of this section [this note] shall be
in an amount which when added to the widow's income determined
under subsection (a)(3) of this section [this note], plus the amount of
any annuity being received under sections 1431-1436 of title 10, United
States Code [10 USCS §§ 1431-1436], but exclusive of a pension
described in subsection (a)(2) of this section [this note], equals $2,340 a
year. In addition, the Secretary concerned shall pay to the widow,
described in the last sentence of subsection (a) of this section [this
note], an amount equal to the pension she would otherwise have been
eligible to receive under subchapter III of chapter 15 of title 38, United
States Code [38 USCS §§531 et seq.], if the service of her deceased
367

10 USCS § 1448

GEN. MIL. LAW—PERSONNEL

spouse was considered active duty under section 101(21) of that title
[38 USCS §§ 101(21)].
"(c) The amounts specified in subsections (a)(3) and (b) shall be
increased by the Secretary concerned whenever there is an increase
under section 3112 of title 38, United States Code [38 USCS § 3112], in
the maximum annual rate of pension under section 541(b) of such title
[38 USCS § 541(b)]. Any such increase under the preceding sentence
shall be in the same amount, and shall have the same effective date, as
such increase in the maximum annual rate of pension.
"(d) Subsection 1450(i) and section 1453 as added to title 10, United
States Code, by clause 3 of the first section of this Act [10 USCS
§§ 1450(i), 1453], are applicable to persons covered by this section [this
note].".
90-day period. Act Sept. 30, 1978, P. L. 95-397, Title II, § 208, 92 Stat.
848, provided that for certain individuals, the 90-day period referred to
in subsec. (a)(2) and (4)(B) of this section shall be considered to end at
the end of the one-year period beginning on the effective date of Title
II of that Act; see 10 USCS § 1447 note.
Effective date and application of 1978 amendments. Act Sept. 30, 1978,
P. L. 95-397, Title II, §210, 92 Stat. 848, which appears as 10 USCS
§ 1447 note, provided that the amendments made to this section by
such Act are effective on Oct. 1, 1978 and applicable to annuities
payable by vinue of such amendments for months beginning on or
after such date.
Surviving spouse; annuity payment and reduction provisions; election of
annuity; definitions; effective date. Act Oct. 9, 1980, P. L. 96-402, § 5,
94 Stat. 1707 (effective Dec. 1, 1980, and applicable as provided by § 7
of such Act, which appears as 10 USCS § 1447 note), provided:
"(a)(1) The Secretary concerned shall pay an annuity to any individual
who is the surviving spouse of a member of the uniformed services
who—
"(A) died before September 21, 1972;
"(B) was serving on active duty in the uniformed services at the
time of his death and had served on active duty for a period of
not less than 20 years; and
"(C) was at the time of his death entitled to retired or retainer
pay or would have been entitled to that pay except that he had
not applied for or been granted that pay.
"(2) An annuity under paragraph (1) shall be paid under the
provisions of subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, United States
Code [10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.], in the same manner as if such
member had died on or after September 21, 1972.
"(b)(1) The amount of retired or retainer pay to be used as the basis
for the computation of an annuity under subsection (a) is the
amount of the retired or retainer pay to which the member would
have been entitled if the member had been entitled to that pay based
upon his years of active service when he died, adjusted by the
overall percentage increase in retired and retainer pay under section
1401a of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS § 1401a] (or any
prior comparable provision of law), during the period beginning on
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the date of the member's death and ending on the day before the
effective date of this section [effective Dec. 1, 1980].
"(2) In addition to any reduction required under the provisions of
subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS
§§ 1447 et seq.], the annuity paid to any surviving spouse under this
section shall be reduced by any amount such surviving spouse is
entitled to receive as an annuity under subchapter I of such chapter
[10 USCS §§ 1431 etseq.].
"(c) If an individual entitled to an annuity under this section is also
entitled to an annuity under subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10,
United States Code [10 USCS §§1447 et seq.], based upon a subsequent marriage, the individual may not receive both annuities but must
elect which to receive.
"(d) As used in this section:
"(1) The term 'uniformed services' means the Armed Forces and the
commissioned corps of the Public Health Service and of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
"(2) The term 'surviving spouse' has the meaning given the terms
'widow' and 'widower' in section 1447 of title 10, United States
Code [10 USCS § 1447].
"(3) The term 'Secretary concerned' has the meaning given such
term in section 101(8) of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS
§ 101(8)], and includes the Secretary of Commerce, with respect to
matters concerning the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, with
respect to matters concerning the Public Health Service.".
Open enrollment period for Survivor Benefit Plan. Act Aug. 13, 1981,
P. L. 97-35, Title II, Subtitle B, § 212, 95 Stat. 383; Sept. 8, 1982, P. L.
97-252, Title XI, § 1119, 96 Stat. 753, provided:
"(a)(1) Any eligible member who on the date of the enactment of this
Act [enacted Aug. 13, 1981] is not a participant in the Survivor
Benefit Plan may elect to participate in the Plan during the open
enrollment period specified in subsection (b).
"(2) Any eligible member who on the date of the enactment of this
Act [enacted Aug. 13, 1981] is a participant in the Plan but elected
not to participate in the Plan at the maximum level or (in the case
of an eligible member who is married) elected to provide an annuity
under the Plan for a dependent child and not for the member's
spouse may during the open enrollment period elect to participate in
the Plan at a higher level or to provide an annuity under the Plan
for the eligible member's spouse at a level not less than the level
provided for the dependent child.
"(3) Any such election shall be made in the same manner as an
election under section 1448 of such title [10 USCS § 1448] and shall
be effective when received by the Secretary concerned. Notwithstanding the last sentence of section 1452(a) of such title [10 USCS
§ 1452(a)], the reduction in retired or retainer pay prescribed by the
first sentence of such section shall, in the case of an individual
making an election under paragraph (1), begin on the first day of the
first month beginning after such election is effective.
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"(b) The open enrollment period is the period beginning on October 1,
1981, and ending on September 30, 1982, in the case of a member or
former member of the uniformed services who on August 13, 1981, was
entitled to retired or retainer pay, and the period beginning on October
1, 1982, and ending on September 30, 1983, in the case of a member or
former member who on August 13, 1981, would have been entitled to
retired pay under chapter 67 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS
§§ 1331 et seq.], but for the fact that he was under sixty years of age
on that date.
"(c) If an individual making an election under subsection (a) dies
before the end of the two-year period beginning on the date of that
election, the election is void and the amount of any reduction in the
retired or retainer pay of such individual that is attributable to the
election shall be paid in a lump sum to that individual's beneficiary
under the Plan (as designated under that election).
"(d) Sections 1449, 1453, and 1454 of title 10, United States Code [10
USCS §§ 1449, 1453, 1454], are applicable to individuals making
elections and to elections under this section.
"(e) For the purposes of this section:
"(1) The term 'eligible member' means a member or former member
of the uniformed services who on August 13, 1981 (A) was entitled
to retired or retainer pay, or (B) would have been entitled to retired
pay under chapter 67 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS
§§ 1331 et seq.], but for the fact that he was under sixty years of age
on that date.
"(2) The term 'Survivor Benefit Plan' or 'Plan' means the program
established under subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, United
States Code [10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.].
"(3) The term 'Secretary concerned' has the meaning given such
term in section 101(5) of title 37, United States Code [37 USCS
§ 101(5)].".
Application of Sept. 8, 1982 amendment of this section. For provisions
as to the application of the amendment of this section by Act Sept. 8,
1982, P. L. 97-252, Title X, § 1003 (see the 1982 Amendments note to
this section), see § 1006(c) of such Act, which appears as 10 USCS
§ 1408 note.
Application and construction of the Oct. 12, 1982 amendment of this
section. For provisions as to the application and construction of the
Oct. 12, 1982 amendment of this section (see the Amendments note to
this section), see § 5 of such Act, which appears as 10 USCS § 101
note.
Application of subsec. (b) to person described in subsec. (b)(3)(A). Act
Sept. 24, 1983, P. L. 98-94, Title IX, Part D, § 941(b), 97 Stat. 653,
provided: "In the case of a person who on the date of the enactment of
this Act [enacted Sept. 24, 1983] is a person described in subparagraph
(A) of subsection (b)(3) of section 1448 of title 10, United States Code
[subsec. (b)(3)(A) of this section] (as amended by subsection (a)(2) [see
the 1983 Amendments note to this section]), such subsection shall
apply to that person as if the one-year period provided for in subpara370
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graph (A) of such subsection began on the date of the enactment of
this Act [enacted Sept. 24, 1983].".
Annuity payable after September 1983. Act Sept. 24, 1983, P. L. 98-94,
Title IX, Part D, § 942(b), 97 Stat. 654, provided: "Any annuity
payable by reason of subsection (a) [amending Act Sept 21, 1972, P. L.
92-425, § 4, 86 Stat. 712, which appears as a note to this section] shall
be payable only for months after September 1983.".
Option for certain participants to withdraw from Survivor Benefit
Plan. Act Nov. 8, 1985, P. L. 99-145, Title VII, Part A, § 711(c), 99
Stat. 670, provided: "A person who during the period beginning on
October 19, 1984, and ending on the date of the enactment of this Act
[enacted Nov. 8, 1985] became a participant in the Survivor Benefit
Plan under subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, United States Code
[10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.], may elect to withdraw from the Plan before
the end of the one-year period beginning on the date of the enactment
of this Act [enacted Nov. 8, 1985]. Any person who makes a withdrawal shall be paid the amount of the contributions by such person
under the Plan, plus interest on such amount as determined by the
Secretary of Defense/'.
Application of Nov. 8, 1985 amendment to subsec. (d). Act Nov. 8,
1985, P. L. 99-145, Title VII, Part A, § 712(b), 99 Stat. 671, provided:
"(1) Section 1448(d) of title 10, United States Code [subsec. (d) of
this Section], as amended by subsection (a) applies to the surviving
spouse and dependent children of a person who dies on active duty
after September 20, 1972, and the former spouse of a person who
dies after September 7, 1982.
"(2) In the case of the surviving spouse and children of a person
who dies during the period beginning on September 21, 1972, and
ending on October 1, 1985, the Secretary concerned shall take
appropriate steps to locate persons eligible for an annuity under
section 1448(d) of title 10, United States Code [subsec. (d) of this
section], as amended by subsection (a). Any such person must
submit an application to the Secretary for such an annuity before
October 1, 1988, to be eligible to receive such annuity. Any such
annuity shall be effective only for months after the month in which
the Secretary receives such application.".
Application of subsec. (f). Act Nov. 8, 1985, P. L. 99-145, Title VII,
Part A, § 713(c), 99 Stat. 672, provided:
"(1) Section 1448(f) of title 10, United States Code [subsec. (f) of
this section], as added by subsection (a), shall apply to the surviving
spouse and dependent children of any person who dies after September 30, 1978, and the former spouse of a person who dies after
September 7, 1982.
"(2) In the case of the surviving spouse and dependents of a person
who dies during the period beginning on September 30, 1978, and
ending on October 1, 1985, the Secretary concerned shall take
appropriate steps to locate persons eligible for an annuity under
section 1448(0 of title 10, United States Code [subsec. (0 of this
section], as added by subsection (a). Any such person must submit
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an application to the Secretary for such an annuity before October 1,
1988, to be eligible to receive such annuity. Any such annuity shall
be effective only for months after the month in which the Secretary
receives such application.'*.
Revision for former spouse coverage already in effect. Act Nov. 8,
1985, P. L. 99-145, Title VII, Part A, § 716(b), 99 Stat. 674, provided:
"A person who before the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted
Nov. 8, 1985] made an election under section 1448(b) of title 10,
United States Code [subsec. (b) of this section], to provide an annuity
for a former spouse may elect, within the one-year period beginning on
that date of enactment, to change that election so as to provide an
annuity for the former spouse and the dependent children of the
person, as authorized by paragraph (4) of that section [subsec. (b)(4) of
this section] added by subsection (a). Such an election may be made
even though the former spouse for whom the annuity was provided has
died.".
One-year open period to switch computation of SBP annuity. Act Nov.
8, 1985, P. L. 99-145, Title VII, Part B, § 723(c), 99 Stat. 677,
provided: "A person who, before the effective date of this title [see 10
USCS § 1447 note], participated in the Survivor Benefit Plan under
subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS
§ 1447 et seq.], and had elected to provide an annuity to a former
spouse may, with the concurrence of such former spouse, elect to
terminate such annuity and provide an annuity to such former spouse
under section 1450(a)(1) of such title [10 USCS § 1450(a)(1)]. Any such
election shall be made before the end of the 12-month period beginning
on the date of the enactment of this Act [enacted Nov. 8, 1985].".
One-year open period for new former spouse coverage. Act Nov. 8,
1985, P. L. 99-145, Title VII, Part B, § 723(d), 99 Stat. 677, provided:
"A person who before the effective date of this part [see 10 USCS
§ 1447 note] was a participant in the Survivor Benefit Plan and did not
elect to provide an annuity to a former spouse may elect to provide an
annuity to a former spouse under the Plan. Any such election shall be
made before the end of the 12-month period beginning on the date of
the enactment of this Act [enacted Nov. 8, 1985].".
Application of amendments by Act Nov. 8, 1985. For provisions as to
the application of amendments to this section by Act Nov. 8, 1985, see
Act Nov. 8, 1985, P.L. 99-145, Title VII, Part C, § 731(b), 99 Stat.
678, which appears as 10 USCS § 1447 note.
CROSS REFERENCES
This section is referred to in 10 USCS §§ 1447, 1449, 1450-1452, 1455; 38
USCS §410.
RESEARCH GUIDE
Law Review Articles:
Hauserman and Fethke, Military Pensions as Divisible Assets: The
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act. 11 J Legis 27,
Winter, 1984.
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INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
1.
2.
3.
4.

Relationship to other law
Election to participate; timeliness
—Notice
—Incorrect listing of spouse's name

vors' annuity benefits under Survivor Benefit
Plan (10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.), notwithstanding
that day before being discharged, serviceman
elected not to participate in plan, after having
earlier elected full plan coverage for his family,
where Air Force did not furnish wife notice of
husband's election not to be covered by plan, as
required by § 1448(a). Barber v United States
(1982) 230 *Ct CI 287, 676 F2d 651.
Spouses of * pre-Survivor Benefit Plan (10
USCS §§ 1447 et seq.) are entitled to notice from
government of retiree's election not to participate
in SBP; retiree's election not to participate in
Plan has no effect until government fulfils its
ministerial duty to notify retiree's spouse. Passaro v United States (1984) 4 CI Ct 395, adhered
to, on reconsideration 5 CI Ct 754.
Failure of government of notify spouse of
military retiree's election not to participate in
Survivor Benefits Plan violates 10 USCS
§ 1448(a) and gives rise to claim for damages on
part of surviving spouse cognizable in claims
court. Passaro v United States (1984) 5 CI Ct
754.

1. Relationship to other law
Limitation contained in 10 USCS § 8963(a)
restricting use of promotion to temporary grade
for retired pay computation purposes is not
applicable in establishing survivor benefit plan
annuity under 10 USCS § 1448(d). (1980) 59 Op
Comp Gen p 276.
Children of deceased Air Force Reserve officer
killed while on active duty for training after
having elected coverage for his children under
Survivor Benefit Plan (10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.)
and subsequently qualifying for retirement under
§8911, are entitled to annuity payments under
Survivor Benefit Plan, where officer was not
actually retired and entitled to retired pay under
§8911, since merely qualifying for retirement
under another statute does not void election to
participate in Survivor Benefit Plan where election was valid when made. (1982) 61 Op Comp
Gen p 441.

4. —Incorrect listing of spouse's name
While incorrect listing of spouse's name on
Survivor Benefit Plan form by member automatically covered by Plan under 10 USCS § 1448(a)
would not ordinarily be sufficient to remove
member from coverage nor would it affect legal
spouse's right to annuity under Plan since in
such case listing of spouse's name on form is
primarily for administrative convenience; however, in case of retired member who must make
affirmative election to participate in Plan pursuant to Public Law 92-425 § 3(b) (10 USCS
§ 1448 note), completion of form is evidence of
member's election to participate and where
member made election to participate for purpose
of providing annuity to ineligible beneficiary, in
this case second spouse whose marriage was
nullity due to continued validity of previous
marriage, election to participate is defective and
must be considered invalid and no annuity may
be paid although amounts deducted from retired
pay as cost of Plan coverage should be paid to
proper beneficiary under 10 USCS § 2771. (1978)
57 Op Comp Gen 426.

2. Election to participate; timeliness
Where member had opportunity to elect for
dependent children during 18-month period authorized by Public Law 92-425, § 3(b), 86 Stat
711, and failed to do so before March 21, 1974,
when his election period for Survivor Benefits
Plan closed, he is precluded from thereafter
amending his coverage to include dependent
children. (1977) 56 Op Comp Gen 1022.
Pre-Survivor Benefit Plan effective date retiree,
who is unmarried with dependent child on first
anniversary date of Survivor Benefit Plan, may
elect spouse coverage under fourth sentence of
10 USCS § 1448(a) upon marriage after close of
18-month election period authorized under subsection 3(b) of Public Law 92-425 (10 USCS
§ 1448 note) notwithstanding fact that he could
have elected coverage for his dependent child
during that period and failed to do so. (1977) 57
Op Comp Gen 98.
3. —Notice
Widow and surviving dependent child of retired serviceman are entitled to recover survi-

§ 1449.

Mental incompetency of member

If a person to whom section 1448 of this title [10 USCS § 1448] applies is
determined to be mentally incompetent by medical officers of the armed
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(11) The term "retired pay" includes retainer pay paid under section 6330 of this title.
(12) The term "standard annuity" means an annuity provided by virtue of eligibility under
section 1448(a)(1)(A) of this title.
(13) The term "reserve-component annuity" means an annuity provided by virtue of
eligibility under section 1448(a)(1)(B) of this title.
(14) The term "reserve-component retired pay" means retired pay under chapter 67 of this
title [10 USCS §§ 1331 et seq.].
(As amended July 1, 1986, P. L. 99-348, Title III. § 301(a)(1), 100 Stat. 702; Nov. 14, 1986, P.
L. 99-661, Div A, Title XIII, Part E, § 1343(a)(8)(A), 100 Stat 3992; Dec. 4, 1987, P. L. 100180, D i v A , Title XII, Part D, § 1231(17), 101 Stat. 1161; Nov. 29, 1989, P. L. 101-189, Div
A, Title XIV, § 1407(a)(l)-(3), 103 Stat. 1589; Nov. 5, 1990, P. L. 101-510, Div A, Title XIV,
Part H, § 1484f/;(4)(C)(i), 104 Stat. 1719.)
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HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Amendments:
1986. Act July 1, 1986, in para. (2)(A), in the introductory matter, inserted "(determined
without regard to any reduction under section 1409(b)(2) of this title)".
Act Nov. 14, 1986, in para. (2)(A), in the introductory matter, deleted "or retainer"
following "retired or" in two places.
1987. Act Dec. 4, 1987, m paras. (1M13), inserted "The term" and, in paras. (2M13V revised
thefirstquoted word in each para, so that the initial letter of such word is lower case.
1989. Act Nov. 29, 1989,. in paras. (2)(B), in the introductory matter, and (Q(ii), substituted
"reserve-component retired pay" for "retired pay under chapter 67 of this title", in para.
(2)(C)(i), and the introductory matter in paras. (3) and (4), deleted "or retainer" following
"retired", in para. (5), in the concluding matter, substituted "this paragraph" for "this
clause" wherever appearing, in para. (11), inserted "paid under section 6330 of this title",
and added para. (14).
1990. Act Nov. 5, 1990 (effective 11/29/89 as provided by § 1484(1)(4XC) of this Act)
corrected the statutory instructions of Act Nov. 29, 1989, P. L. 101-189, § 1407(a), so that
the amendment to para. (5) concluding matter substituting "this paragraph" for "this clause"
was effected each place it appears.
Short title:
Act Nov. 29, 1989, P. L. 101-189, Div A, Title XIV, § 1401, 103 Stat 1577, provides: "This
title may be cited as the 'Military Survivor Benefits Improvement Act of 1989'.". For full
classification of this Title, consult USCS Tables volumes.
RESEARCH GUIDE
Law Review Articles:
Polchek, Recent property settlement issues for legal assistance attorneys. 1992 Army Law 4,
December, 1992.
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
Children of Survivor Benefit Plan (10 USCS
§§ 1447 et seq.) participants who are over 18 years
old and are not attending school may become
eligible for annuity at any time until they reach age
of 22 by undertaking full-time course of study, as
Congress in establishing plan indicated that children aged anywhere between 18 and 22 years old
who are students should be regarded as eligible
dependents for purposes of annuity coverage; (1986)
65 Op Comp Gen p 767.
If Survivor Benefit Plan (10 USCS §§ 1447 et
seq.) participant's child who is between 18 and 22
years old becomes full-time student and thus becomes eligible for annuity under plan, any resulting
adjustment that may be necessary in participant's
cost for beneficiary coverage should be made effective on first day of month after child has resumed
school attendance, as costs for benefit coverage
generally are assessed on monthly basis and should
be predicated on beneficiary status in beginning on
first day of month for that month. (1986) 65 Op
Comp Gen p 767.
Generally, valid marriage entered into by Survi-

vor Benefit Plan (10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq.) participant's child terminates child's annuity eligibility for
all time, as valid marriage operates to end child's
dependence upon parents, and relationship of dependency cannot be renewed by subsequent divorce;
if marriage is ended not by ordinary divorce but
rather by annulment, or there is otherwise judicial
decree rendered by court of competent jurisdiction
declaring marriage void, there would be proper
basis for concluding marriage was invalid, and
child's annuity coverage could be reinstated. (1986)
65 Op Comp Gen p 767.
Former wife is not entitled to be designated as
former spouse beneficiary under survivor benefit
plan of retired service member where court order
merely reiterated earlier divorce decree requirement
that service member provide former spouse coverage, since court order is not "modification" of
previous court order as that term is used in 10
USCS § 1447(8) and does not establish new statutory one yearfilingperiod for election of coverage.
Nawanna Driggers (1992) 71 Comp Gen 475; Constance L. Posner (1992) 71 Comp Gen 478.

§ 1448. Application of Plan
(a)(1) [Introductory matter unchanged]
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(A) [Unchanged]
(B) Persons who would be eligible for reserve-component retired pay but for the fact that
they are under 60 years of age.
(2) [Introductory matter unchanged]
(A) [Unchanged]
(B) to a person who (i) is eligible to participate in the Plan under paragraph (1)(B), (ii)
is married or has a dependent child when he is notified under section 1331(d) of this title
that he has completed the years of service required for eligibility for reserve-component
retired pay, and (iii) elects to participate in the Plan (and makes a designation under
subsection (e)) before the end of the 90-day period beginning on the date he receives such
notification.
[Concluding matter unchanged]
(3) [Unchanged]
(4)(A) An election under paragraph (2)(A) not to participate in the Plan is irrevocable if
not revoked before the date on which the person first becomes entitled to retired pay.
(B) [Unchanged]
(5) A person who is not married when he becomes eligible to participate in the Plan but
who later marries or acquires a dependent child may elect to participate in the Plan, but
his election must be written, signed by him, and received by the Secretary concerned within
one year after he marries or acquires that dependent child. Such an election may not be
revoked except in accordance with subsection (b)(3). His election is effective as of the first
day of the first calendar month following the month in which his election is received by the
Secretary concerned. In the case of a person providing a reserve-component annuity, such
an election shall include a designation under subsection (e).
(6) [Unchanged]
(b)(l)-(4) [Unchanged]
(5) A person who elects to provide an annuity to a former spouse under paragraph (2) or
(3) shall, at the time of making the election, provide the Secretary concerned with a written
statement (in a form to be prescribed by that Secretary and signed by such person and the
former spouse) setting forth (A) whether the election is being made pursuant to the
requirements of a court order, or (B) whether the election is being made pursuant to a
written agreement previously entered into voluntarily by such person as a part of or incident
to a proceeding of divorce, dissolution, or annulment and (if so) whether such voluntary
written agreement has been incorporated in, or ratified or approved by, a court order.
(c) [Unchanged]
(d)(1) [Unchanged]
(2) The Secretary concerned shall pay an annuity under this subchapter [10 USCS §§ 1447
et seq.] to the dependent child of a member described in paragraph (1) if* there is no surviving
spouse or if the member's surviving spouse subsequently dies.
(3)-(5) [Unchanged]
(e) [Unchanged]
(f)(1) [Introductory matter unchanged]
(A) before being notified under section 1331(d) of this title [10 USCS § 1331(d)] that he
has completed the years of service required for eligibility for reserve-component retired
pay; or
(B) during the 90-day period beginning on the date he receives notification under section
1331(d) of this title that he has completed the years of service required for eligibility for
reserve-component retired pay if he had not made an election under subsection (a)(2)(B)
to participate in the Plan.
(2) The Secretary concerned shall pay an annuity under this subchapter [10 USCS §§ 1447
et seq.] to the dependent child of a person described in paragraph (1) if there is no surviving
spouse or if the person's surviving spouse subsequently dies.
(3), (4) [Unchanged]
(g) [Unchanged]
(As amended Nov. 14, 1986, P. L. 99-661, Div A, Title VI, Part D, §§ 641(b)(1), 642(a), 100
Stat. 3885, 3886; Nov. 14, 1986, P. L. 99-661, Div A, Title XIII, Part E, § 1343(a)(8)(B), 100
Stat. 3992; Nov. 29, 1989, P. L. 101-189, Div A, Title XIV, § 1407(a)(2), (3), 103 Stat. 1588.)
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
Amendments:
1986. Act Nov. 14, 1986 (applicable as provided by § 641(c) of such Act, which appears as
10 USCS § 1450 note), in subsec. (b), in para. (5), inserted "(A) whether the election is being
made pursuant to the requirements of a court order, or (B)".
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Such Act further (applicable as provided by § 642(c) of such Act, which appears as a note
to this section), in subsec. (d), substituted "if there is no surviving spouse or if the member's
surviving spouse subsequently dies'* for "if the member and the member's spouse die as a
result of a common accident"; and in subsec. (f), m para. (2), substituted "if there is no
surviving spouse or if the person's surviving spouse subsequently dies" for "if the person and
the person's spouse die as a result of a common accident".
Such Act further, in subsec. (aX5), substituted "a reserve-component annuity" for "an
annuity by virtue of eligibility under paragraph (1)(B)"
1989. Act Nov. 29, 1989, in subsec. (a), m paras. (1)(B) and (2)(B), substituted "reservecomponent retired pay" for "retired pay under chapter 67 of this title", deleted "or retainer"
following "retired", and, in subsec. (f)(1)(A) and (B), substituted "reserve-component retired
pay" for "retired pay under chapter 67 of this title".
Other provisions:
Income supplement for certain widows of retired members of the uniformed forces; special
annuity for widows of commissioned personnel of the Public Health Service and National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in lieu of VA Pension. Act Sept. 21, 1972, P. L.
92-425, § 4, 86 Stat. 712; Oct. 14, 1976, P. L. 94-496, § 2, 90 Stat. 2375; Sept. 30, 1978, P.
L. 95-397, Title II, § 209, 92 Stat. 848; Oct. 9, 1980, P. I. 96-402, § 6, 94 Stat. 1708; Sept
24, 1983, P. L. 98-94, Title IX, Part D, § 942(a), 97 Stat. 654 (effective for payments after
Sept. 1983, as provided by § 942(b) by such Act), provided:
(a), (b) [Unchanged]
"(c) The amounts specified in subsections (a)(3) and (b) shall be increased by the Secretary
concerned whenever there is an increase under section 3112 [now section 5112] of title 38,
United States Code, in the maximum annual rate of pension under section 541(b) of such
title. Any such increase under the preceding sentence shall be in the same amount, and shall
have the same effective date, as such increase in the maximum annual rate of pension."
(d) [Unchanged]
Revision for former spouse coverage already in effect. Act Nov 8, 1985, P L. 99-145, Title
VII, Part A, § 716(b), 99 Stat. 674; Nov 14, 1986, P L, 99-661, Div A, Title VI, Part D,
§ 645, 100 Stat. 3887, provides:
"A person who before March 1, 1986 made an election under section 1448(b) of title 10,
United States Code [subsec. (b) of this section], to provide an annuity for a former spouse
may elect to change that election so as to provide an annuity for the former spouse and the
dependent children of the person, as authorized by paragraph (4) of that section [subsec.
(b)(4) of this section] added by subsection (a). Such an election may be made even though
the former spouse for whom the annuity was provided has died. Such an election must be
made—
"(1) not later than March 1, 1987, m the case of a person who made the election to
provide an annuity for a former spouse before November 8, 1985; and
"(2) not later than the end of the one-year period beginning on the date of the enactment
of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1987 [enacted Nov. 14, 1986], in the
case of a person who made the election to provide an annuity for a former spouse during
the period beginning on November 8, 1985, and ending on February 28, 1986.".
Application of the amendments made by § 642 of Act Nov. 14, 1986. Act Nov. 14, 1986, P.
L. 99-661, Div A, Title VI, Part D, § 642(c), 100 Stat. 3886, provides: "The amendments
made by subsection (a) shall apply only to claims ansmg on or after March 1, 1986. The
amendments made by subsection (b) shall apply to payments for periods after February 28,
1986.".
Authority for certain remarried Survivor Benefit Plan participants to withdraw from Plan.
Act Dec. 4, 1987, P. L. 100-180, Div A, Title VI, Part D, § 631, 101 Stat. 1104, provides:
"(a) Authority to withdraw. (1) An individual who is a participant in the Survivor Benefit
Plan under subchapter II of chapter 73 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS §§ 1447
et seq.], and is described m paragraph (2) may, with the consent of such individual's
spouse, withdraw from participation in the Plan.
"(2) An individual referred to m paragraph (1) is an individual who—
"(A) is providing coverage for a spouse or for a spouse and child under the Plan; and
"(B) remained before March 1, 1986, and at a time when such individual was a
participant in the Plan but did not have an eligible spouse beneficiary under the Plan.
"(b) Applicable provisions. An election under subsection (a) shall be subject to subparagraphs
(B) and (D) of section 1448(a)(6) of title 10, United States Code, except that in applying such
subparagraph (B) to subsection (a), the one-year period referred to in clause (u) of such
subparagraph shall extend until the end of the one-year period beginning 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
"(c) Treatment of prior contributions. No refund of amounts by which the retired pay of a
participant in the Survivor Benefit Plan has been reduced by reason of section 1452 of title
10, United States Code, may be made to an individual who withdraws from the Survivor
Benefit Plan under subsection (a).".
Annuity for certain surviving spouses. Act Sept. 29, 1988, P. L. 100-456, Div A, Title VI,
Part F, § 653, 102 Stat. 1991, provides:
"(a) Annuity (1) The Secretary concerned shall pay an annuity to the qualified surviving
spouse of each member of the uniformed services who—
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"(A) died before November 1, 1953; and
"(B) was entitled to retired or retainer pay on the date of death.
"(2) A qualified surviving spouse for purposes of this section is a surviving spouse who
has not remained and who is eligible for an annuity under section 4 of Public Law 92425(10U.S.C 1448 note).
"(b) Amount of annuity. (1) An annuity payable under this section shall be paid at the rate
of $165 per month, as adjusted from time to time under subsection (c).
"(2) An annuity paid to a surviving spouse under this section shall be reduced by the
amount of dependency and indemnity compensation (DIQ to which the surviving spouse
is entitled under section 411(a) of title 38, United States Code.
"(c) Cost-of-living mcreases. Whenever retired or retainer pay is mcreased under section
1401a(bX2) of title 10, United States Code, each annuity that is payable under this section
shall be mcreased at the same time and by the same total percent The amount of the mcrease
shall be based on the monthly annuity payable before any reduction under this section.
"(d) Relationship to other programs. An annuity paid to a surviving spouse under this section
is m addition to any pension to which the surviving spouse is entitled under subchapter III
of chapter 15 of title 38, United States Code [38 USCS §§ 532 et seq.], or section 306 of the
Veterans' and Survivors' Pension Improvement Act of 1978 (38 U.S.C. 521 note), and any
payment made under the provisions of section 4 of Public Law 92-425 [note to this section].
An annuity paid under this section shall not be considered as income for the purposes of
eligibility for any such pension.
"(e) Definitions. For purposes of this section.
"(1) The terms 'uniformed services' and 'Secretary concerned* have the meanings given
those terms m section 101 of title 37, United States Code.
"(2) The term Surviving spouse' has the meaning given the terms 'widow' and 'widower'
in paragraphs (3) and (4), respectively, of section 1447 of title 10, United States Code.
"(f) Effective date. Annuities under this section shall be paid for months beginning after the
month m which this Act is enacted. No benefit shall accrue to any person by reason of the
enactment of this section for any period before the first month referred to m the preceding
sentence. No benefit shall be paid to any person under this section unless an application for
such benefit has been filed with the Secretary concerned by or on behalf of such person.".
Open enrollment period. Act Nov. 29, 1989, P L. 101-189, Div A, Title XIV, § 1405, 103
Stat. 1586; Nov. 5, 1990, P. L. 101-510, Div A, Tide VI, Part D, § 631(2), Title XIV, Part
H, § 14840X4)(B), 104 Stat. 1580, 1719; Dec. 5, 1991, P. L. 102-190, Div A, Title VI, Part
E, § 653(aXl), (c)(2), 105 Stat. 1388; Oct. 23, 1992, P. L. 102-484, Div A, Title VI, Subtitie
D, § 643, 106 Stat. 2425, provides
"(a) Persons not currently participating m Survivor Benefit Plan (1) Election of SBP
coverage. An eligible retired or former member may elect to participate in the Survivor
Benefit Plan during the open enrollment period specified m subsection (f).
"(2) Election of supplemental annuity coverage. An eligible retired or former member
who elects under paragraph (1) to participate in the Survivor Benefit Plan at the
maximum level may also elect during the open enrollment penod to participate m the
Supplemental Survivor Benefit Plan established under subchapter III of chapter 73 of
title 10, United States Code [10 USCS §§ 1456 et seq.], as added by section 1404
"(3) Eligible retired or former member. For purposes of paragraphs (1) and (2), an eligible
retired or former member is a member or former member of the uniformed services who
on the day before the first day of the open enrollment penod is not a participant m the
Survivor Benefit Plan and—
"(A) is entitled to retired pay; or
"(B) would be entitled to retired pay under chapter 67 of title 10 [10 USCS §§ 1331
et seq.], Umted States Code, but for the fact that such member or former member is
under 60 years of age.
"(4) Status under SBP of persons making elections. (A) Standard annuity A person
making an election under paragraph (1) by reason of eligibility under paragraph
(3XA) shall be treated for all purposes as providing a standard annuity under the
Survivor Benefit Plan.
"(B) Reserve-component annuity. A person making an election under paragraph (1)
by reason of eligibility under paragraph (3)(B) shall be treated for all purposes as
providing a reserve-component annuity under the Survivor Benefit Plan.
"(b) Election to mcrease coverage under SBP. A person who on the day before the first day
of the open enrollment period is a participant m the Survivor Benefit Plan but is not
participating at the maximum base amount or is providing coverage under the Plan for a
dependent child and not for the person's spouse or former spouse may, during the open
enrollment penod elect to—
"(1) participate m the Plan at a higher base amount (not in excess of the participant's
retired pay), or
'•(2) provide annuity coverage under the Plan for the person's spouse or former spouse
at a base amount not less than the base amount provided for the dependent child.
"(c) Election for current SBP participants to participate in supplemental SBP. (1) Election.
A person who is eligible to make an election under this paragraph may elect during the
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open enrollment period to participate in the Supplemental Survivor Benefit Plan established under subchapter III of chapter 73 of title 10, United States Code [10 USCS
§§ 1456 et seq ], as added by section 1404
"(2) Persons eligible Except as provided in paragraph (3), a person is eligible to make
an election under paragraph (1) if on the day before the first day of the open enrollment
period the person is a participant in the Survivor Benefit Plan at the maximum level, or
during the open enrollment period the person increases the level of such participation to
the maximum level under subsection (b) of this section, and under that Plan is providing
annuity coverage for the person's spouse or a former spouse
"(3) Limitation on eligibility for certain SBP participants not affected by two-tier annuity
computation A person is not eligible to make an election under paragraph (1) if (as
determined by the Secretary concerned) the annuity of a spouse or former spouse
beneficiary of that person under the Survivor Benefit Plan will be computed under section
1451(e) of title 10, United States Code However, such a person may during the open
enrollment period waive the right to have that annuity computed under such section.
Any such election is irrevocable. A person makmg such a waiver may make an election
under paragraph (1) as in the case of any other participant m the Survivor Benefit Plan.
"(d) Manner of makmg elections An election under this section must be made in writing,
signed by the person makmg the election, and received by the Secretary concerned before the
end of the open enrollment period Any such election shall be made subject to the same
conditions, and with the same opportunities for designation of beneficiaries and specification
of base amount, that apply under the Survivor Benefit Plan or the Supplemental Survivor
Benefit Plan, as the case may be A person makmg an election under subsection (a) to provide
a reserve-component annuity shall make a designation described in section 1448(e) of title
10, United States Code
"(e) Effective date for elections Any such election shall be effective as of the first day of the
first calendar month following the month m which the election is received by the Secretary
concerned
"(f) Open enrollment period defined The open enrollment period is the one-year period
beginning on April 1, 1992
"(g) Effect of death of person makmg election within two years of makmg election (1) If a
person makmg an election under this section dies before the end of the two-year period
beginning on the effective date of the election, the election is void and the amount of any
reduction m retired pay of the person that is attributable to the election shall be paid m
a lump sum to the person who would have been the deceased person's beneficiary under
the voided election if the deceased person had died after the end of such two-year period
"(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply m the case of the death of a person makmg an election
under subsection (a) if the beneficiary of that person under the election is the person's
spouse and that spouse was entitled, before November 1, 1990, to receive dependency and
indemnity compensation benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs based on a
previous marriage to another member or former member of the uniformed services.
"(h) Applicability of certain provisions of law The provisions of sections 1449, 1453, and
1454 of title 10, Umted States Code, are applicable to a person makmg an election, and to
an election, under this section m the same manner as if the election were made under the
Survivor Benefit Plan or the Supplemental Survivor Benefit Plan, as the case may be
"(l) Report concerning open season Not later than June 1, 1990, the Secretary of Defense
shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report on the open season authorized by this section for the Survivor Benefit Plan
The report shall include—
"(1) a description of the Secretary's plans for implementation of the open season,
"(2) the Secretary's estimates of the costs associated with the open season, including any
anticipated effect of the open season on the actuarial status of the Department of Defense
Military Retirement Fund, and
"(3) any recommendation by the Secretary for further legislative action
"(j) Additional premium The Secretary of Defense may require that the SBP premium for a
person makmg an election under subsection (aXl) or (b) include, in addition to the amount
required under section 1452(a) of title 10, Umted States Code, an amount determined under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense for the purposes of this subsection Any
such amount shall be stated as a percentage of the base amount of the person makmg the
election and shall reflect the number of years that have elapsed smce the person retired, but
may not exceed 4 5 percent of that person's base amount "
Definitions. Act Nov 29, 1989, P L 101-189, Div A, Title XTV, § 1406, 103 Stat 1588,
Dec 5, 1991, P L 102-190, Div A, Title VI, Part E. § 653(a)(2), 105 Stat 1388, provides
"For the purpose of this title [for full classification, consult USCS Tables volumes]
"(1) The term 'Survivor Benefit Plan' means the program established under subchapter
II of chapter 73 of title 10, Umted States Code [10 USCS §§ 1447 et seq ]
"(2) The term 'retired pay' mcludes retainer pay paid under section 6330 of title 10,
United States Code
"(3) The terms 'uniformed services' and *Secretary concerned' have the meanings given
those terms in section 101 of title 37, Umted States Code

10 USCS § 1448
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"(4) The term 'SBP premium' means the reduction in retired pay required as a condition
afp/vvuiiffg &? JU2xv}/y uxder /2?<? Surveyor Ba^cdt Plan.
"(5) The term 'base amount* has the meaning & v c n th a t t e r m m section 1447(2) of title
10, United States Code.".
RESEARCH GXJTDE

Law Review Articles:
Polchek, Recent property settlement issues for legal assistance attorneys. 1992 Army Law 4,
December, 1992.
INTERPRETIVE NOTES AND DECISIONS
5. Right of action
2. Election to participate; timeliness
Terminally ill retired officer's election of Survivor
Benefit Plan (SBP) coverage for former spouse
pursuant to clause in divorce settlement was irrevocable, and precluded current spouse from SBP
coverage where election in favor of former spouse
was made in proper form, member was never adjudicated incompetent, and great weight of medical
and other evidence presented supported former
spouse's contention that he was mentally competent
when he made election. (1985) 65 Op Comp Gen p
134.
3. —Notice

Air Force's failure to notify spouses of service
members' election to not participate in survivor
annuity benefits under Survivor Benefit Plan (10
USCS §§ 1447-1455) rendered such elections ineffective as Congress intended that election out would
be void unless statutory notice requirement was
satisfied. Kelly v United States (1987, CA F Q 826
F2d 1049.
Widow's affidavit containing assertion that she
received no notice of late husband's decision to
forego participation in annuity plan rebutted presumption that Air Force officials discharged their
duties correctly, and thus presumption ceased to
exist. Kelly v United States (1986) 10 CI Ct 579,
aflfd (CA F Q 826 F2d 1049.

Air Force was not contractually or statutorily
obli§atecj t 0 notify estranged spouse of retired ser^ ^ member's failure to elect coverage under Survivor
Benefit Plan that went into effect after his
reti
*ement. Wirt v United States (1990) 21 CI a
92.
^ith respect to claims for annuities (survivor
benefit plan annuities and minimum income widow
ann
Uities) by surviving spouses of deceased mem^ ^ of uniformed services, where member elected
not
to participate in annuity program but governmex
U failed to notify spouse of that fact (effect of
which is to invalidate non-participation election), 31
US
^ S § 3702(b), which limits General Accounting
Ogee's jurisdiction to consider claims to those that
are §Ied within six years after they arise, operates as
stat^ te 0 f limitations, such that surviving spouse
mus
t claim benefits within six years of member's
death (or when all events have transpired necessary
to
$le claim) or be forever barred from doing so.
Application of Barring Act to Annuity Claims
0*92) 71 Comp Gen 398.
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daaiages. Dean v United States (1986) 10 CI Ct 563.
have made s u
manner as tb
§ 1449. Mental incompetency of member
that such ^ n
If a person to whom section 1448 of this title applies \s determined to be mentally incompetent
order, reguj a ,
by medical oflfcers of the armed force concerned or 0 f t n e Department of Veterans Affairs, or
of such per s o
by a court of competent jurisdiction, any election described in subsection (a)(2) or (b), of section
official) tha^t <
1448 of this title may be made on behalf of that Person t>y foc Secretary concerned. If the
State law.
person for whom the Secretary has made an election is later determined to be mentally
(B)
An ele^tj
competent by an authority named in the first sent^nCe> he may, within 180 days after that
case
of an> ,
determination revoke that election. Any deductions m a c i e from retired pay by reason of such
spouse of the
an election will not be refunded.
(C) [Uncha,ni
(As amended Nov. 29, 1989, P. L. 101-189, Div A, T ^ e XIV, § 1407(a)(3), Title XVI, Part C,
(4) A court o^-d
§ 1621(a)(1), 103 Stat. 1588, 1602.)
under section \4
former spouse a
HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS A N D DIRECTIVES
(g) [Unchanged]
Amendments:
(h) Except as provi
1989. Act Nov. 29, 1989 deleted "or retainer" folioving "retired" and substituted "Department of Veterans Affairs" for "Veterans* Adininistnrtjon".
to any other payi^
annuity shall be c 0
§ 1450. Payment of annuity: beneficiaries
Affairs.
(a) [Unchanged]
6). (j) [Unchanged
(b) An annuity payable to the beneficiary terminates effective as of the first day of the month (k)(l)Ifawidow,,
in which eligibility is lost. An annuity for a widow, Widower, or former spouse shall be paid to
(c) subsequent^
the widow, widower, or former spouse while the wiflow, widower, or former spouse is living
of the remarri a
or, if the widow, widower, or former spouse remarries before reaching age 55, until the widow,
remarriage sue},
widower, or former spouse remarries. If the widow, widower, or former spouse remarries before
of the annuity (
reaching age 55 and that marriage is terminated by fleath, annulment, or divorce, payment of
the effective d^j
the annuity will be resumed effective as of the first d a y 0 f the month in which the marriage is
be in effect witj
so terminated. However, if the widow, widower, or fc )rm er spouse is also entitled to an annuity
subsection (c) £
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that statute. Thus, in its decision upholding jurisdiction of a claim against the United States for contribution—incidentally, a
claim that was not expressly covered by
the Act—the Court wrote:
"This brings the instant cases within
the principle approved in United States
v. Aetna Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383
[TO S.Ct. 207, 216, 94 L.Ed. 171]:
" 'In argument before a number of District Courts and Courts of Appeals, the
Government relied upon the doctrine that
statutes waiving sovereign immunity
must be strictly construed. We think
that the congressional attitude in passing
the Tort Claims Act is more accurately
reflected by Judge Cardozo's statement
in Anderson v. \5^Hayes Construction
Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153 N.E. 28, 2930: 'The exemption of the sovereign
from suit involves hardship enough
where consent has been withheld. We
are not to add to its rigor by refinement
of construction where consent has been
announced."'
"Once we have concluded that the Federal Tort Claims Act covers an action for
contribution due a tort-feasor, we should
not, by refinement of construction, limit
that consent to cases where the procedure is by separate action and deny it
where the same relief is sought in a
third-party action. As applied to the
State of New York, Judge Cardozo said
in language which is apt here: 'No sensible reason can be imagined why the
State, having consented to be sued,
should thus paralyze the remedy.' 243
37. See also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682. 709, 69 S.Ct. 1457,
1470, 93 L.Ed. 1628 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("In the course of a century or more a
steadily expanding conception of public morality regarding 'governmental responsibility' has
led to a 'generous policy of consent for suits
against the government' to compensate for the
negligence of its agents as well as to secure
obedience to its contracts"); Great Northern Life
Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 59, 64 S.Ct. 873,
879, 88 L.Ed. 1121 (1944) (Frankfurter. J., dissenting) ("[CJonsent does not depend on some
ritualistic formula. Nor are any words needed
to indicate submission to the law of the land.
The readiness or reluctance with which courts

N.Y. at 147, 153 N.E. at 29. 'A sense of
justice has brought a progressive relaxation by legislative enactments of the
rigor of the immunity rule. As representative governments attempt to ameliorate inequalities as necessities will permit, prerogatives of the government
yield to the needs of the citizen
When authority is given, it is liberally
construed.' United States v. Shaw, 309
U.S. 495, 501[, 60 S.Ct. 659, 661, 84 L.Ed.
888]." United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,
340 U.S. 543, 554-555, 71 S.Ct. 399, 406407, 95 L.Ed. 523 (1951).37
(sspToday we should be guided by the
wisdom of Cardozo and Friendly rather
than by the "unnecessarily grudging" approach that was unanimously rebuffed in
Gibbs. See 383 U.S., at 725, 86 S.Ct., at
1138.
I respectfully dissent.
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490 U.S. 581, 104 L.Ed.2d 675

j^siGerald E. MANSELL, Appellant
v.
Gaye M. MANSELL.
No. 87-201.
Argued Jan. 10, 1989.
Decided May 30, 1989.
Former husband sought modification
of divorce decree by removing the provision
find such consent has naturally been influenced
by prevailing views regarding the moral sanction to be attributed to a State's freedom from
suability. Whether this immunity is an absolute
survival of the monarchial privilege, or is a
manifestation merely of power, or rests on abstract legal grounds, it undoubtedly runs counter to modern democratic notions of the moral
responsibility of the State. Accordingly, courts
reflect a strong legislative momentum in their
tendency to extend the legal responsibility of
Government and to confirm MaitJand's belief,
expressed nearly fifty years ago, that 'it is a
wholesome sight to see "the Crown" sued and
answering for its torts'").
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that required him to share his total retire- / communitv propertv divisible upon divorce
ment pay with his former wife The Call
10 U S C A § 1408(a)(4)(B) (c)(1)
forma Superior Court Merced County, denied the request without opinion Former
Syllabus *
husband appealed The California Court of
In direct response to McCarty v
Appeal affirmed The California Supreme
McCarty, 453 I S 210 101 S Ct 2728, 69
Court denied the former husband's petition L Ed 2d 589 which held that federal law as
for review Appeal was taken The Su- it then existed completely pre-empted the
preme Court, Justice Marshall, held that application of s>tate community property
military retirement pay that had been law to military retirement pay, Congress
waived b> the former husband in order to enacted the Uniformed Services Former
receive veterans disability benefits was not Spouses' Protection "Act (Act), 10 U S C
community property divisible upon divorce
§ 1408 (1982 ed and Supp V) which authorizes state courts to treat as community
Reversed and remanded
property "disposable retired or retainer
Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting
pay,' § 1408(c)(1), bpecifically defining
opinion, in which Justice Blackmun joined
such pay to exclude, inter aha, any miliOpinion on remand, 217 Cal App 219, tary retirement pay waived in order for the
265 Cal Rptr 227
retiree to receive veterans' disability benefits, § 1408(a)(4)(B) The Act also creates a
mechanism whereby the Federal Govern1. Husband and Wife <s=>249(3)
ment will make direct community property
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' payments of up to 50 percent of disposable
Protection Act did not give state courts retired or retainer pay to certain former
authority to treat total military retirement spouses who present state-court orders
pay as community property, but rather, granting such pay A pre-McCarty propergave them authority to treat disposable ty settlement agreement between appellant
retirement pay as community property 10 and appellee, who were divorced in a counU S C A § 1408(aX4)(B)ric)(D"
ty Superior Court in California, a community property State, provided that appellant
2. Divorce <3=>252.3(4)
would pay appellee 50 percent of his total
Husband and Wife <s=>249(3)
military retirement pay, including that porUniformed Services Former Spouses'
tion of such pay which he had waived in
Protection Act imposes substantive limits
order to receive military disability benefits
on state courts' power to divide military
After the Act's passage, the Superior Court
retirement pay, and is not garnishment
denied appellant's request to modify the
statute designed solely to limit when federdivorce decree by removing the provision
al government will make direct payment to
requiring him to share his total retirement
former spouse, Act does not give state
pay with appellee The State Court of Apcourts authonty to treat total retirement
peal affirmed, rejecting appellant's contenpay as community property 10 U S C A
tion that the Act precluded the lower court
§ 1408(a)(4XB), (c)(1)
from treating as community property the
military retirement pay appellant had
3. Divorce <s»252.3(4)
waived to receive disability benefits In so
Husband and Wife <s=>249(3)
Military retirement pay that had bedn holding, the court relied on a State Suwaived by former husband m order to rec- preme Court decision which reasoned that
eive veterans' disability benefits was^rtoc the Act did not limit a state court's ability
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
of the Court but has been prepared by the Re
porter of Decisions for the convenience of the

reader See imted States v Detroit Lumber Co,
200 I S 321 337 26 S Ct 282 287 50 L Ed
499
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to treat total military retirement pay as
community property and to enforce a former spouse's rights to such pay through
remedies other than direct Federal Government payments.
Held: The Act does not grant state
courts the power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay
waived by the retiree in order to receive
veterans' disability benefits. In light of
§ 1408(a)(4)(B)'s limiting language as to
such waived pay, the Act's plain and precise language establishes that § 1408(c)(1)
grants state courts the authority to treat
only disposable retired pay, not total retired pay, as community property. Appellee's argument that the Act has no preemptive | e f f e c t of its own and must be
read as a garnishment statute designed
solely to limit when the Federal Government will make direct payments to a former spouse, and that, accordingly,
§ 1408(a)(4)(B) defines "disposable retired
or retainer pay" only because payments
under the statutory direct payment mechanism are limited to amounts defined by that
term, is flawed for two reasons. First, the
argument completely ignores the fact that
§ 1408(c)(1) also uses the quoted phrase to
limit specifically and plainly the extent to
which state courts may treat military retirement pay as community property. Second, each of § 1408(c)'s other subsections
imposes new substantive limits on state
courts' power to divide military retirement
pay, and it is unlikely that all of the section, except for § 1408(c)(1), was intended
to pre-empt state law. Thus, the garnishment argument misplaces its reliance on
the fact that the Act's saving clause expressly contemplates that a retiree will be
liable for "other payments" in excess of
those made under the direct payment mechanism, since that clause is more plausibly
interpreted as serving the limited purpose
of defeating any inference that the mechanism displaced state courts' authority to
divide and garnish property not covered by
the mechanism. Appellee's contention that
giving effect to the plain and precise statutory language would thwart the Act's obvi-

ous purposes of rejecting McCarty and restoring to state courts their pre-McCarty
authority is not supported by the legislative history, which, read as a whole, indicates that Congress intended both to create
new benefits for former spouses and to
place on state courts limits designed to
protect military retirees. Pp. 2028-2032.
Reversed and remanded.
MARSHALL. J., delivered the opinion
of the Court, in which REHNQUIST. C.J.,
and BRENNAN; WHITE, STEVENS,
SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined.
O'CONNOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
in which BLACKMUN, J., joined, post, p.
2032.
Douglas B. Cone, Merced, Cal., for appellant.
Dennis A. Cornell, Merced, Cal., for appellee.
Is&Justice MARSHALL delivered the
opinion of the Court.
In this appeal, we decide whether state
courts, consistent with the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982 ed. and
Supp. V) (Former Spouses' Protection Act
or Act), may treat as property divisible
upon divorce military retirement pay
waived by the retiree in order to receive
veterans' disability benefits. We hold that
they may not.
I
A
Members of the Armed Forces who serve
for a specified period, generally at least 20
years, may retire with retired pay. 10
U.S.C. § 3911 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. V)
(Army); § 6321 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp.
V) (Navy and Marine Corps); § 8911 et seq.
(1982 ed. and Supp. V) (Air Force). The
amount of retirement pay a veteran is eligible to receive is calculated according to the
number of years served and the rank

2026

109 SUPREME COURT REPORTER

achieved. §§ 3926 and 3991 (Army);
§§ 6325-6327 (Navy and Marine Corps);
§ 8929 (Air Force). Veterans who became
disabled as a result of military service are
eligible for disability benefits. 38 U.S.C.
§ 310 (wartime disability); § 331 (peacetime disability). The amount of disability
benefits a veteran is eligible to receive is
calculated according to the seriousness of
the disability and the degree to which the
veteran's ability to earn a living has been
impaired. §§ 314 and 355.
In order to prevent double dipping, a
military retiree may receive disability benefits only to the extent that he waives a
corresponding amount of his military retirement pay. § 3105.1 Because disability
benefits are exempt from federal, state,
and local taxation, § 3101(a), military retirees who waive their retirement pay in favor
of disability benefits inprease^ their aftertax income. Not surprisingly, waivers of
retirement pay are common.
California, like several other States,
treats property acquired during marriage
as community property. When a couple
divorces, a state court divides community
property equally between the spouses
while each spouse retains full ownership of
any separate property. See Cal.Civ.Code
Ann. § 4800(a) (West 1983 and Supp.1989).
California treats military retirement payments as community property to the extent
they derive from military service performed during the marriage. See, e.g., Casas v. Thompson, 42 Cal.3d 131, 139, 228
Cal.Rptr. 33, 37-38, 720 P.2d 921, 925, cert,
denied, 479 U.S. 1012, 107 S.Ct 659, 93
L.Ed.2d 713 (1986).
1. For example, if a military retiree is eligible for
$1500 a month in retirement pay and $500 a
month in disability benefits, he must waive $500
of retirement pay before he can receive any
disability benefits.
2. The language of the Act covers both community property and equitable distribution States, as
does our decision today. Because this case concerns a community property State, for the sake
of simplicity we refer to § 1408(c)(1) as authorizing state courts to treat "disposable retired or
retainer pay" as community property.
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In McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210,
101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), we
held that the federal statutes then governing military- retirement pay prevented state
courts from treating military retirement
pay as community property. We concluded
that treating such pay as community property would do clear damage to important
military personnel objectives. Id., at 232235, 101 S.Ct.. at 2741-2743. We reasoned
that Congress intended that military retirement pay reach the veteran and no one
else. Id., at 228, 101 S.Ct. at 2739. In
reaching this conclusion, we relied particularly on Congress' refusal to pass legislation that would have allowed former spouses to garnish military retirement pay to
satisfy property settlements. Id., at 228232, 101 S.Ct., at 2739-2741. Finally, noting the distressed plight of many former
spouses of military members, we observed
that Congress was free to change the statutory framework. Id, at 235-236, 101
S.Ct. at 2742-2743.
In direct response to McCarty, Congress
enacted the Former Spouses' Protection
Act, which authorizes state courts to treat
"disposable retired or retainer pay" as community property. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(cXD.2
" 'Disposable retired orj^retainer pay' " is
defined as "the total monthly retired or
retainer pay to which a military member isentitled," minus certain deductions.
§ 1408(a)(4) (1982 ed. and Supp. V).
Among the amounts required to be deducted from total pay are any amounts waived
in order to receive disability benefits.
§ 1408(a)(4)(B).3
3. Also deducted from total military retirement
pay are amounts: (a) owed by the military
member to the United States; (b) required by
law to be deducted from total pay. including
employment taxes, and fines and forfeitures ordered by courts-martial; (c) properly deducted
for federal, state, and local income taxes; (d)
withheld pursuant to other provisions under the
Internal Revenue Code; (e) equal to the amount
of retired pay of a member retired for physical
disability; and (0 deducted to create an annuity
for
the
former
spouse.
10
U.S.C.
§§ 1408(a)(4)(AMF) (1982 ed. and Supp. V).
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The Act also creates a payments mechanism under which the Federal Government
will make direct payments to a former
spouse who presents, to the Secretary of
the relevant military service, a state-court
order granting her a portion of the military
retiree's disposable retired or retainer pay
This direct payments mechanism is limited
in two ways. § 1408(d). First, only a former spouse who was married to a military
member "for a period of 10 years or more
during which the member performed at
least 10 years of service creditable in determining the member's eligibility for retired
or retainer pay," § 1408(d)(2), is eligible to
receive direct community property payments. Second, the Federal Government
will not make community property payments that exceed 50 percent of disposable
retired or retainer pay. § 1408(e)(1).
B
Appellant Gerald E. Mansell and appellee
Gave M. Mansell were married for 23 years
and are the parents of six children. Their
marriage ended in 1979 with a divorce decree from the Merced County, California,
Superior Court. At that time, Major Mansell received both Air Force retirement pay
and, pursuant to a waiver of a portion of
that pay, disability benefits. Mrs. Mansell
and Major Mansell enteredj^into a property settlement which provided, in part, that
Major Mansell would pay Mrs. Mansell 50
percent of his total military retirement pay,
including that portion of retirement pay
waived so that Major Mansell could receive
disability benefits. Civ. No. 55594 (May 29,
4. That clause provides that veterans benefits
"shall not be assignable except to the extent
specifically authorized by law, and
shall be
exempt from the ciaim(s} of creditors, and shall
not be liable to attachment, levy, or seizure by
or under any legal or equitable process whatever, either before or after receipt by the [veteran]." 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1982 ed. and Supp.
V).
5. In a supplemental brief, Mrs. Mansell argues
that the doctrine of res judicata should have
prevented this prc-McCarty property settlement
from being reopened. KicCarty v. McCarty, 453
V.S. 210, 101 SCt. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981).
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1979). In 1983, Major Mansell asked the
Superior Court to modify the divorce decree by removing the provision that required him to share his total retirement pay
with Mrs Mansell. The Superior Court
denied Major Mansell's request without
opinion.
Major Mansell appealed to the California
Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District,
arguing that both the Former Spouses'
Protection Act and the anti-attachment
clause that protects a veteran's receipt of
disability benefits, 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a)
(1982 ed. and Supp. IV)f4 precluded the
Superior Court from treating military- retirement pay that had been waived to receive disability benefits as community property. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court of California in Casas v.
Thompson, supra, the Court of Appeal rejected that portion of Major Mansell's argument based on the Former Spouses' Protection Act. 5 Civ No. F002872 (Jan. 30,
1987).5 Casas held that after the passage
of the Former Spouses' Protection Act, federal law no longer pre-empted | ^state community property law as it applies to military retirement pay. The Casas court reasoned that the Act did not limit a state
court's ability to treat total military retirement pay as community property and to
enforce a former spouse's rights to such
pay through remedies other than direct
payments from the Federal Government.
42 Cal.3d, at 143-151, 228 Cal.Rptr., at 4046, 720 P2d, at 928-933. The Court of
Appeal did not discuss the anti-attachment
clause, 38 U.S.C. § 3101(a).6 The Supreme
The California Court of Appeal, however, decided that it was appropriate, under California lav*,
to reopen the settlement and reach the federal
question. 5 Civ No F002872 (Jan 30. 1987)
Whether the doctrine of res judicata, as applied
in California, should have harred the reopening
of pre- KicCarty settlements is a matter of state
law over which we ha\e no jurisdiction. The
federal question is therefore properlv before us
6. Because we decide that the Former Spouses
Protection Act precludes States from treating as
community propertv retirement pay waived to
receive veterans disability benefits, we need not
decide whether the anti-attachment clause,
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Court of California denied Major Mansell's
petition for review.
We noted probable jurisdiction, 487 U.S.
1217, 108 S.Ct. 2868, 101 L.Ed.2d 904
(1988), and now reverse.
II
Because domestic relations are preeminently matters of state law, we have consistently recognized that Congress, when it
passes general legislation, rarely intends to
displace state authority in this area. See,
e.g., Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 628, 107
S.Ct. 2029, 2035, 95 L.Ed.2d 599 (1987);
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,
581, 99 S.Ct. 802, 808, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979).
Thus we have held that we will not find
preemption absent evidence that it is " 'positively required by direct enactment.'"
Hisquierdo, supra, at 581, 99 S.Ct. at 808
(quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68,
77, 25 S.Ct. 172, 176, 49 L.Ed. 390 (1904)).
The instant case, however, presents one of
those rare instances where Congress has
directly and specifically legislated in the
area of domestic relations.
It is clear from both the language of the
Former Spouses' Protection Act, see, e.g.,
§ 1408(c)(1), and its legislative history, see,
e.g., H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 97-749, p. 165
(1982); S.Rep. No. 97-502, pp. 1-3, 16
(1982), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News
1982, p. 1555, that Congress sought to
change the legal landscape created by the
McCarty decgion.sgg7 Because pre-existing
federal law, as construed by this Court,
completely pre-empted the application of
state community property law to military
retirement pay, Congress could overcome
the McCarty decision only by enacting an
affirmative grant of authority giving the
States the power to treat military retirement pay as community property. Cf. Mid§ 3101(a), independently protects such pay.
See, e.g.t Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 107 S.Ct.
2029, 95 L.£d.2d 599 (1987); Wissner v. Wissner,
338 U.S. 655, 70 S.Ct. 398, 94 L.£d. 424 (1950).
7. Congress also demonstrated its focus on
McCarty when it chose June 25, 1981, the day
before McCarty was decided, as the applicable
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Ian tic Sat. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of
Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494,
501, 106 S.Ct. 755, 759-60, 88 L.Ed.2d 859
(1986).
The appellant and appellee differ sharply
on the scope of Congress' modification of
McCarty. Mrs. Mansell views the Former
Spouses' Protection Act as a complete congressional rejection of McCarty 's holding
that state law is pre-empted; she reads the
Act as restoring to state courts all preMcCaHy authority. Major Mansell, supported by the United States, argues that
the Former Spouses' Protection Act is only
a partial rejection of the McCarty rule that
federal law preempts state law regarding
military retirement pay.8
[1] Where, as here, the question is one
of statutory construction, we begin with
the language of the statute. See, e.g.,
Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896, 104
S.Ct. 1541, 1547-48, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984);
Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100
S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980).
Mrs. Mansell's argument faces a formidable obstacle in the language of the Former
Spouses' Protection Act Section 1408(c)(1)
of the Act affirmatively grants state courts
the power to divide military retirement pay,
yet its language is both precise and limited.
It provides that "a court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay ... either as
property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of
j^ 9 such court." § 1408(c)(1). The Act's
definitional section specifically defines the
term "disposable retired or retainer pay" to
exclude, inter alia, military retirement pay
waived in order to receive veterans' disabildate for some of the Act's provisions. 10 U.S.C.
§ 1408(c)(1); see also note following § 1408,
Pub.L. 97-252, § 1006(b) (transition provisions).
8. Although the United States has filed an amicus
brief supporting Major Mansell, its initial amicus brief, filed before the Court noted jurisdiction, supported Mrs. Mansell.
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ity payments § 1408(a)(4)(B)9 Thus, under the Act's plain and precise language
state courts have been granted the authority to treat disposable retired pay as community property, they have not been
granted the authority to treat total retired
pay as community property
[2] Mrs Mansell attempts to overcome
the limiting language contained in the definition, § 1408(a)(4)(B) by reading the Act
as a garnishment statute designed solely to
set out the circumstances under which, pursuant to a court order, the Federal Government will make direct payments to a former spouse
According to this view,
§ 1408(a)(4)(B) defines "[disposable retired
or retainer pay" only because payments
under the federal direct payments mechanism are limited to amounts defined by that
term
The garnishment argument relies heavily
on the Act's saving clause That clause
provides
"Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve a member of liability for
the payment of alimony, child support, or
other payments required by a court order on the grounds that payments made
out of disposable retired or retainer pay
under this section have been made in the
maximum amount permitted under [the
direct payments mechanism] Any such
unsatisfied obligation j ^ o f a member
may be enforced by any means available
under law other than the means provided
under this section m any case m which
the maximum amount permitted under
[the direct payments mechanism] has
been paid." § 1408(e)(6) (emphasis added)
Mrs Mansell argues that, because the saving clause expressly contemplates "other

payments in excess of those made under
the direct pavments mechanism the Act
does not attempt to tell the state courts
what thev may or may not do with the
underlying property ' Brief for \ppellee
17 For the reasons discussed below, we
find a different interpretation more plausible In our view, the saving clause serves
the limited purpose of defeating any inference that the federal direct pa>ments
mechanism displaced the authority of state
courts to divide and garnish property not
covered by the mechanism Cf Hisquierdo, 439 U S , at 584, 99 S Ct, at 809-10 (to
prohibit garnishment is to prohibit division
of property), Wissner v Wissner 338 U S
655 70 SCt 398, 94 LEd 424 (1950)
(same)
First, the most serious flaw in the garnishment argument is that it completely
ignores § 1408(c)(1) Mrs Mansell provides no explanation for the fact that the
defined term— 'disposable retired or retainer pay"—is used m § 1408(c)(1) to limit
specifically and plainly the extent to which
state courts may treat military retirement
pay as community property
Second, the view that the Act is solely a
garnishment statute and therefore not intended to pre-empt the authority of state
courts is contradicted not only by
§ 1408(c)(1), but also by the other subsections of § 1408(c) Sections 1408(c)(2),
(c)(3), and (c)(4) impose new substantive
limits on state courts' power to divide military retirement pay Section 1408(c)(2) prevents a former spouse from transferring,
selling, or otherwise disposing of her community interest m the military retirement
pay I0 Section 1408(c)(3) provides that a
j^istate court cannot order a military member to retire so that the former spouse can
immediately begin receiving her portion of

9. The statute provides in pertinent part
"Disposable retired or retainer pay means the
total monthly retired or retainer pav to which a
member is entitled
less amounts which—

bv courts martials Federal emplovment taxes
and amounts waived in order to receive com
pensation under title 5 or title 38 [disability
pavments]
§ 1408(a)(4)(B)

'(B) are required bv law to be and are deduct
ed from the retired or retainer pay of such
member including fines and forfeitures ordered

10 The Senate Report expressly contemplates
that § 1408(c)(2) will preempt state law S Rep
No 97-502 p 16 (1982)
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military retirement pay.11 And § 1408(c)(4)
prevents spouses from forum shopping for
a State with favorable divorce laws.12 Because each of these provisions pre-empts
state law, the argument that the Act has
no pre-emptive effect of its own must fail.13
Significantly, Congress placed i592each of
these substantive restrictions on state
courts in the same section of the Act as
§ 1408(c)(1). We think it unlikely that every subsection of § 1408(c), except
§ 1408(c)(1), was intended to pre-empt state
law.

ka Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643,
98 S.Ct. 2053, 2061, 56 L.Ed.2d 591 (1978)!
The legislative history does not indicate the
reason for Congress' decision to shelter
from community property law that portion
of military retirement pay waived to receive veterans' disability payments.14 But
the absence of legislative history on this
decision is immaterial in light of the plain
and precise language of the statute; Congress is not required to build a record in
the legislative history to defend its policy
choices.
In the face of such plain and precise
Because of the absence of evidence of
statutory language, Mrs. Mansell faces a specific intent in the legislative history,
daunting standard. She cannot prevail Mrs. Mansell resorts to arguments about
without clear evidence that reading the lan- the broad purposes of the Act. But this
guage literally would thwart the obvious reliance is misplaced because, at this generpurposes of the Act. See, e.g., Trans Alas- al level, there are statements that both
11. There was some concern expressed at the
Senate hearings on the Act that state courts
could direct a military member to retire. See,
e.g., Hearings before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Committee
on Armed Services, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 132133 (1982) (Sen. Exon); id., at 70-71 (veterans'
group); id., at 184 (Air Force). Thus the Senate
version of the bill contained § 1408(c)(3) in
order to ensure that state courts did not have
such power, S.Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 17, and
at conference the House agreed to add the provision. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 97-749, p. 167
(1982).
12. A state court may not treat disposable retirement pay as community property unless it has
jurisdiction over the military member by reason
of (1) residence, other than by military assignment in the territorial jurisdiction of the court,
(2) domicile, or (3) consent. § 1408(c)(4). Although the Senate Committee had decided not
to include any forum shopping restrictions, seeing "no need to limit the jurisdiction of the State
courts by restricting the benefits afforded by
this bill ...." S.Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 9,
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 1604.
the House version of the bill contained the restrictions, and at conference, the Senate agreed
to add them. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 97-749, supra,
at 167.
13. That Congress intended the substantive limits
in § 1408(c)(1) to be, to some extent, distinct
from the limits on the direct payments mechanism contained in § 1408(d) is demonstrated by
the legislative compromise that resulted in the
direct payments mechanism being available
only to former spouses who had been married

to the military retiree for 10 years or more.
§ 1408(d)(2). Under the House version of the
bill, military retirement pay could be treated as
community property only if the couple had been
married for 10 years or more. H.R.Conf.Rep.
No. 97-749, supra, at 165. The Senate Committee had considered, but rejected, such a provision. S.Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 9-11. The
conferees agreed to remove the House restriction. Instead, they limited the federal direct
payments mechanism to marriages that had
lasted 10 years or more. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 97749, supra, at 166-167. Under this compromise,
stale courts have been granted the authority to
award a portion of disposable military retired
pay to former spouses who were married to the
military member for less than 10 years, but
such former spouses may not take advantage of
the direct payments mechanism.
14. The only reference to the definitional section
is contained in the Senate Report which states
that the deductions from total retired pay, including retirement pay waived in favor of veterans' disability payments, "generally parallel
those existing deductions which may be made
from the pay of Federal employees and military
personnel before such pay is subject to garnishment for alimony or child support payments
under section 459 of the Social Security Act.
(42 U.S.C. 659)." S.Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at
14, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p.
1609. This statement, however, describes the
defined term in § 1408(a)(4). It is not helpful
in determining why Congress chose to use the
defined term—"disposable retired or retainer
pay "—to limit
state-court authority
in
§ 1408(c)(1).
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contradict and support her arguments.
Her argument that the Act contemplates
no federal pre-emption is supported by
statements in the Senate Report and the
House Conference } .^Report that the purpose of the Act is to overcome the McCarty
decision and to restore power to the
States.15 But the Senate Report and the
House Conference Report also contain
statements indicating that Congress rejected the uncomplicated option of removing all
federal pre-emption and returning unlimited authority to the States.16 Indeed, a bill
that would have eliminated all federal preemption died in the Senate Committee.17
Her argument that Congress primarily intended to protect former spouses is supported by evidence that Members of Congress were moved by, and responding to,
the distressed economic plight of military
wives after a divorce.18 But the Senate
Report and the House debates con£ain594
statements which reveal that Congress was
15. See. e.g., S.Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 1,
U.S.Code Cong. &. Admin.News 1982, p. 1596
('The primary purpose of the bill is to remove
the effect of the United States Supreme Court
decision in McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210,
101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981). The bill
would accomplish this objective by permitting
Federal, State, and certain other courts, consistent with the appropriate laws, to once again
consider military retired pay when fixing the
property rights between the parties to a divorce,
dissolution, annulment or legal separation").
See also id., at 5 and 16; H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 97749, supra, at 165.
16. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 97-749, supra, at 165,
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p. 1570
('The House amendment would permit disposable military retired pay to be considered as
property in divorce settlements under certain
specified conditions") (emphasis added); ibid.
('The House Amendment contained several provisions that would place restrictions on the division of retired pay"); S.Rep. No. 97-502, supra,
at 4, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p.
1599 ("[Senate] 1814 imposes three distinct limits on the division or enforcement of court orders against military retired pay in divorce
cases") (emphasis added).
17. Entitled "Nonpreemption of State law" the
bill provided that "[f\or purposes of division of
marital property of any member or former
member of the armed forces upon dissolution of
such member's marriage, the law of the State in

concerned as well with protecting the interests of military members.19
Thus, the legislative history, read as a
whole, indicates that Congress intended
both to create new benefits for former
spouses and to place limits on state courts
designed to protect military retirees. Our
task is to interpret the statute as best we
can, not to second-guess the wisdom of the
congressional policy choice. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522. 526,
107 S.Ct. 1391, 1393, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987)
(per curiam ) ("Deciding what competing
values will or will not be sacrificed to the
achievement of a particular objective is the
very essence of legislative choice"). Given
Congress' mixed purposes, the legislative
history does not clearly support Mrs. Mansell's view that giving effect to the plain
and precise language of the statute would
thwart the obvious purposes of the Act.
which the dissolution of marriage proceeding
was instituted shall be dispositive on all matters
pertaining to the division of any retired, retirement, or retainer pay to which such member or
former member is entitled or will become entitled." S. 1453, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
18. The Senate Committee pointed out that "frequent change-of-station moves and the special
pressures placed on the military spouse as a
homemaker make it extremely difficult to pursue a career affording economic security, job
skills and pension protection." S.Rep. No. 97502, supra, at 6. U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News
1982, p. 1601. The language of the Act, and
much of its legislative history, is written in
gender neutral terms, and there is no doubt that
the Act applies equally to both former husbands
and former wives. But "it is quite evident from
the legislative history that Congress acted largely in response to the plight of the military wife."
Horkovich, Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act: Congress' Answer to McCarty
v. McCarty Goes Beyond the Fundamental Question, 23 Air Force L.Rev. 287, 308 (1982-1983)
(emphasis in original).
19. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at 7,
U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News \9S2, p. \b\\
("All agreed that some form of remedial legislation which is fair and equitable to both spouses
was necessary to provide a solution to the
McCarty decision"); see also id., at 11; nn. 10,
11, 12, and 16, supra.
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We realize that reading the statute literally may inflict economic harm on many
former spouses. But we decline to misread
the statute in order to reach a sympathetic
result when such a reading requires us to
do violence to the plain language of the
statute and to ignore much of the legislative history. Congress chose the language
that requires us to decide as we do, and
Congress is free to change it.
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2742, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981), that "the
plight of an ex-spouse of a retired service
member is often a serious one." In holding
that federal law precluded state courts
from dividing nondisabxlity military retired pay pursuant to state community
property laws, McCarty concluded with an
invitation to Congress to reexamine the
issue. Congress promptly did so and enacted the Former Spouses' Protection Act.
Today, despite overwhelming evidence that
Ill
Congress intended to overrule McCarty
[3] For the reasons stated above, we completely, to alter pre-existing federal
hold that the Former Spouses' Protection military retirement law so as to eliminate
Act does not grant state courts the j 595POW- the pre-emptive effect ^discovered in
er to treat as property divisible upon di- McCarty, and to restore to the States auvorce military retirement pay that has been thority to issue divorce decrees affecting
waived to receive veterans' disability bene- military retirement pay consistent with
fits. The judgment of the California Court state law, the Court assumes that Congress
of Appeal is hereby reversed, and the case only partially rejected McCarty and that
is remanded for further proceedings not the States can apply their community propinconsistent with this opinion.
erty laws to military retirement pay only to
the extent that the Former Spouses' ProIt is so ordered.
tection Act affirmatively grants them auJustice O'CONNOR, with whom Justice thority to do so. Ante, at 2028. The
McCarty decision, however, did not address
BLACKMUN joins, dissenting.
Today the Court holds that the federal retirement pay waived to receive disability
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Pro- benefits; nor did it identify any explicit
tection Act (Former Spouses' Protection statutory provision precluding the States
Act or Act) denies state courts the power from characterizing such waived retireto order in a divorce decree the division of ment pay as community property. Thus, I
military retirement pay unilaterally waived reject the Court's central premise that the
by a retiree in order to receive veterans' States are precluded by McCarty from
disability benefits. The harsh reality of characterizing as community property any
this holding is that former spouses like retirement pay waived to receive disability
Gaye Mansell can, without their consent, be benefits absent an affirmative grant of audenied a fair share of their ex-spouse's thority in the Former Spouses' Protection
military retirement pay simply because he Act.
elects to increase his after-tax income by
In my view, Congress intended, by enactconverting a portion of that pay into dis- ing the Former Spouses' Protection Act, to
ability benefits. On the Court's reading of eliminate the effect of McCarty 's pre-empthe Former Spouses' Protection Act, Gaye tion holding altogether and to return to the
Mansell will lose nearly 30 percent of the States their authority "to treat military
monthly retirement income she would oth- pensions in the same manner as they treat
erwise have received as community proper- other retirement benefits." S.Rep. No. 97ty. I view the Court's holding as inconsis- 502, p. 10 (1982), U.S.Code Cong. & Adtent with both the language and the pur- min.News 1982, p. 1604. See also td, at 1,
poses of the Act, and I respectfully dissent. U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p.
The Court recognized in McCarty v. 1596 ("The primary purpose of the bill is to
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235, 101 S.Ct. 2728, remove the effect of the United States Su-
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preme Court decision in McCarty v.
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69
L.Ed.2d 589 (1981). The bill would accomplish this objective by permitting Federal,
State, and certain other courts, consistent
with the appropriate laws, to once again
consider military retired pay when fixing
the property rights between the parties to
a divorce, dissolution, annulment or legal
separation"); id., at 5, U.S.Code Cong. &
Admin.News 1982, 1599 ("[T]he committee
intends the legislation to restore the law to
what it was when the courts were permitted to apply State divorce laws to military
retired pay"); id., at 16, U.S.Code Cong. &
Admin.News 1982, p. 1611 ("The provision
is intended to remove the federal pre-emption found to exist by the United States
Supreme Court and permit State and other
courts of competent jurisdiction to apply
pertinent State or other laws in determining I597whether military retired or retainer
pay should be divisible"); 128 Cong.Rec.
18314 (1982) ("The amendment simply returns to State courts the authority to treat
military retired pay as it does other public
and private pensions") (remarks of Rep.
Schroeder, bill sponsor).
Family law is an area traditionally of
state concern, Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,
439 U.S. 572, 581, 99 S.Ct. 802, 808, 59
L.Ed.2d 1 (1979), and we have not found
federal pre-emption of state authority in
this area absent a determination that "Congress has 'positively required by direct enactment' that state law be pre-empted."
Ibid, (quoting Wetmore v. Markoe, 196
U.S. 68, 77, 25 S.Ct. 172, 176, 49 L.Ed. 390
(1904)). The Former Spouses' Protection
Act does not "positively require" States to
abandon their own law concerning the divisibility upon divorce of military retirement
pay waived in order to obtain veterans'
disability benefits. On the contrary, the
whole thrust of the Act was to restore to
the States their traditional authority in the
area of domestic relations. Even beyond
that restoration, Congress sought to provide greater federal assistance and protection to military spouses than existed before
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McCarty by creating a federal garnishment remedy in aid of state court community property awards. That, in fact, is the
central purpose and preoccupation of the
Act's complex statutory framework. The
Former Spouses' Protection Act is primarily a remedial statute creating a mechanism
whereby former spouses armed with state
court orders may enlist the Federal Government to assist them in obtaining some
of their property entitlements upon divorce.
The federal garnishment remedy created
by the Act is limited, but it serves as
assistance and not as the Court would
have it, a hindrance to former spouses.
Thus, the provision at 10 U.S.C.
§ 1408(a)(4)(B) (1982 ed. and Supp. V) of
the Act defining "[disposable retired or
retainer pay" to exclude "amounts waived
in order to receive compensation under title
5 or title 38," and its incorporation into
§ 1408(c)(l)'s community property provision, only limits the federal garnishment
remedy created by the Act. It does not
limit the authority i59eof States to characterize such waived retirement pay as community property under state law.
This reading is reinforced by the legislative history, which indicates that "[t]he specific deductions that are to be made from
the total monthly retired and retainer pay
generally parallel those existing deductions
which may be made from the pay of Federal employees and military personnel before
such pay is subject to garnishment for
alimony or child support payments under
section 459 of the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. 659)." S.Rep. No. 97-502, supra, at
14, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, p.
1609 (emphasis added). The Court finds
that this statement "is not helpful in determining why Congress chose to use the defined term—'disposable retired or retainer
pay'—to limit state-court authority in
§ 1408(c)(1)." Ante, at 2030, n. 14. True,
it is singularly unhelpful in supporting the
Court's view that § 1408(c)(1) denies state
courts authority to characterize retirement
pay waived in lieu cf disability benefits as
community property. By contrast, it is
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helpful in determining why Congress chose the jurisdiction of such court." (Emphasis
to use "disposable retired or retainer pay" added.) This provision should not be read
as the term limiting state court authority to preclude States from characterizing reto garnish military retirement pay. In tirement pay waived to receive disability
light of the fact that disability benefits are benefits as community property but only to
exempt from garnishment in most cases, 38 preclude the use of the federal direct payU.S.C. § 3101(a) (1982 ed., Supp. V), had ments mechanism to attach that waived
Congress not excluded "amounts waived" pay. Nor do §§ 1408(c)(2), (c)(3), and (c)(4)
in order to receive veterans' disability bene- compel the conclusion that Congress infits from the federal garnishment remedy tended to pre-empt States from characterizcreated by the Former Spouses' Protection ing gross military retirement pay as comAct it would have eviscerated the force of munity property divisible upon divorce.
the anti-attachment provisions of § 3101(a). Those three provisions indicate what States
To take advantage of the federal gar- may "not" do. That Congress explicitly
nishment remedy, which provides for direct restricted the authority of courts in certain
payment by the Government to former specific respects, however, does not supspouses in specified circumstances, former port the inference that § 1408(c)(1)—an afspouses must serve on the appropriate ser- firmative grant of power—should be intervice Secretary court orders meeting certain preted as precluding everything it does not
requirements. In the case of a division of grant. On the contrary, it supports the
property, the court order must "specifically inference that Congress explicitly and diprovid[e] for the payment of an amount, rectly precluded those matters it wished to
expressed in dollars or as a percentage of pre-empt entirely, leaving the balance of
disposable retired or retainer pay, from the responsibility in the area of domestic reladisposable retired or retainer pay of a tions to the States. In this respect, the
member." 10 U.S.C. § 1408(aJ2XC)s99 Court mischaracterizes Gaye Mansell's ar(1982 ed., Supp. V). It must contain certain gument as insisting that "the Act contemno federal
pre-emption
"
information and be regular on its face. plates
§§ 1408(b)(1)(B), 1408(bXD(C), 1408(b)(1)(D), jfpoAnte, at 2030. Subsection 1408(c) has
1408(b)(2) (1982 ed. and Supp. V). The Act substantive effects on the power of state
sets forth the procedures to be followed by courts—its first paragraph expands those
the Secretary in making payments directly powers ("a court may treat"); its remainto former spouses. § 1408(d) (1982 ed. and ing paragraphs restrict those powers ("this
Supp. V). Finally, the Act places limits on section does not create"; "[t]his section
the total amount of disposable retirement does not authorize"; "[a] court may not
pay that may be paid by the Secretary to treat").
former spouses, §§ 1408(e)(1), 1408(e)(4)(B)
That States remain free to characterize
(1982 ed. and Supp. V), and it clarifies the waived portions of retirement pay as comprocedures to be followed in the event of munity property is unambiguously undermultiple or conflicting court orders. scored by the broad language of the saving
§§ 1408(eX2), 1408(e)(3XA) (1982 ed., Supp. clause contained in the Act, § 1408(e)(6).
V).
That clause provides:
"Nothing in this section shall be conSubsection 1408(c)(1) authorizes the apstrued to relieve a member of liability for
plication of this federal garnishment remethe payment of alimony, child support, or
dy to community property awards by proother payments required by a court orviding that "a court may treat disposable
der on the grounds that payments made
retired or retainer pay payable to a memout of disposable retired or retainer pay
ber . . . either as property solely of the
under this section have been made in the
member or as property of the member and
maximum amount permitted under parahis spouse in accordance with the law of
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graph (1) or subparagraph (B) of paragraph (4). Any such unsatisfied obligation of a member may be enforced by
any means available under law other
than the means provided under this
section in any case in which the maximum amount permitted under paragraph
(1) has been paid and under section 459
of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 659)
in any case in which the maximum
amount permitted under subparagraph
(B) of paragraph (4) has been paid." {Emphasis added.)
The Court explains that the saving clause
"serves the limited purpose of defeating
any inference that the federal direct payments mechanism displaced the authority
of state courts to divide and garnish property not covered by the mechanism."
Ante, at 2029 (emphasis added). I agree.
What I do not understand is how the Court
can read the Act's saving clause in this
manner and yet conclude, without contradiction, that California may not characterize retirement pay waived for disability
benefits as community property. All California seeks to do is "divide and garnish
property not covered by the [federal direct
payments] mechanism." Ibid. Specifically, California wishes to exercise its traditional famjly6oi law powers to divide as
community property that portion of Major
Mansell's retirement pay which he unilaterally converted into disability benefits, and
use state-law garnishment remedies to attach the value of Gaye Mansell's portion of
this community property. That is precisely
what § 1408(e)(6) saves to the States by
"defeating" any contrary inference, ante,
at 8, that the Act has displaced the State's
authority to enforce its divorce decrees "by
any means available under law other than
the means provided under this section...."
§ 1408(e)(6). As the California Supreme
Court so aptly put it, in the saving clause
Congress emphasized that "the limitations
on the service secretary's ability to reach
the retiree's gross pay [are] not to be
deemed a limitation on the state court's
ability to define the community property
interests at the time of dissolution." Ca-

sas v. Thompson, 42 Cal.3d 131, 150, 228
Cal.Rptr. 33, 45, 720 P.2d 921, 933, cert,
denied. 479 U.S. 1012, 107 S.Ct. 659, 93
L.Ed.2d 713 (1986). In other words, while
a former spouse may not receive community property payments that exceed 50 percent of a retiree's disposable retirement
pay through the direct federal garnishment
mechanism, § 1408(e)(1), a state court is
free to characterize gross retirement pay
as community property depending on the
law of its jurisdiction, and former spouses
may pursue- any other remedy "available
under law" to satisfy that interest. "Nothing" in the Former Spouses' Protection Act
relieves military retirees of liability under
such law if they possess other assets equal
to the value of the former spouse's share
of the gross retirement pay.
Under the Court's reading of the Act as
precluding the States from characterizing
gross retirement pay as community property, a military retiree has the power unilaterally to convert community property into
separate property and increase his aftertax income, at the expense of his exspouse's financial security and property entitlements. To read the statute as permitting a military retiree to pocket 30 percent,
50 percent, even 80 percent of gross retirement pay by converting it into disability
benefits and thereby to avoid his obligations^ under state community property
law, however, is to distort beyond recognition and to thwart the main purpose of the
statute, which is to recognize the sacrifices
made by military spouses and to protect
their economic security in the face of a
divorce. Women generally suffer a decline
in their standard of living following a divorce. See Weitzman, The Economics of
Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child
Support Awards, 28 UCLA L.Rev. 1181,
1251 (1981). Military wives face special
difficulties because "frequent change-ofstation moves and the special pressures
placed on the military spouse as a homemaker make it extremely difficult to pursue a career affording economic security,
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la and pension protection." S.Rep. benefits in satisfaction of her claim to a
-502, at 6, U.S.Code Cong. & Ad- share of his gross military retirement pay,
ws 1982, p. 1601. The average mili- just as § 1408(c)(1) precludes her from in
uple married for 20 years moves voking the federal direct payments mecha2 times, and military wives experi- nism in satisfaction of that claim. To recunemployment rate more than dou- ognize that § 3101(a) protects the funds
\t of their civilian counterparts, from a specific source, however, does not
or Women's Equity Action League mean that § 3101(a) prevents Gaye Mansell
s Amici Curiae 10-11. Retirement from recovering her 50 percent interest in
loreover, is often the single most Major Mansell's gross retirement pay out
le asset acquired hy military couples. of any income or assets he may have other
than his veterans' disability benefits. So
18. Indeed, the one clear theme that
long as those benefits themselves are pro?s from the legislative history of the
tected, calculation of Gaye Mansell's entithat Congress recognized the dire
tlement on the basis of Major Mansell's
of many military wives after divorce
gross retirement pay does not constitute an
ught to protect their access to their
"attachment" of his veterans' disability
bands' military retirement pay. See
benefits. Section 3101(a) is designed to
No. 9 7 - 5 0 2 / a t f>; 128 Cong.Rec.
ensure that the needs of disabled veterans
4<
(1982) ( [F]requent military moves
and their families are met, see Rose v.
ireclude spouses from pursuing their
Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 634, 107 S.Ct. 2029,
ireers and establishing economic in2038, 95 L.Ed.2d 599 (1987), without interlence. As a result, military spouses
ference from creditors. That purpose is
*quently unable to vest in their own
fulfilled so long as the benefits themselves
nent plans or obtain health insurance
are protected by the anti-attachment provige from a private employer. Milision.
pouses who become divorced often
In sum, under the Court's interpretation
II access to retirement and health
ts—despite a 'career' devoted to the of the Former Spouses' Protection Act, the
former spouses Congress sought to protect
7") (remarks of Rep. Schumer). See
d., at 18315, 18316, 18317, 18320, risk having their economic security severe18328. Reading the Act as not pre- ly undermined by a unilateral decision of
g States from characterizing retire- their ex-spouses to waive retirement pay in
pay waived to receive disability bene- lieu of disability benefits. It is inconceivas property divisible upon divorce is ble that Congress intended the broad remeul to loathe clear remedial purposes dial purposes of the statute to be thwarted
? statute in a way that the Court's in such a way. To be sure, as the Court
notes, Congress sought to be "fair and
retation is not.
1
conclusion that States may treat equitable" to r e ^ i r e d ^ service members as
Ante,
military retirement pay as property well as to protect divorced spouses.
at
2031,
and
n.
19.
Congress
explicitly
i)le upon divorce is not inconsistent
38 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (1982 ed., Supp. protected military members by limiting the
This anti-attachment provision pro- percentage of disposable retirement pay
that veterans' disability benefits subject to the federal garnishment remedy
I not be liable to attachment, levy, or and by expressly providing that military
re by or under any legal or equitable members could not be forced to retire. See
10 U.S.C. §§ 1408(e)(1),
1408(eX4MB),
as whatever, either before or after
1408(c)(3). Moreover, a retiree is still adpt by the beneficiary." Gaye Mansell
owledges, as she must, that § 3101(a) vantaged by waiving retirement pay in lieu
udes her from garnishing under state of disability benefits: the pay that is
Major Mansell's veterans' disability waived is not subject to the federal direct

payments mechanism, and the former
spouse must resort instead to the more
cumbersome and costly process of seeking
a state garnishment order against the value of that waived pay. See H.R.Rep. No.
98-700, pp. 4-5 (1984) (discussing difficulties faced by ex-spouses in obtaining state
garnishment orders). Even these state
processes cannot directly attach the military retiree's disability benefits for purposes of satisfying a community property
division given the strictures of the antiattachment
provision
of
38
U.S.C.
§ 3101(a). There is no basis for concluding, however, that Congress sought to protect the interests of service members by
allowing them unilaterally to deny their
former spouses any opportunity to obtain a
fair share of the couple's military retirement pay.
It is now once again up to Congress to
address the inequity created by the Court
in situations such as this one. But because
I believe that Congress has already expressed its intention that the States have
the authority to characterize waived retirement pay as property divisible upon divorce, I dissent.
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Taxpayers brought action challenging
Arizona statute permitting State Land Department to lease minerals and school trust
lands a t flat rate royalty. The Superior
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Court, Maricopa County, No. C-433745,
John Sticht, J., granted summary judgment
in favor of defendants. Plaintiffs appealed. Motion for transfer was granted and
the Arizona Supreme Court, Feldman,
V.C.J., 155 Ariz. 484, 747 P.2d 1183, reversed and remanded with instructions.
Certiorari was granted.
The Supreme
Court, Justice Kennedy, held that: (1) Supreme Court had jurisdiction, and (2) statute governing mineral leases of state lands
was void.
Affirmed.
Justice O'Connor took no part in the
consideration or decision.
Justice Brennan filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment in which Justices White, Marshall,
and Blackmun joined.
Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Justice
Scalia joined.

1. Federal Courts <s=>503
Arizona Supreme Court's decision, that
state law governing mineral leases was
invalid, was final, and therefore, United
States Supreme Court had jurisdiction on
writ of certiorari even though Arizona Supreme Court remanded case for trial court
to determine appropriate further relief; trial court on remand did not have before it
any federal question as to whether past or
current leases were valid since respondents
on appeal withdrew request for accounting
and payment of sums under past leases and
trial court's further actions could not affect
Arizona Supreme Court's ruling that state
law was invalid. A.R.S. § 27-234, subd. B.
2. C o u r t s <s=»97U)
Although state courts are not bound to
adhere to federal standing requirements,
they possess authority, absent provision
for exclusive federal jurisdiction, to render
binding judicial decisions that rest on their
own interpretations of federal law. 28
U.S.C.A. § 1738.

Addendum "D."
Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit No. 1

UPDATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE FOR SUE VARALLO AS OF FEBRUARY 15, 1993
(Includes pay raise and other income)
1.

Gross Monthly Income
Salary
Dividends & interest
Dreyfus & Vanguard (est) *
Mortgage note from Mom's estate *
Royal Bank of Scotland Bond *
Savings account (est)

$3350.53
110.57
152.03
119.00
329.00
$4060.60

* income from mother's estate
2.

Monthly Deductions
State & federal income tax
Number exemptions taken
Social Security
Medical insurance (Mall Handlers,
High Option, Self & Family)
Retirement fund
Savings Plan
Charity
Life Insurance

3.

Net Monthly Income:

4.

Debts & Obligations

$ 877.54
0
256.30
87.99
194.33
10.83
6.50
15.38
$1448.87
$2611.73

First Security Bank
Mortgage on Condo $84,500
Park Place Homeowners Asso Condo Fee
Westminster College
Valerie's School
$2,000
Judge Memorial High School
Carafs School
?
First Federal Bank Mortgage on Btfl House $126,000

$ 593.00
175.00
667.00 *
270.00 *
$1388.00 *:

* These obligations are currently shared equally w/husband.
**This obligation is shared equally w/husband; he is currently
under court order to make the mortgage payments.
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5.

Property
Automobile:

1990 Mitsubishi Galant

$10,000

Securities, stocks, bonds:
Royal Bank of Scotland Bond *
Petroleum Technologies Corp **

$15,000,00
15,000,00

* Purchasedw/proceeds from mother's estate; currently held
w/husband as joint owner as broker did not have Pay On Death
option.
**Purchased w/proceeds from mother's estate.
Cash & Deposit Accounts
America First Credit Union
Chase Manhatten Bank
Exchange Credit Union
Vanguard Money Market Fund *
Dreyfus Money Market Fund *
* Funds from mother's estate
Retirement" Accounts:
Thrift Saving Plan (IRA) est.
Pentagon Fed Credit Union (IRA)

$ 9,943.80
392.21
79,000.78
5,261.98
21,274.90

1,900.00
536.72

Addendum "E."
Findings of Fact
and
Conclusions of Law

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Ronald E. Nehring (2374)
Sally B. McMinimee (5316)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 524-1000
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MERRILYN SUSAN VARALLO,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
FRANCIS V. VARALLO,
Defendant.

Civil No. 9247013b!

The above-Captioned matter was tried -Lefoie Tne
Honorable Jon M. Memmott on February 17 and February 18, 1993.
Ronald Nehring appeared as counsel for plaintiff; Harold Dent
appeared as counsel for defendant.

Having heard the testimony

of witnesses, received evidence, and considerea the arguments
of counsel, the Court, being otherwise fully advised in the
premises, now enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Findings Relating to Jurisdiction.
1.
WES
LER
lt« 900
South
Itv

Plaintiff is a bona fide resident of Davis

County, state of Utah, and maintained such residency for more

than three months immediately prior to the filing of this
action,
2.

Defendant and plaintiff are husband and wife,

having been married on June 26, 1970, at Washington, D.C.
Findings Relating to Grounds.
3.

During the course of the marriage, the parties

have developed differences which are irreconcilable, causing
the continuation of the marriage to be impossible.
Findings Relating to Child Custody and Visitation.
4.

Three children have been born as issue of this

marriage, to-wit: Valerie Jean Varallo, Dorn January 18, 1972;
Sean Thomas Varallo, born August 17, 1974; and Cara Noel
Varallo, oorn December 21, 1977.
5.

Plaintiff is a fit and proper person to be

awarded the care, custody, and control of Cara Varallo, subject
to defendant's right to exercise rights of visitation as set
out in the Standard Visitation Rule for the Second Judicial
District Court.
6.

The Court finds that Sean Varallo does not have

special needs which warrant ongoing custody and support.
Findings Relating to Child Support.
7.

The Court finds the plaintiff's gross income to

be $3,242 per month, and the defendant's gross income to be

$4,225 per month for the purposes of determining child support
pursuant to the Child Support Obligation Worksheet.
Accordingly, defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of
$401.86 per month as child support.
Findings Relating to Alimony.
8.

Plaintiff is currently employed full time by the

United States Bureau of Reclamation.
unemployed.

Defendant is currently

Defendant has a bachelor of science degree, 30

years of experience in the United States Army, and two years
experience as an employee of Unisys, Inc.

The Court finds that

defendant is capable of employment, notwithstanding his
disability rating whicn may impair defendant's ability to
perform physical labor.

The Court recognizes that defendant is

unlikely to find employment at a salary comparable to that
received during his employment at Unisys and tnat his prospects
for employment may depend on obtaining vocational training.
9.

The Court finds that in order to maintain the

standard of living which the parties enjoyed during their
marriage, plaintiff is in need of support and, therefore,
defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff alimony in the araount of
$500 per month.

The Court finds that defendant's re-employment

would constitute a material change of circumstance entitling
plaintiff to seek an adjustment of alimony.

Findings Relating to the Marital Home.
10.

During the course of the marriage, the parties

acquired a residence located at 826 North Ridge Drive,
Bountiful, Utah.

The Court finds the equity in the marital

home to be approximately $70,000. The Court finds that the
home should be sold in a manner reasonaoly calculated to
maximize its value and the net proceeds of the sale equally
divided one-half to each party.

Pending the sale of the

residence, defendant shall assume and pay the mortgage owing
thereon, together with all other costs and expenses relating to
the marital nome.
Findings Relating to Retirement Plans.
11.

The Court finds that plaintiff was employed for

several years during the course of the marriage and obtained an
interest in a retirement plan.

When plaintiff terminated her

employment, she withdrew retirement funds which were expended
for marital purposes.

Plaintiff incurred an obligation to

repay approximately $8,500 as a condition to reinstating her
retirement plan.

The Court finds that it is equitable for

defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of $4,250 as defendant's
share of the reinstatement obligation.

These funds shall be

paid plaintiff within 30 days of the entry of the Decree of
Divorce.
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12.

As of the date of trial, defendant received a

total of $4,225 per month, of which $3,734 per month was
comprised of military retirement payments, and $491 per month
V.A. disability payments.

The military retirement payments are

reduced pro rata by the amount of disability payments defendant
receives.

Plaintiff and defendant were married for 18 of the

30 years of defendant's military service.

Accordingly,

plaintiff is entitled to 30% of defendant's gross military
retirement.
13.

Defendant has the election of enrolling in the

Survivor Benefit Plan (SBP).

Under the SBP, defendant may

obtain for the benefit of plaintiff an annuity which would pay
plaintiff 55% of defendant's military retirement pay in the
event of defendant's death, a sum which would be reduced to 35%
in the_event plaintiff were to receive Social Security
benefits.

The Court offered the parties the option of

exercising his option to obtain the maximum available SBP
coverage for plaintiff in lieu of a 30% award of gross
retirement payments to plaintiff.

Defendant accepted this

offer, which the Court finds to be an equitable method for the
allocation to plaintiff of her portion of defendant's military
retirement.

Accordingly, defendant shall exercise his SBP

enrollment option and obtain the maximum available coverage.
Defendant shall pay all costs of this coverage.

Findings Relating to Educational Expenses.
14.

Both parties testified that they were committed

to providing educational opportunities to their children to the
maximum extent allowed by their resources.

Consistent with

this testimony, plaintiff and defendant shall share equally all
education expenses of each of the parties' children until each
attains the age of twenty-two years. Without limiting the
foregoing, the Court finds that, based on the incomes of the
parties and the value of the marital estate, Valerie should be
permitted to complete the requirements for her degree at
Westminster College and Cara should be permitted to continue
her enrollment at Judge Memorial High School.
Findings Relating to Personal Property.
15.

The personal property comprising the marital

estate shall be divided as follows:
To the plaintiff:
Pentagon Federal Credit Union account
containing approximately $32,572;
Riggs National Bank account containing
approximately $1,000;
America First Credit Union account
containing approximately $8,000;
Chase Manhattan account containing
approximately $3,133;
Proceeds from the sale of the parties1
Virginia house in the amount of $143,541.

To the defendant:
Pentagon Federal Credit Union account from
which $13,733 was withdrawn at or about
September 1992;
Union Bank of Switzerland account having a
value as of February 18, 1993, of $97,797;
Army National Bank account containing
approximately $30,000;
Securities having a value of approximately
$2,000;
Proceeds from the sale of the parties1
Virginia house in the amount of $45,659.
16.

With respect to household goods which have not

yet been divided (Plaintifffs Exhibit 13), the Court finds that
the china should be held by the plaintiff in trust for Cara and
Valerie, and that the remaining household items should be
selected by the parties on an alternating basis, with plaintiff
choosing first.
17.

The parties own two automobiles.

the automobiles to be of equal value.
1990 Mitsubishi.
18.

The Court finds

Plaintiff is awarded the

The defendant is awarded the 1990 Isuzu.

All real and personal property not identified

herein as being part of the marital estate is found to have
been received by plaintiff or defendant through gift or
inheritance and not subject to distribution.

kTES
LER
It* 900
South
Ity

-7-

Findings Relating to Health Insurance.
19.

Plaintiff has health insurance available through

her employment and shall maintain coverage of the parties1
children to the maximum extent permitted.

Defendant has health

coverage under CHAMPUS and shall maintain coverage for the
parties' children to the maximum extent permissible.

Any

medical or dental expenses not covered by insurance incurred by
the parties1 children shall be borne equally by the parties.
Findings Relating to Life Insurance.
20.

Defendant is currently paying the sum of $568 per

month in life insurance premiums.

Two of the policies owned by

the defendant were written by Executive Life, an insurance
company which is insolvent and in receivership.

Defendant is

ordered to maintain unchanged life insurance contracts
currently in force on defendant's life unless owing to the
financial instability of the insurance company it becomes no
longer prudent to maintain coverage under the policies.

In

that event, defendant shall obtain a substitute policy or
policies from a life insurance company rated A+ by A.M. Best
Company with a premium equal to that now paid by defendant
naming as beneficiaries those persons identified as
beneficiaries on policies now in force.

Findings Relating to Taxes,
21.

The parties shall file separate federal and state

income tax returns for the year 1992. Defendant shall be
entitled to claim Sean Varallo as a dependent.

Plaintiff shall

be entitled^to claim Cara and Valerie as dependents.
Findings Relating to Indebtedness.
22.

Plaintiff shall assume and pay the indebtedness

secured by her condominium.
Findings Relating to Attorney's Fees.
23.

The Court finds that the parties are capable of

bearing their own attorney's fees incurred in the prosecution
of this action.
Findings Relating to Miscellaneous Matters.
24.

Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to

the other such documents as are required to implement the
provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered pursuant to these
Findings and Conclusions.
25.

If defendant falls 30 or more days in arrears in

his child support obligation/ plaintiff shall be entitled to
mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45d-l, et seq. (1984, as amended).
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes and enters its

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court concludes that the parties are subject to
the jurisdiction of the Court as set out above under the
Court's Findings of Fact, and that the plaintiff is entitled to
a Decree of Divorce, the same to become final upon entry herein.
The Court concludes that all other issues of dispute
have been resolved by the Court pursuant to the above Findings
of Fact.
DATED this

day of

, 1993.

BY THE COURT:

JON M. MEMMOTT
District Court Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that, on the

2-^

day of June, 1993,

I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW to the following:
Harold J. Dent, Jr., Esq.
KING & DENT
2120 South 1300 East, Suite 301
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
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tolberg, and Johnson l 4 In the instant
ase, this full back pay award will serve not
nly to make plaintiff whole, but also to
iscourage similar unconstitutional dismissIs in the future M
Thus we cannot conclude that plaintiffs
ight-year struggle for vindication should
ield him reappointment with only one
ear's back pay. Such a "victory" would be
yrrhic indeed His reemployment is for a
>ming single one-year entitlement; for
irther employment he must prove his cometence in accordance with lawful universif procedures His loss of earnings, howver, encompasses seven years, and upon a
roper showing he should recover the whole
ppropriate damages
The judgment is affirmed
BIRD, C J , and MOSK, RICHARDSON,
[ANUEL and NEWMAN, JJ , concur
I. We note that a plethora of statutory provi
slons both in California and elsewhere demon
strates a general policy in favor of full back
pay awards even in the absence of constitution
al violations Thus, for example, under the
National Labor Relations Act, even an at will
employee who is improperly dismissed is entl
tied to an award of full back pay from the date
of the improper dismissal to the date of his
reinstatement (29 U S C § 160(c)) As the
United States Supreme Court explained in
NLRB v Rutter Rex Manufacturing Co (1969)
396 U S 258, 263, 90 S Ct 417, 420, 24 L Ed 2d
405, "(T)he purpose of the remedy is clear 'A
back pay order is a reparation order designed
to vindicate the public policy of the statute by
making the employees whole for losses suf
fered on account of an unfair labor practice'
ICitation omitted JM
Numerous California statutes In the Educa
tion Code and in other areas provide for simi
larly comprehensive back pay remedies Thus,
for example section 89540, former section
24310, of the Education Code provides that
with respect to both tenured permanent teach
ers and untenured probationary teachers, * [ijf
the dismissal suspension or demotion
[of the teacher for cause] is revoked or modi
fied
the employee shall be restored to
his position in accord with the decision, and
shall be paid back salary equal to that which
the employee would haxe earned if continuous
ly employed in accord with the decision *'
(Emphasis added ) (See also former Ed Code,
§§ 13439, 13516 5, now §§ 44946, 45037 (certifi
cated employee of school district), §§ 13408,
13409, 13411, now $$ 87735, 87736, 87738 (reg
ular and certificated employees of community

148 Cal Rptr 9

In re the MARRIAGE OF Richard William and Marilyn Betty STENQUIST.
Richard William STENQUIST, Appellant,
v.
Marilyn Betty STENQUIST, Appellant.
L.A. 30718.
Supreme Court of California,
In Bank
Aug 7, 1978

Appeal was taken from judgment of
the Superior Court, San Diego County,
Louis M Welsh, J , in marriage dissolution
case
The Supreme Court, Tobriner, J ,
college district), Gov Code § 19584 (employee
of state civil service) Lab Code, § 1426 (per
mitting State Fair Employment Practice Com
mission to order employer to reinstate employ
ee with full back pay when employer is found
to have engaged in unlawful employment prac
tice)
15. The trustees rely on 7immerer v Spencer
(5th Clr 1973), 485 F 2d 176, and Frosc v
Trustees, 46 CalApp3d 225, 120 Cal Rptr 1,
for the conclusion that back pay is not availa
ble to plaintiff Both cases are distinguishable
from the instant case
In Zimmerer, the court found a nontenured
teacher s dismissal improper only because of
the defendants failure to provide the teacher
with a hearing to which she was entitled
Finding ' that the [defendant] Board s reasons
for its actions were valid and
that
the controversy was intractable and recognized
by the parties to be such,' the court concluded
that ' as a practical consequence
the
most that Dr Zimmerer lost was one year s
pay " (485 F 2d 176 179 ) In the instant case,
by contrast the record does not in any way
reveal that plaintiffs performance would inevi
tably have led to his termination after one
additional year of teaching
The Frost decision is also distinguishable
from the present case In Frost the court up
held the chancellor s decision to reinstate a
probationary academic employee, but to deny
him back salary The claim in Frost for pay
ment of back salary however, was not based
on an alleged violation of constitutional rights,
as in the present case

held that (1) upon dissolution of marriage,
husband's military retired pay was properly
divided on basis of determination that pension rights attributable to husband's military service before marriage, plus the portion of those rights earned during marriage
attributable to husband's disability, constituted his separate property while the portion of pension rights earned during marriage equivalent to ordinary retirement
pension, computed on the basis of longevity
of service and rank at retirement^ constituted a community asset, but (2) in case in
which parties had been married for 25 years
and, following retirement from military,
husband had not yet been employed, while
wife was attempting to start work as parttime real estate salesperson, trial court
abused its discretion in divesting itself of
jurisdiction to award spousal support 24
months after the date of the decree
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part
Clark, J , filed a dissenting opinion
Opinion, 62 CalApp3d 849, 133 Cal
Rptr 341, vacated

1. Divorce «=>252
Upon dissolution of marriage, husband's military retired pay was properly
divided on basis of determination that pension rights attributable to husband's military service before marriage, plus the portion of those rights earned during marriage
attributable to husband's disability, constituted his separate property while the portion of pension rights earned during marriage equivalent to ordinary retirement
pension, computed on the basis of longevity
of service and rank at retirement, constituted a community asset 10 U S C A §§ 1201,
1401
2. Husband and Wife *=»265
One spouse cannot, by invoking a condition wholly within his control, defeat community interest of the other spouse
S*2 P2d-^1

3. Divorce *=*240(4)
Award of only $1 per month in spousal
support was not an abuse of discretion
where, following division of husband's military pension and considering wife's income
from part-time employment, husband and
wife would have approximate equal monthly incomes
4. Divorce <&=>254
Decisions to terminate continuing jurisdiction with respect to spousal support cannot be based on speculation concerning future earnings and employment, but instead
should be deferred until the realized facts
demonstrate whether further support is
warranted
5. Divorce «=>254
In case in which parties had been married for 25 years and, following retirement
from military, husband had not yet been
employed, where wife was attempting to
start work as part-time real estate salosj>erson, trial court abused its discretion in divesting itself of jurisdiction to award spousal support 24 months after the date of the
decree
6. Court* *=» 100(1)
Husband and Wife <*= 249(1)
Military retired pay based on disability
contains two components (1) compensation
to the serviceman for loss of earning power
and personal suffering, and (l>) retirement
support, the latter component, to the extent that it is attributable to employment
during marriage, is community property,
but such holding will be applied retroactively only to those cases in which the property
rights arising from the marriage have not
yet been adjudicated, to such rights if such
adjudication is still subject to appellate re
view, or if in such adjudication the tri il
court has expiessly reserved jurisdiction to
divide pension rights
Hervey, Mitchell, Ashworth & Kceney
and Thomas Ashworth, III, San Diego, for
appellant Husband
Rand & Day and Roland B Day, San
Diego, for appellant Wife
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in our recent decision of In re Marriage of
Morrison (1978) 20 Cal.Sd 437, 143 Cal.Rptr.
139, 573 P.2d 41. Because any assertion
that wife will attain economic self-suffiOBRINER, Justice.
etiring after 26 years of military ser- ciency within 24 months of the judgment
, husband received a "disability" pen- below rests on speculation, not evidence, the
i of 75 percent of his basic pay in lieu of trial court's order divesting itself of the
retirement" pension at 65 percent of power to order spousal support beyond that
ic pay.1 Although a military "retire- brief period constitutes an abuse of discreit" pension is a community asset (In re tion. We therefore reverse that portion of
rriage of Fithian (1974) 10 Cal.3d 592, the trial court's order, remanding the mat, 111 Cal.Rptr. 369, 517 P.2d 449), hus- ter for further proceedings in light of this
d claims that his entire "disability" pen- opinion.
i is his separate property under our deciI in In re Marriage of Jones, supra, 13
1. The trial court correctly apportioned
.3d 457, 119 Cal.Rptr. 108, 531 P.2d 420.
husbandfs pension into community
)king beneath the label of a "disability"
and separate assets.
ision, however, the trial court found that
In the instant case the husband joined the
y the excess of the "disability" pension Army in 1944 and married in 1950. In 1953
hts over the alternative "retirement" he suffered a service-related injury leading
ision represented additional compensa- to amputation of his left forearm, for which
te attributable to husband's disability; the Army assigned him an 80 percent dis\ balance of the pension rights acquired ability rating. If the husband had retired
ring the marriage, it ruled, served to immediately, his maximum "disability" pay
>lace ordinary "retirement" pay and thus would have been 75 percent of basic pay,
ist be classed as a community asset.
compared to a maximum "retirement" pay
We agree with the reasoning of the trial of 22V* percent of basic pay. He neverthejrt; to permit the husband, by unilateral less continued his military service until he
tction of a "disability" pension, to "trans- retired in 1970. At that time he faced the
ite community property into his own sep- choice of taking regular "retirement" pay
ate property" (In re Marriage of Fithian, at the rate of 65 percent of his basic pay, or
pra, 10 Cal.3d 592, 602, 111 Cal.Rptr. 369, taking "disability" pay, a stipend equal to
5, 517 P.2d 449, 455), is to negate the 75 percent of basic pay.1 Assuming the
otective philosophy of the community husband desired the higher amount, the
operty law as set out in previous decisions Army began making "disability" payments
this court. We therefore affirm the to him.
dgment of the trial court apportioning
isband's pension rights between separate
[1] The husband commenced proceedid community assets and dividing the ings for dissolution of the marriage in 1974.
immunity interest equally between the The trial court first determined that all
>ouses.
pension rights attributable to the husband's
Turning to wife's cross-appeal, we ex- military service before marriage, plus the
ain that the trial court's order limiting its portion of those rights earned during marriage attributable to the husband's disabiliirisdiction o v e r spousal s u p p o r t t o 24
ty, constituted his separate property. It
lonths conflicts w i t h t h e policy e s t a b l i s h e d
artrude D. Chern, Santa Maria, as amicuriae on behalf of appellant Wife.

We used the labels "disability pay" and
"retirement pay" in In re Marriage of Jones
(1975) 13 Cal.3d 457, 460, 119 Cal.Rptr. 108,
531 P.2d 420. Sections 1201 and 1401 of 10
United States Code, which govern military
retirement benefits, speak only of "retired
pay."

2.

We note that if the husband had retired
years later, in 1974, both his maximum
ability" and his maximum "retirement"
would have been 75 percent of his basic

four
"dispay
pay.
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then ruled that that portion of the pension
rights earned after the marriage equivalent
to an ordinary retirement pension, computed on the basis of longevity of service and
rank at retirement, constituted a community asset.
The court finally divided this asset equally between the spouses.8 The husband appeals from the portion of the judgment
awarding his wife part of his pension as
community property. The wife also appeals
from the judgment below; challenging the
court's apportionment, she claims that only
that portion of the pension attributable to
husband's employment before marriage is
separate property.

v./ui.

;;;;

§ 1401.) Under either formula, he cannot
receive more than 75 percent of his last
monthly basic pay. The amount of retired
pay the serviceman receives under either
option therefore depends largely on his
monthly pay at retirement, a function of
longevity of service and rank; rank itself is
closely related to length of service.

In In re Marriage of Jones, supra, 13
Cal.3d 457, 119 Cal.Rptr. 108, 531 P.2d 420,
and In re Marriage of Ijochr (1975) 13
Cal.3d 465, 119 Cal.Rptr. 113, 531 P.2d 425,
its companion memorandum decision, we
held that a serviceman's right to "disability" pay, acquired before he had earned a
"vested" right to ordinary retirement pay,
We begin our discussion of this issue by was separate property. Subsequently in In
reviewing the procedure by which a dis- re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838,
abled serviceman may compute the amount 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561, we held
of "retired pay" to which he is entitled. He that "vested" and "nonvested" |>ension
may elect, first, to compute his "retired rights should be treated alike. Relying on
pay" on the basis of his rank and disability those decisions, the husband contends that
by multiplying his monthly basic pay by his all military pensions based on disability are
percentage of disability. Alternatively, he now separate property.4 Closer examinacan compute his "retired pay" on the basis tion, however, reveals that the reasoning of
of rank and longevity of service by multi- Jones and Brown supports the division of
plying his monthly basic pay by 2xfa percent the husband's pension which the present
times his years of service. (10 U.S.C. trial court ordered.
3.

The trial court held that "(t]he ratio of that
portion of the marriage from the commencement thereof up until the time of the petitioner's (husband's) retirement from military service, as compared with the entire total service
of twenty-five years, eight months and ten days
with which petitioner was credited, is seventyseven percent (77%). The Court therefore
finds that had the petitioner retired on longevity retirement pay, the respondent [wife] would
be entitled to 38.5% of such pay, as a division
of community property, such percentage representing fifty percent (50%) of the amount of
such retirement accumulated during coverture
. . . . Ill] The Court further finds that . .
the difference in pay between what the Petitioner would have received had he retired on
straight retirement for years, and the disability
pay which he is actually receiving, is the sole
and separate property of the husband, while
said lesser sum Is community property, as accumulated during coverture. .
[II] Pursuant thereto, the Court finds that 65/75ths
(86.66%) of the disability retirement pay being
received by the Petitioner would be community
property to the extent the same was accrued
during coverture, and that 7 7 % thereof was so
accrued during coverture, hence, 66.73% of

said disability retirement pay is community
property and one-half thereof (33.36%, rounded off to 33'/3% for convenience by stipulation)
is respondent's share. (86.66% X 77% -> 2 33»/ 3 %)."
4.

The wife on her part acknowledges that the
trial court arrived at an equitable apportionment of the pension between separate and
community interests. She argues, however,
that the duty of making such apportionment
imposes so great a burden on the courts that
we should instead adopt a clear and simple rule
that all "disability" payments, the right to
which was earned during coverture, are community property. Rejecting this rigid rule and
the contention that any other disposition of the
issue causes complications, we point out that
the method of apportionment adopted by the
trial court, which we endorse, does not involve
any delicate balancing of equities, but a simple
mathematical computation based on the relationship of the "disability" pension to an alternative "retirement" pension. It does not impose a burden so heavy that for reasons of
expediency we must settle for the less equitable, all-or-nothing rule wife proposes.
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Jones, we held that when a spouse is
sd to receive a pension only because
jisabled, and has no right to a pension
se of longevity of service, the disabilinefit payments are his separate propjpon dissolution of the marriage. At
ime Jones was decided, however, we
ed the community interest in a non1 retirement pension a mere expectan,nd not a property interest.
(See
:h v. French (1941) 17 Cal.2d 775, 112
235.) Since Jones retired before his
to a "retirement" pension vested, his
tance of "disability" pay did not af/ect
present community asset, but merely
nted an expectancy from coming into
on. Recognizing, however, that the
iples in Jones might not govern a case
hich the serviceman had acquired a
d right to retired pay wholly apart
his disability, we expressly limited our
ion to cases involving nonvested pene year following our decision in Jones
verturned past precedent and held in
? Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d
126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561, that
on rights, whether or not vested, conLed a property interest; that to the
it that such rights derive from employ, during coverture, they now comprise
nunity assets. This holding unders the fundamental premise of Jones:
the award of a serviceman's "disabili>ension to the serviceman as his sepaproperty would not impair any commuinterest of his spouse. Under current
-in contrast to the law prevailing when
s was decided—both the nonvested
ement pension in Jones and the bus's vested right to a "retirement" penin the present case constitute valuable
/hile In In re Marriage of Brown, supra, 15
3d 838, 851, footnote 14. 126 Cal.Rptr. 633,
1 P.2d 561, we disapproved dicta in Waite
I Marriage of Peterson to the effect that
wested pension rights were not community
iperty, we did not disapprove the holding in
se cases that one spouse could not by eleci destroy the community interest of the othspouse.

community assets deserving of judicial protection.

property." (70 Cal.App.3d at pp. 71-72, 137
Cal.Rptr. at p. 132.) 7

Our reasoning in Brown is particularly
appropriate to the present case. As we
stated there, "over the past decades, pension benefits have become an increasingly
significant part of the consideration earned
by the employee for his services. As the
date of vesting and retirement approaches,
the value of the pension right grows until it
often represents the most important asset
of the marital community. .
A division of community property which awards
one spouse the entire value of this asset,
without any offsetting award to the other
spouse, does not represent that equal division of community property contemplated
by [the Family Law Act]." (In re Marriage
of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 847, 126
Cal.Rptr. 633, 638, 544 P.2d 561, 566.)

In the second place, "only a portion of
husband's pension benefit payments, though
termed 'disability payments,' is properly allocable to disability. It would be unjust to
deprive wife of a valuable property right
simply because a misleading label has been
affixed to husband's pension fund benefits."
(In re Marriage of Cavnar (1976) 62 Cal.
App.3d 660, 665, 133 Cal.Rptr. 267, 270; see
Pattiz, In a Divorce or Dissolution Who
Gets the Pension Rights: Domestic Relations Law and Retirement Plans (1978) 5
Peppcrdine L.Rev. 191, 198 and cases there
cited.) 8

[2J We cannot permit the serviceman's
election of a "disability" pension to defeat
the community interest in his right to a
pension based on longevity. In the first
place, such a result would violate the settled principle that one spouse cannot, by
invoking a condition wholly within his control, defeat the community interest of the
other spouse. (See Waite v. Waite (1972) 6
Cal.3d 461, 472, 99 Cal.Rptr. 325, 492 P.2d
13; In re Marriage of Peterson (1974) 41
Cal.App.3d 642, 650 651, 115 Cal.Rptr.
184.) 5 As the court explained in In re
Marriage of Mueller (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d
66, 137 Cal.Rptr. 129, a case indistinguishable from the present appeal, the employee
spouse retains the right to determine the
nature of the benefits to be received.' It
would be inconsistent with community
property principles "to permit that spouse
to transmute what would otherwise be community property into his or her separate
6.

Recognition of the nonemployee spouse's interest in the "disability" pension would not
limit the employee's freedom "to elect between
alternative retirement programs." (In re Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 849, 126
Cal.Rptr. 633, 640. 544 P.2d 561, 568.) Any
serviceman eligible to receive "disability" payments higher than ordinary retirement benefits
would remain free to elect the higher payments
if he so chose.

The purpose of disability benefits, as we
explained in Jones, is primarily to compensate the disabled veteran for "the loss of
earnings resulting from his compelled premature military retirement and from diminished ability to compete in the civilian job
market" (13 Cal.3d at p. 459, 119 Cal.Rptr.
at p. 109, 531 P.2d at p. 421) and secondarily
to compensate him for the personal suffering caused by the disability.
Military
retired pay based on disability, however,
does not serve those purposes exclusively.
Because it replaces a "retirement" pension,
and is computed in part on the basis of
longevity of service and rank at retirement,
it also serves the objective of providing
support for the serviceman and his spouse
after he leaves the service. Moreover, as
the veteran approaches normal retirement
age, this latter purpose may become the
predominate function served by the "disability" pension.
7.

We note that the courts of Texas have held
that if a serviceman surrenders a vested right
to retirement benefits in order to obtain "disability" benefits, the "disability" benefits are
community property. (See Busby v. Busby
(Tex. 1970) 457 S.W.2d 551; Dominev v. Dominey (Tex.Civ.App.1972) 481 S.W.2d~473, cert,
den., 409 U.S. 1028, 93 S.Ct. 462, 34 L.Ed.2d
321.)

8.

As we have affirmed many times, adjustments in the amount of alimony awarded will
not mitigate the hardship caused the wife by
the denial of her community interest in the
pension payments. Alimony lies within the
discretion of the trial court and may be modi-
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The present case illustrates the point.
The husband here did not retire prematurely from military service to face the prospect
of competing on the civilian labor market
handicapped by his disability; he served for
26 years, retiring only after he had acquired
a vested right to a "retirement" pension.
He did not begin to receive his disability
pension until 17 years after the injury. The
value of his present "disability" pension depends largely on the high military rank he
had achieved at the time of retirement and
his extensive military service; it docs not
relate to his rank or longevity at the time
of injury. Under these circumstances, the
pension's function of compensating the husband for loss of earning capacity or providing recompense for personal suffering is
secondary to the primary objective of providing retirement support.
The Court of Appeal in In re Marriage of
Mueller, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 66, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 129, explained the method of allocating a disability pension between the separate interest of the disabled spouse and the
community interest in the retirement benefits. It stated that "where the employee
spouse elects to receive disability benefits in
lieu of a matured right to retirement benefits, only the net amount thus received over
and above what would have been received
as retirement benefits constitutes compensation for personal anguish and loss of earning capacity and is, thus, the employee
spouse's separate property. The amount
received in lieu of matured retirement benefits remains community property subject
to division on dissolution." (70 Cal.App.3d
at p. 71, 137 Cal.Rptr. at p. 132.)'
fied with changing circumstances: "the spouse
'should not be dependent on the discretion of
the court
. . t o provide her with the
equivalent of what should be hers as a matter
of absolute right.' " (In re Marriage of Brown,
supra, 15 Cal.3d 838. 848, 126 Cal.Rptr 633
639. 544 P.2d 561, 567.)
9.

Although the quoted language from In re
Marriage of Mueller speaks of "matured"
retirement benefits, the court earlier in its opin
ion made clear that matured benefits could not
be distinguished from immature but vested
benefits. Indeed in light of In re Marriage of
Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838. 126 Cal.Rptr 633.
544 P.2d 561, no distinction can be drawn be

Cal.

582 FACinc KuruKTUK, za

SJUKIKS

amount of $1 per month, but contends that
the 24-month limitation is an abuse of discretion.
Since the court's continuing jurisdiction is
not expressly limited to the 24-month period, the order is not entirely clear on its
face. The award of $1 per month alimony,
however, serves to clarify the meaning of
the order. That award plainly is not intended as genuine support for the wife, but
to serve as a legal fiction demonstrating the
continuing jurisdiction of the court over
spousal support. By limiting the $1 per
month payments to a period of 24 months,
the court impliedly indicated that it did not
intend to extend its jurisdiction to modify
the award of spousal support beyond the
24-month period.
The trial court abused its discretion
So interpreted, the trial court's award is
by limiting its jurisdiction to modify inconsistent with our recent decision in In
spousal support to a period of 24 re Marriage of Morrison, supra, 20 Cal.3d
months.
437, 143 Cal.Rptr. 139, 573 P.2d 41. We
e trial court ordered husband to pay to stated in Morrison that "A trial court
"as and for her spousal support, the should not terminate jurisdiction to extend
of $1.00 per month, payable for a peri- a future support order after a lengthy mar\ twenty-four (24) months, commencing riage, unless the record clearly indicates
:h 1, 1974, subject to the continuing that the supported spouse will be able to
diction of the Court to alter, modify, or adequately meet his or her financial needs
mate the same upon good cause first at the time selected for termination of jur% shown." Wife does not challenge the isdiction. In making its decision concerning

» trial court in the present case cor' followed this formula. It first classias separate property that portion of
tusband's pension attributable to emlent before marriage. Turning to the
ce of the pension, it assigned as sepaproperty only the excess of the huss pension over the "retirement" penthat he would have received if not
led; the remainder of the pension it
ed as community property.11 Finding
portion of the trial court's decision in
d with the principles stated in In re
iage of Mueller, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d
37 Cal.Rptr. 129, and adopted in this
on, we affirm its division of the mariroperty.11

;en matured benefits and nonvested bene-

Contrary to the view advanced In the dlsitlng opinion, allocation of the "disability"
lslon between separate and community Inests does not discriminate against the dised. In attempting to demonstrate such dismination, the dissent first describes a
ilthy worker who takes some action, such as
mlnating his employment before his pension
;ts or working beyond his retirement date,
ich has the effect of forfeiting all or part of
pension rights. In such a case, of course,
» worker's spouse has no claim to any of the
felted rights; a community share of nothing
aals nothing. (See Reppy, Community and
parate Interests in Pension and Social SecurBenefits After Marriage of Brown and ERI[ (1978) 25 U C L A . L.Rev. 417, 426, fn. 31.)
e dissent then compares such a healthy
>rker to a disabled worker who retires and
:eives a "disability" pension, part of which
der the present decision will be classified as
mmunity property. Because the spouse of
; disabled worker can claim a share in his

pension, the dissent concludes that the decision
discriminates against the disabled.
The conclusion of the dissent, however, derives from the dissent's inappropriate comparison. If instead of comparing a healthy worker
who has forfeited pension rights with a disabled worker receiving a pension, we compare
healthy and disabled workers who are both
receiving pensions, we discover that under the
allocation formula set forth In this opinion the
disabled worker usually will retain a higher
percentage of the benefits. In the present case,
for example, the husband's pension by virtue of
his disability is higher than the "retirement"
pension of a healthy serviceman of equivalent
rank and longevity. Because we allocate to
husband the whole of the excess of his "disability" pensions over a "retirement" pension, he
receives greater pension benefits than does the
undisabled veteran.
II. Language in In re Marriage of Jones, supra,
13 Cal.3d 457, 119 Cal.Rptr. 108, 531 P.2d 420,
and In re Marriage of Loehr, supra, 13 Cal.3d
465, 119 Cal.Rptr. 113, 531 P.2d 425, inconsistent with this opinion, is disapproved.
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the retention of jurisdiction, the court must
rely only on the evidence in the record and
the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom. It must not engage in speculation. If the record does not contain evidence of the supported spouse's ability to
meet his or her future needs, the court
should not 'burn its bridges' and fail to
retain jurisdiction." (20 Cal.3d at p. 453,
143 Cal.Rptr. at p. 150, 573 P.2d at p. 52.)
In the present case, the parties had been
married for 25 years. Following retirement
from the military, husband has not been
employed. Wife attempted to start work as
a part-time real estate salesperson, but as
of trial she earned only about $100 a month.
As is so often the case, the combined income of the parties is insufficient to meet
the anticipated expenses of separate living.12
[3] If the husband's military pension is
divided as ordered by the trial court, husband and wife will have approximately
equal monthly incomes; thus the award of
only $1 per month in spousal support is not
an abuse of discretion. Any attempt to
predict conditions of two, five, or ten years
hence, however, is a matter of total speculation. Husband may remain unemployed
and totally dependent on his military pension; on the other hand his demonstrated
talents may yield a well paying job. Wife
may or may not succeed as a real estate
salesperson.
f4] Both In re Marriage of Morrison and
the Court of Appeal cases cited with approval in Morrison stress that decisions to
terminate continuing jurisdiction cannot be
based on speculation concerning future
earnings and employment. Such decisions
12. The record on appeal does not include a
reporter's transcript of the brief testimony
heard by the trial court. The arguments of the
parties suggest that none of this testimony bore
on the question of the wife's ability to attain
economic self-sufficiency within a period of
two years following the decree.
13. Upon such reconsideration, the trial court
may wish to reserve jurisdiction to award
spousal support to the husband as well as to
the wife If the economic prospects of the parties so warrant.

should instead be deferred until the realized
facts demonstrate whether further support
is warranted. As the Court of Appeal explained in In re Marriage of Smith (1978) 79
Cal.App.3d 725, 738-739, 145 Cal.Rptr. 205,
210: "by making an order terminating all
spousal support
. . without reserving jurisdiction to extend the period, the
court put it out of its power to provide any
support whatever for wife after that time
even if, after maximum effort on her part,
she is unable to support herself in a reasonable fashion. There is no justification for
the court so 'burning its bridges.'" (See
also In re Marriage of Andrccn (1978) 76
Cal.App.3d 667, 673, 143 Cal.Rptr. 94.)
[5] We conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion in divesting itself of
jurisdiction to award spousal support 24
months after the date of the decree. Four
years having passed since the trial court
rendered its judgment, that court should
now reconsider the issue of spousal support
in light of the current income and earning
potential of the parties, and frame its
award in conformity with the principles
outlined in this opinion and elucidated fully
in In re Marriage of Morrison, supra, 20
Cal.3d 437,18 143 Cal.Rptr. 139, 573 l\2d 41.
3. Summary.
[6] We conclude that military retired
pay based on disability contains two components: (a) compensation to the serviceman
for loss of earning power and personal suffering, and (b) retirement support. The
latter component, to the extent that it is
attributable to employment during marriage, is community property.14 The trial
court correctly followed this analysis in ap14. Following the policy of In re Marriage of
Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 851, 126 Cal.Rptr.
633, 641, 544 P.2d 561. 569, our holding re
specting the division of military "disability"
pensions applies retroactively only to cases "in
which the property rights arising from the marriage have not yet been adjudicated, to such
rights if such adjudication is still subject to
appellate review, or if in such adjudication the
trial court has expressly reserved jurisdiction
to divide pension rights."

Cal.

582 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES

ning the husband's pension rights in
istant case. That court erred, howin limiting its jurisdiction to award
al support to the brief period of two
; it should have retained jurisdiction
ler to be able to evaluate the parties'
and capacities in light of future
s.
j portion of the judgment limiting the
s jurisdiction to award spousal sups reversed and the cause remanded for
er proceedings consistent with the
expressed herein. In all other rei the judgment is affirmed. Marilyn
|uist shall recover her costs on this
il.
*D, C. J., and MOSK, RICHARDSON,
UEL and JEFFERSON (Assigned by
Chairperson of the Judicial Council),
oncur.
ARK, Justice, dissenting,
issent.
tirement pensions earned during marconstitute community property, and
ility pensions—no matter when the
ility occurs—constitute separate propUnder federal law, a veteran who has
fied for both may receive only one.
;r the separate property interest or the
nunity property interest must be sacri, and the question before us is whether
dissolution a portion of the disability
ion—equal to the amount of retirement
ion earned during marriage—shall be
to be community property. On the
of well-settled principles, authorities
reason set forth in In re Marriage of
s (1975) 13 Cal.3d 457, 119 Cal.Rptr.
531 P.2d 420, it must be concluded the
>led person upon dissolution is entitled
e future disability pension payments as
rate property, with spousal support
able to meet the needs of the nondisaformer spouse in appropriate cases,
i reach the result that part of the disty pension is community, the majority
>prove our recent unanimous decision in
's (by the author of today's opinion),
implying that Jones was based on the
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overruled doctrine of French v. French
(1941) 17 Cal.2d 775, 112 P.2d 235, which
held that nonvested retirement pensions are
mere expectancies. (Ante, p. 13 of 148 Cal.
Rptr., p. 100 of 582 P.2d.) The implication
is false; Jones did not rely upon the
doctrine of French.
Moreover, by repudiating Jo/ies, the majority establish an
invidious discrimination between disabled
employees and healthy ones who terminate
employment, a discrimination betraying a
shocking lack of compassion for the handicapped.
FACTS
Husband entered the Army in 1944 and
married in 1950. In 1953 he was injured by
shell fragments, suffering amputation of
his left forearm. Rather than exercising
his right to disability compensation, he
chose to remain on active duty.
When husband retired in 1970 at the age
of 43, he possessed the options of regular
retirement pay based on longevity of service equal to 65 percent of his basic pay, or
disability compensation equal to 75 percent
of his basic pay. Disability compensation is
not subject to federal or state taxes. The
Army assumed husband desired the higher
amount and began making disability payments to him.
Husband commenced dissolution of the
marriage in 1974. The trial court held the
difference between future disability compensation and regular retirement benefits
constitutes husband's separate property. A
portion of the pension was attributed to
husband's employment prior to marriage
and was also held to be his separate property. The balance was attributed to employment during marriage and was held to be
community property. The court awarded
the wife half of all community assets, determined $38,000 was her separate property,
granted child support and one dollar per
month spousal support for two years.
RETIREMENT PENSIONS
Recognizing that retirement benefits are
not gratuities but represent deferred compensation for past service, this court has

held that anticipated future retirement
payments attributable to employment during marriage constitute a community asset
divisible upon dissolution. (In re Marriage
of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838, 841 et seq.,
126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561; In re Marriage of Jones, supra, 13 Cal.3d 457, 461, 119
Cal.Rptr. 108, 531 P.2d 420; Waite v. Waite
(1972) 6 Cal.3d 461, 471, 99 Cal.Rptr. 325,
492 P.2d 13; PhiUipson v. Board of Administration (1970) 3 Cal.3d 32, 89 Cal.Rptr. 61,
473 P.2d 765.) On this basis, future military retirement benefits have been held divisible as community property. (In re Marriage of Fithian (1974) 10 Cal.3d 592, 604,
111 Cal.Rptr. 369, 517 P.2d 449.) The
retirement pension is divisible whether
vested or nonvested. (In re Marriage of
Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 843 850, 126
Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561.) While nonvested pension rights may in theory be divided by determining the present value of
the rights, their evaluation must take into
account the possibility that death or termination of employment may destroy them
before maturity. The uncertainties warrant refusal to divide present value and
instead awarding a portion of each pension
payment as it comes due. (Id. at p. 848, 126
Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561.)
Limitations on the applicability of community property principles to retirement
pensions have also been established. Judicial recognition of the nonemployee spouse's
interest in pension rights does not limit the
employee's freedom to change or terminate
his employment, to modify employment
terms, including retirement benefits or "to
elect between alternative retirement programs. 12
The employee retains
"&In PhiUipson v. Board of Administration,
supra, 3 Cal.3d 32, 89 Cal.Rptr. 61, 473 P.2d 765,
the employee had absconded with most of the
community assets; the trial court to equalize the
division of community property awarded the
spouse all of the employee's pension rights. Under those special circumstances we held that
since the employee no longer enjoyed a beneficial interest in the rights, the divorce court could
control the employee's election between alternative benefit programs. (3 Cal.3d at p. 48, 89
Cal.Rptr. 61, 473 P.2d 765.)
the right to decide, and by his decision
define, the nature of the retirement bene-

fits owned by the community." (In re Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 849850, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 640, 544 P.2d 561,
568.) Unlike other community property interests, the nonemployee spouse's interests
may not be devised or inherited. (Waite v.
Waite, supra, 6 Cal.3d 461, 472 474, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 325, 492 P.2d 13.) And a provision in
the employee benefit plan granting benefits
to an employee's "widow" will be enforced
to exclude benefits to a spouse married
during the employment period where the
marriage was dissolved and the employee
remarried. (Id. at p. 472, fn. 6, 99 Cal.Rptr.
325, 492 P.2d 13; PhiUipson v. Board of
Administration, supra, 3 Cal.3d 32, 42-43,
89 Cal.Rptr. 61, 473 P.2d 765; Benson v.
City of Los Angeles (1963) 60 Cal.2d 355,
360-362, 33 Cal.Rptr. 257, 384 P.2d 649; In
re Marriage of Peterson (1974) 41 Cal.
App.3d 642, 650, 115 Cal.Rptr. 184.)
These limitations on the applicability of
community property doctrine reflect that
pension programs not only compensate for
past services but are also designed to induce
persons to continue in the service of their
employer by providing subsistence for employees and their dependents. (Waite v.
Waite, supra, 6 Cal.3d 461, 472 473, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 325, 492 P.2d 13.) When the various
goals conflict, community interests will be
sacrificed when necessary to protect the
private interests of employers and employees.
DISABILITY COMPENSATION
Unlike retirement |>ensions, veteran's disability benefits do not constitute deferred
compensation for past services. While longevity of service may be a factor in determining the underlying right to disability
compensation and its amount, benefits depend primarily upon physical or mental disability, compensating for loss of earning
capacity in the open labor market. Earnings following dissolution are of course separate property. The secondary pur|x>se of
disability benefits is to com|>ensate for pain,
suffering, disfigurement and resulting misfortune—all personal rather than community concerns. (//) re Marriage of Jones, su-
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ra, 13 Cal.3d 457, 462, 119 Cal.Rptr. 108,
31 P.2d 420; 7 Witkin, Summary of Cal.
,aw (8th ed. 1974) Community Property,
1, p. 5094.)
Because the main bases for disability
ompensation are loss of earning capacity
md personal damage rather than past servces performed, disability compensation is
malogous to a personal injury award rather
han to a retirement benefit. In Washngton v. Washington (1956) 47 Cal.2d 249,
(02 P.2d 569, we held that while personal
njury awards recovered during marriage
night be classified as community property,
i cause of action for such injury becomes
:he injured spouse's separate property when
:he cause has not been reduced to judgment
jrior to the date of divorce. Justice Traylor reasoned that in "such a case not only
Tiay the personal elements of damages such
is past pain and suffering be reasonably
treated as belonging to the injured party,
but the damages for future pain and suffering, future expenses, and future loss of
Earnings are clearly attributable to him as a
jingle person following the divorce. Moreover, as in any other case involving future
earnings or other after-acquired property,
the wife's right, if any, to future support
may be protected by an award of alimony."
(47 Cal.2d 249, 253-254, 302 P.2d 569, 571.)

WAIVER OF RETIREMENT PENSION
The veteran in Jones did not possess a
vested right to a retirement pension and we
expressly left open the question whether a
disability pension, granted after the serviceman obtains a vested right, constitutes separate property. Nevertheless, the reasoning of Jones requires our conclusion that
disability payments are separate property
whether or not the veteran's right to a
retirement pension has vested.
Jones was decided when the rule existed
that nonvested pension rights do not constitute community property divisible on divorce. (French v. French, supra, 17 Cal .2d
775, 778, 112 P.2d 235.) We later overruled
French and held that nonvested pension
rights are divisible upon dissolution. (In re
Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838,
851, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561.) Rejecting the argument that division of nonvested retirement pensions would infringe
upon the employee's freedom to contract,
we pointed out that recognition of the nonemployee spouse's interest in vested pension
rights does not limit the employee's right to
change or terminate employment, to modify
employment terms including retirement
benefits, or to elect between alternative
retirement programs. (Id. at p. 849, 126
Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 661.)

For the foregoing reasons, we concluded
in In re Marriage of Jones, supra, 13 Cal.3d
457, 464, 119 Cal.Rptr. 108, 113, 531 P.2d
420, 425, that "military disability payments
received after dissolution of a marriage
should . . .
be classified as the separate property of the disabled veteran."
(See In re Marriage of Olhausen (1975) 48
Cal.App.3d 190, 192 et seq., 121 Cal.Rptr.
444 (police officer disability).)1

Because our decision in Brown determined that vested and nonvested retirement pensions shall be treated alike, no
reason exists to distinguish our holding in
Jones that disability compensation following dissolution is separate property when a
disabled employee possesses nonvested
retirement rights. Disability compensation
is obviously a legitimate separate property
interest, whether the retirement pension is
vested or not. And when, as here, direct
conflict exists between that interest and the
community interest in the retirement pension, one must bow. Resolution of the conflict is provided by Washington v. Washington, supra, 47 Cal.2d 249, 253-254, 302
P.2d 569, holding disability compensation

1. The majority's formula Implicitly accepts the
conclusion that disability benefits are separate
property. Under the formula, had there been

no retirement benefits, the former spouse of
the disabled employee would not be entitled to
any of the disability pension.

The Legislature subsequently extended
the Washington principle to all personal
injury damages and settlement payments
received after interlocutory decree of dissolution. (Civ. Code, § 5126.)

separate property but fashioning spousal
support to meet the needs of the nondisabled spouse.2
Such holding does not result in a deprivation of the spouse's justifiable reliance on a
retirement pension. Any such reliance
must take into account our holding in In re
Marriage of Jones, supra, 13 Cal.3d 457, 464,
119 Cal.Rptr. 108, 531 P.2d 420, that military disability payments received after dissolution of a marriage are separate property of the disabled veteran if retirement due
to disability occurs prior to vesting of a
retirement pension. Thus, the spouse is on
notice during the entire period when the
retirement pension is assertedly earned that
should the employee obtain dissolution and
retire for disability, the disability payments
will be separate.
THE MAJORITY OPINION
A.

The Excuse to Reconsider In re Marriage of Jones, supra, 13 Cal.3d 457, 119
Cal.Rptr. 108, 531 P.2d 420.

The majority indicate that Jones was
somehow based on the doctrine of French v.
French, supra, 17 Cal.2d 775, 112 P.2d 235,
that nonvested pension rights were mere
expectancies and thus not subject to division upon divorce as community property.
(Ante, p. 13 of 148 Cal.Rptr., p. 100 of 582
P.2d.) The majority then reason that because French was overruled in In re Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 851,
126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561, we should
now repudiate Jones.
The majority's indication that Jones was
based on the expectancy doctrine is false.
As shown above, the basis on Jones was
that disability pensions are primarily compensation for loss of earning capacity and
for pain, suffering, disfigurement, and resulting misfortune—all separate rather
than community concerns after dissolution.
Jones does not cite French or mention the
expectancy doctrine. And there was a very
2.

Such an approach was followed by the trial
court in Waite v. Waite, supra, 6 Cal.3d 461,
466, 99 Cal.Rptr. 325, 492 P.2d 13, in dividing
the retired judge's pension and providing for $i
a month support. The court ordered that, in

good reason why it was not mentioned—\
justices were fully aware of the Iikclih<
that French and the expectancy doctr
would be repudiated. I^ess than a y<
earlier, this court in In re Marriage of \
son (1974) 10 Cal.3d 851, 853, 112 Cal.Rj
405, 406, 519 P.2d 165, 166, stated in
second and third sentences of the opini
"We granted a hearing upon the petition
respondent wife, supported by an impl
invitation from the Court of Appeal,
ascertain the current viability of the rule
French v. French (1941) 17 Cal.2d 775, 1
112 P.2d 235, [134 A.L.R. 366], that pens
benefits which have not yet vested an
mere expectancy and not subject to divis
as community property. [H] Upon furti
examination of the record it appears t
issue is not properly before us
All of the justices who participated
Jones had participated in Wilson, and
participated less than a year after Jo
when in Brown, French was disapprov
The right hand knew what the left lu
was doing. In the circumstances, while
pectancy doctrine could have furnisher
basis to reach the result in Jones, any
liance upon exj>ectancy doctrine of Frci
in Jones would have been improper. Jo
not even mentioning French or the ex pi
ancy doctrine, it is unreasonable to sugg
that Jones was somehow based on Frci
or the doctrine.
The excuse furnished by the majority
repudiating our recent unanimous decis
in Jones displays a remarkable lack of c
dor.
B.

Results of Repudiation of Jones.

However contrived the excuse given
reconsidering a recent unanimous decisi
however weak the reasons given for repi
ating the decision, in the last analysis
results following from the new rule adop
must be weighed on their own mer
When we weigh the majority's determi
tion to repudiate Jones, we find that tl
the event the retired judge accepted a trm
rary judicial assignment thereby suspend
pension payments, the support should be
creased to an amount equal to the fori
spouse's share of the pension.
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tablished an invidious discrimination
n disabled employees and healthy
ees who terminate employment
here is a dissolution.
pproving Jones, the majority purport
r upon In re Marriage of Brown,
15 Cal.3d 838, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544
>1. Both Jones and Brown dealt with
ees who had non vested retirement
I rights. Brown was concerned with
ees generally without focusing on
vho were disabled. Brown held that
ited retirement pensions would be
mity property like vested ones,
rer, recognizing that nonvested penghts might be destroyed by death or
lation of employment before vesting,
>urt held that the uncertainties warefusal to divide present value of the
n and instead awarding a portion of
>ension payment as it comes due. (In
rriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838,
26 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561.) This
carefully pointed out that judicial recan of the nonemployee spouse's interpension rights does not "limit" the
yee's freedom to change or terminate
yment. "The employee retains the
to decide, and by his decision, the
* of the retirement benefits owned by
>mmunity." (Id. at pp. 849-850, 126
rtr. at p. 640, 544 P.2d at p. 568.)
mort under Brown when the healthy
yee having only nonvested retirement
terminates his employment—perhaps
lore lucrative employment—the non\ pension rights are lost with the eme owing no obligation to compensate a
»r spouse for the loss of the nonvested
m rights. Under Jones, a comparable
was reached—the disabled employee
g nonvested retirement rights who
nated employment and received a disy pension was not required to compenLhe former spouse for loss of the nond pension rights.
disapproving Jones, the majority sinjt the handicapped and compel them to
le majority in footnote 10 suggest that the
per comparison is between healthy employwho receive pension payments and the dis»d The comparison is not in point because

compensate former spouses for loss of nonvested pension rights due to termination of
employment. The disabled are placed in a
worse position than the healthy who terminate employment. Former spouses of the
disabled are given benefits when former
spouses of the healthy are denied similar
benefits.
The disabled are also placed in a worse
position than the healthy employee who
continues his employment. There is no liability to former spouses because there are
no retirement benefits. The employee may
continue to work until he dies in which
event there may never be retirement pension payments. On the other hand, the
employee who retires for disability under
today's majority decision immediately must
pay part of the disability pension to the
former spouse. The former spouse of the
disabled employee is entitled to benefits
upon payment of the disability pension,
when had the employee remained healthy
the former spouse might not have been
entitled to any benefits and at most could
only receive delayed benefits.3
Both federal and state law prohibit discrimination against the handicapped in employment. (See, e. g., 29 U.S.C. § 793; Lab.
Code, §§ 1430, 1735.) Today, the majority
not only permit but require discrimination
against the disabled who are compensated
for their liability to compete in the labor
market—discrimination essentially against
the unemployed handicapped. I cannot join
in the majority's discrimination; I cannot
share their lack of compassion.
Primarily, there are three situations
where there is a clear difference in the
practical effects of the majority's determination to give the former spouse an interest
in the disability pension and my approach to
hold that the pension is separate property
with spousal support available to meet the
needs of the formal spouse. The three situations involve justification to deny or severely limit spousal support. The disability
pension and other economic resources availno payments are made under nonvested pensions
The pension must be vested before
there are payments
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able to the disabled employee may be insufficient to meet his needs, warranting denial
of spousal support. The former spouse may
have sufficient economic resources so that
little or no support is required. The former
spouse may remarry terminating spousal
support (Civ. Code, § 4801.)4 In all three
situations the balance of equities falls in
favor of the disabled employee.
C. The Majority's Settled Principle.
Relying upon Waite v. Waite, supra, 6
Cal.3d 461, 472, 99 Cal.Rptr. 325, 492 P.2d
13, and In re Marriage of Peterson, supra,
41 Cal.App3d 642, 650-651, 115 Cal.Rptr.
184, the majority proclaim the "settled principle that one spouse cannot, by invoking a
condition wholly within his control, defeat
the community interest of the other
spouse." (Ante, p. 13 of 148 Cal.Rptr., p.
100 of 582 P.2d.)
However, the cases cited do not stand for
the so-called "settled principle," but hold
only that the possibility the employee may
elect to forego an otherwise vested pension
does not unvest that pension. (Waite and
Peterson were decided prior to this court's
decision in Brown holding that nonvested
pensions are community property subject to
division upon dissolution.)
Moreover, the so-called "settled principle"
is contrary to Brown because, as we have
seen, the employee is free to change or
4.

5.

Death of the obligor ordinarily terminates
spousal support (Civ Code, § 4801), but em
ployee pension payments ordinarily terminate
on death of the employee
As pointed out
earlier, surviving spouse benefits are paid only
to surviving spouses, not former spouses who
may have been married to the employee during
the period of employment

In re Marriage of Cavnar (1976) 62 Cal
App 3d 660, 133 Cal Rptr 267, is distinguishable on its own terms In that case, the husband, after obtaining retirement payments at
the age of 59, converted his retirement benefit
plan to a disability retirement plan, receiving
increased benefits
The court held that the
portion of the disability benefits which could
have been received as retirement benefits was
a community asset The court pointed out that
In re Marriage of Jones, supia, 13 Cal 3d at p
462, 119 Cal Rptr 108, 531 P 2d 420, and 7n re
Marriage of Olhausen, supra, 48 Cal App 3d at
pp 193-194, 121 Cal Rptr. 444, holding disabili-
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terminate employment, modify retirement
terms, or elect between alternative retirement programs. (In re Marriage of Brow n,
supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 849-850, 126 Cal Rptr.
633, 544 P.2d 561.) Dissolution of the marriage does not require an employee to retire
at the earliest possible age; rather he may
forego retirement and continue working in
which case there are no retirement payments to divide and the earnings after dissolution will be the employee's separate
property or community property of any new
marriage.5
I would reverse the judgment.
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William M. BULLIS, as trustee, etc., et
al., Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL
BANK, Defendant and Appellant.
L.A. 30711.
Supreme Court of California.
Aug. 10, 1978.
Heirs of an estate brought suit against
a bank for damages allegedly occasioned
ty pay was separate property were based on
the characterization of disability benefits "as
compensation for personal anguish and dimin
ished earning capacity " The court then went
on to reason that, because the husband had
already retired before electing disability pay,
that pay could not be characterised as tompen
sation for diminished earning capacity or for
inability to compete in the labor market
It
was concluded that only part of the disability
pay could be properly allocated to disability
(62 Cal App 3d at p 665, 133 Cal Rptr 267 at
270)
By way of contrast, in the instant case the
husband commenced receiving disability pav at
the age of 43, he did not receive retirement p a \ ,
and it is clear that his disability pay is compen
sation for the diminished ability of a one armed
man to compete In the labor market
I would disapprove In re Marriage of Mueller
(1977) 70 Cal App 3d 66, 137 Cal Rptr 129

